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Kęstutis Kilinskas: Several historical remarks on Russian application of force Ukraine

Kęstutis Kilinskas
Dr., Assistant Professor 
University of Vilnius, Faculty of History
Lithuania

Since 2008  Russian military forces went on the large scale armed forces reform and modernization process, but only part of the new weapons platforms, organisational developments, operational and tactical inovations were tested in occupation of Crimea 2014  and Syria civil war. Unfortunately Russian agression in Ukraine offers us  possibility to observe actions of conventional military forces of Russia in sense of  full spectrum war.

The first days of war and  Russian forces attempts to capture Hostomel airport and attack on Kiev, not only remained Soviet army operations in Hungary 1956 (Budapest), Czechoslvakia 1968 (Prague) and Afghanistan 1978- 1979 (Kabul), but also inspired a question has the reform/modernisation of Russian military forces made affect on application of forces in regime change/regime support operations? Do Russian military science and operational art  trie to learn and integrate new aspects from Western way of warfare?  In order to answer it comparative analysis of Soviet military interventions to support pro communist regimes and to suppress democratic oposition in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Afghanistan and Ukraine and Western military operations to destroy Taliban regime in Afghanistan and change Sadam Hussein regime in Iraq must be made.

The selection cases for comparative analysis were made on several criterea: a) Successfull  regime change operation as „model to follow“, because historically military forces learn from successfull events; b) military operation had to be made in „perceived soviet space“, because Russia understands Ukraine as it‘s own territory or at least as it‘s own geopolitical zone. c)  Western regime change operations were based on effect of revolution in military affairs (RMA), because Russia included some technological aspects of  RMA recently.

Research revealed several strong tendencies how Russia use it‘s forces in all analyzed cases, they are: a) From 6 to 12 months lasting assembly of Russian military forces covered by excersises in all cases before beginning of active military campaign.  b) Efforts to destabilize governmental structures and military forces from inside before military invansion and efforts to legitimaze invasion by „political request for assistance” (Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Afghanistan, Ukraine). C) Balistic missiles attack on strategic military installations prior to invasion (Ukraine);  d) Special and airmobile/airborne forces open (Budapest, Kabul, Kiev) or covered  (Prague) assault on airport within the close distance from  capital and fast attack on govermental institutions, major communication centers, such as radio and TV, political institutions, private property of rulling politicians, ministry of interior and security offices; e) Multidirectional (“multifrontal”) ground forces invasion on main axis of advance in order to block military forces in order to paralyze defence (Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Ukraine and partly in Kabul - limited due to constrains of terrain); f) Reinstalation of former regime supported by soviet/Russian military forces and violence against society to punish it for support to “opposition”.

If we analyze Western military operations: a) assembly of force is much faster and takes up to 3 - 4 months (Afghanistan, Iraq); b) Western forces make huge emphasis on long lasting air forces bombing campaigns guided by special forces (Afghanistan,Iraq) and cyber attacks to create multidimensional crise for defending state (Iraq); c) Special forces and local militia operations (Afghanistan, Iraq) or conventional attack to destroy enemy military forces and capture capital and vital centers of power (Afghanistan, Iraq); d) Efforts to separate political regime from society providing humanitarian assitance for society and wining potential support for new democratic government; e) After the war Western way of warfare transfers power from military to provisonal government in order to establish civil governed democratic rule.

General conclusion would be that Russian way of regime change operations prioritize covert and fast attack on political regime, then legitization of new goverment and attempts to suppres society for support of oposition. While Western way of regime change operations focuses more on defeating it‘s military forces as basis of the regime, trie to separate society from  the political regime and establish democracy in post operational phase.