karttatausta

Mykhailo Gonchar: Ukraine – EU: Integration under conditions of war in Europe

Mykhailo Gonchar
President
Center Strategy XXI

Chief Editor
Black Sea Security Journal
Kyiv, Ukraine
info@geostrategy.org.ua

In 2014, after the Revolution of Dignity and the beginning of Russian aggression against Ukraine, the signing of the Association Agreement with the EU looked like an impressive success on the way to the country's return to Europe. In February 2019, the Parliament of Ukraine made amendments to the Constitution, which fixed the state's strategic course for membership in the EU and NATO.

But hardly anyone could have predicted that in 3 years, in June 2022, the EU will grant the country the status of a candidate for accession, and after another 1.5 years, in December 2023, it will open accession negotiations. In Ukraine, we remember with gratitude the neighboring Slovakia’s government of Eduard Heger, which in 2022 made significant efforts to promote the idea of granting Ukraine the EU candidate status. This dynamic of the EU decision-making regarding Ukraine undoubtedly evokes positive emotions in Ukrainian society. It became even more united in the issue of European and Euro-Atlantic integration after the full-scale armed invasion of the Russian Federation on February 24, 2022.

The latest sociological data of the end of 2023 indicate that 78% of Ukrainians would vote for Ukraine's accession to the EU in the event of a referendum, while only 5% of respondents would be against it. Support for joining the EU has slightly decreased compared to July 2023, when it was 85%. It is obvious that some decrease occurred against the background of the Polish-Ukrainian dispute regarding Ukrainian agricultural products on the EU and Polish markets in particular. Polish fear of competition with Ukraine stimulated similar sentiments in some neighboring countries of Central Europe, in particular, in Hungary and Slovakia. Another blow from the side of the EU member state was the blocking of the important transport corridor Poland – Ukraine by Polish carriers.

These examples showed Ukrainians that the all-powerful European Commission was unable to ensure that the Polish government adheres to policies agreed within the framework of the EU. The weakness of the leading institution of the EU caused disappointment in the Ukrainian society. Skeptical sentiments regarding the capabilities of EU institutions are also strengthened by the activities of Russia's Trojan horse in Europe – Viktor Orban's regime, which opposes Ukraine's membership in the EU and tries in every possible way to develop relations with Russia despite the sanctions policy of the West. The change in Slovakia's political course after last year's elections, when another putinversteher Robert Fico returned to power, did not add optimism to Ukrainians.

Ukraine appreciates the position of the Finnish government in the context of providing rapid military aid to Ukraine, as well as the acceleration of the EU's decision on an aid instrument in the amount of €50 billions. Also, the decisions and steps taken by Finland to abandon the Russian nuclear power plant project and the import of fossil fuels from the Russian Federation do not go unnoticed in Kyiv. This is an important example for other EU member states.

The long-term delay in resolving the issue of transferring the frozen assets of the Russian Central Bank to Ukraine contributes to the decline of the EU's credibility. The European Parliament called for their confiscation and transfer to Ukraine, the European Commission advocated the transfer of profits from their use, and the European Central Bank categorically opposed both options.

Meanwhile, Russian missiles, Iranian-made drones, and shells from North Korea continue to destroy Ukrainian cities and villages. The small "coalition of evil" turns out to be more capable than the large European Union, which failed to provide the promised 1 million artillery shells for Ukraine, while North Korea provided the Russian Federation with almost 1 million shells only in the period from August to October 2023.

“Sustainable Peace Manifesto. Never Again 2.0,” developed a year ago by the civil society of Ukraine clearly states that “the risk of Ukraine’s non-accession in the EU and NATO (maintaining a “gray zone”, which creates a constant temptation for unpunished aggression from the Russian Federation) far exceeds the previously debated enlargement risks". Ukraine is not a problem for the EU, but part of the solution for the future of Europe. A clear focus on Ukraine's victory and its integration into the EU is needed, because the rapid degradation of the EU's geostrategic environment requires an immediate strengthening of Europe's defense. This can best be done in the synergy of efforts with Ukraine to repel the "coalition of evil". The sooner this is realized in Brussels and the capitals of the member states, the cheaper the war in Europe will be for the EU.