Viktoriia Hladii
Administrative Officer at Baltic Sea Strategy Point (EU Strategy for the
Baltic Sea Region)
Centrum Balticum Foundation
Finland
viktoriia.hladii@centrumbalticum.org
Ukraine is facing a historical moment, at the crossroads of tragedy and hope. On one hand, the country is dealing with the brutal and unjustified war of destruction and submission brought on by Russia – an outright attempt, albeit unsuccessful, at erasing the Ukrainian nation and identity. On the other hand, the silver lining comes with the prospects of the long-awaited and much-desired European integration and EU accession – something that was previously denied and was considered unrealistic even as recent as 3-4 years ago.
The Russian aggression in Ukraine turned out to be a decisive factor in shutting out EU’s hesitation and the “enlargement fatigue” narrative – the EU Member States have come to the realisation that staying within the vague terms of friendly neighbourhood will not suffice in these harsh geopolitically circumstances and that firm choices and decisions are needed. Neither it is a coincidence that such breakthrough determination comes at a time like this – the saying goes that the EU gets stronger and thrives particularly during times of crisis.
The EU candidacy and the eventual membership of Ukraine will still come with their own twists and challenges in the form of numerous reforms, entrance to the single market, and competition. In addition, there are political worries of a power shift towards the East once Ukraine would fully enter the EU family. This is not, however, a new matter to the EU, as every previous enlargement brought forth fierce competition in the economy of the entrant, as well as challenged the Member States’ existing industry through the inflow of cheaper products and services entering the single market without limitations or tariffs. In all cases, these matters have been eventually worked out, and as for decision making, alternative ways, such as the qualified majority, have been introduced. Furthermore, once an EU member state, due to its vast territory and recovery needs, Ukraine would likely become the largest beneficiary of the EU’s cohesion policy funds, considerable amount of the EU budget meant to eliminate the regional disparities. How to ensure that Ukraine, once joining the EU family, will not be a liability, but an asset? Ukraine is yet to fight its battle and prove its worthiness in purely economic terms, but no evidence is needed to realise Ukraine’s potential as a powerful labour resource and a vessel for vast economic growth.
For the moment, though, as the war of aggression is ongoing, a delicate matter remains the external support for Ukraine. Regardless of the will, preparedness, and sacrifices of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, it would be an extremely difficult task for Ukraine to defend its sovereignty without support from the outside. In pseudo-democratic or authoritarian regimes, such as Russia, mobilising financial and human resources is considerably easier, as decisions can be made quickly without relying on multiple actors and opinions. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Russia increased its military spending to 35% of the state’s budget for the year 2024, while further decreasing health and social spending. On top of that, it also receives external support in different forms such as weapons, to continue its aggression. In contrast, Ukraine is fighting for its survival and for the defence of these exact values – democracy, freedom of choice, and the value of human life, which goes against mobilising warfare resources by fully neglecting the society’s needs and wellbeing.
While the Union- or national-level support is the most important, the decisions at this level can experience delays and blockages and are very reliant on politics. Thus, the power of cooperation through more regional formats should not be underestimated – practical support can come uninterrupted from various bilateral and multilateral formats, such as twin-city- or municipality- cooperation or, for example, through the EU macro-regional Strategies. This support does not always come in the form of money, but also in addressing the very practical needs of the population, or the policy-related support – in the form of knowledge exchange and support in preparation of the Ukrainian legislation to come into the conformity with the EU’s.
The sustainable rebuilding of the country is an important opportunity for Ukraine and the EU to converge faster than ever: damaged old buildings can be repaired or rebuilt specifically around energy efficiency; environment-damaging mines can be closed and reoriented towards renewable energy sources; wastewater facilities can be recovered or built anew by the EU standards. Although adjusting the legislation in non-military related sectors represents additional bureaucratic burden while the country is living in a permanent state of emergency, the perspective of EU membership acts as catalyst for effective and quality changes. For the EU, in turn, it is a decisive moment to further strengthen the Union and welcome to the team a strong and powerful ally supporting and defending the common EU values.
The level of support for Ukraine, both financial, political, and practical, is unprecedented compared to any other period of time since its independence. Together with developing further its resilience and defence capabilities, and, in parallel, further implementing the reforms and building capable and corruption-free transparent administration that are adamant for accession into the EU, Ukraine has a strong prospect of breaking free from the Russian coercion, empowered by the continued steady military support, and by the decisive acts to guarantee Ukraine’s complete and conclusive victory.