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Steven Pifer: NATO should talk accession with Ukraine









Steven Pifer 
Affiliate
Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University
United States
spifer@stanford.edu

Two things have become clear since the beginning of 2022.  First, Europe will not be stable and secure unless Ukraine is stable and secure.  Second, even when the current war ends, a Ukraine left on its own will remain a temptation for an aggressive Kremlin.  NATO membership could change that.  While an invitation to join NATO now would be a bridge too far, Alliance leaders should use NATO’s July 2024 summit to launch accession talks with Ukraine.

Russia’s February 2022 assault on Ukraine turned a war that began in 2014 into the largest and bloodiest that Europe has seen since World War II.  Stripping away the Kremlin’s pretense and propaganda, the conflict results primarily from Vladimir Putin’s neo-imperialist desire to regain parts of the former Russian Empire that Moscow lost when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991.  While a tragedy for Ukraine, Putin’s unjustified war has also proven a military and geopolitical disaster for Russia; it could rank among the greatest blunders in modern European history.

NATO members and Ukraine’s other partners should focus on the urgent task:  providing Ukraine the weapons and other assistance it needs to win—either by driving the Russian military out of all its territory, or by achieving such success on the battlefield that a negotiated settlement becomes possible on terms the Ukrainian government and people can accept.  While focusing on the immediate task, NATO also should consider how to ensure a stable and secure Europe once the current war is over.  That will mean avoiding lingering long-term tensions around Ukraine and a possible renewal of fighting if—or when—an aggressive Kremlin might choose.

Doing nothing is not the answer.  A Ukraine by itself and bereft of Western support would all but invite a new Russian attack.  Commitments to provide Kyiv with arms, ammunition, and other support, as the G7 and other countries have offered, in the final analysis, still leave Ukraine alone.  Given Russia’s larger population, larger military, and larger industrial capacity, the Kremlin might well decide to resume hostilities at a future point, assessing that the risks and costs of a new war with just Ukraine would be manageable.

The answer for ensuring long-term security and stability is to bring Ukraine into NATO.  Over the past 30 years, Russia has supported separatists in Moldova and Georgia, fought Georgia, and used its military to seize Crimea and support conflict in Donbas before launching its 2022 invasion.  In those same 30 years, Russia has not attacked a NATO member.

A number of NATO members wanted the Alliance’s June 2023 Vilnius summit to extend an invitation to Ukraine to join, but allies could not reach consensus.  The question could well arise again with the approach of the July 2024 summit in Washington.  NATO members should prepare now so that meeting can announce the launch of accession talks with Kyiv, with a view to extending an invitation for Ukraine to join at an early point in the future.

This approach offers a logical compromise to the differences that emerged in the run-up to Vilnius.  This is not the process for membership that the Alliance has used since 1997.  Typically, an invitation was extended, and the aspirant formally joined NATO once current members had completed their internal legal processes to approve accession.  However, that process is not fixed in law.  NATO and Ukraine could launch accession talks, just as the European Union and Kyiv did last December.  Those talks, conducted in the NATO-Ukraine Council, would identify the steps Kyiv needs to take to secure an invitation and otherwise prepare for membership.

Bringing Ukraine into NATO while it remains at war with Russia poses a steep challenge, because it would immediately raise the question of the application of Article 5 of the NATO treaty (an attack on one is considered an attack on all).  Alliance members have declined to commit their forces to join Ukraine’s current fight against Russia.  While a way might be found to bring Ukraine into NATO even absent peace with Russia, the “how” of doing so and what it would mean for Article 5’s application remain unclear.

On the other hand, the question is much more straight-forward if a Ukraine at peace joins NATO.  In that case, Moscow’s calculation regarding launching a new war would have to weigh the risks and costs of a fight against Ukraine and NATO, with all its conventional and nuclear capabilities.  The onus for initiating a direct clash would rest with the Kremlin.

In any event, beginning accession talks would set a definitive membership path for Ukraine.  It would send strong signals to Kyiv—that NATO countries are serious about Ukraine’s security—and to Moscow—that the Alliance’s commitment to Ukraine will endure.

Ukraine’s partners must ensure Ukraine’s military has the weapons and other support needed to continue the fight.  At the same time, NATO allies should begin preparing the ground so that Alliance leaders and President Zelensky can announce the launch of accession talks in July.