Andrii
Ryzhenko
Ukrainian
Navy Captain (retired), Strategic Expert
Defense
consulting company Sonata
Ukraine
The Ukraine has a difficult task of liberating 80 percent of Ukraine’s coast, now controlled by Russia, including the Azov Sea region and Crimean Peninsula. The country also needs to restore navigation from its Black Sea ports blockaded by Russia as well as clear mines and ensure freedom of navigation throughout the Black and Azov seas. It is becoming apparent that, to liberate its coastline and seas, Ukraine will have to rely on its own naval capabilities to conduct sea-denial and sea-control operations in the restricted waters of the northern Black and Azov seas.
At the outset of Russia’s February 2022 invasion, the Ukrainian Navy consisted of four Island-class patrol boats, seven Gyurza-M river gunboats, as well as 18 obsolete Soviet-era ships and boats alongside a dozen support vessels. Such a flotilla presented little deterrence, let alone defense, capabilities and was only able to provide limited port protection. Enjoying 12-fold dominance in forces at sea, Russia quickly captured the entire coastline of the Sea of Azov from Henichesk to Mariupol, blocked Ukraine’s Black Sea ports and seized Snake Island. During the first week of the war, several civilian vessels were destroyed or damaged while navigating to Ukrainian ports. Almost 40 foreign ships remain trapped in Ukraine’s ports—now for almost 24 months. Russian ships have also approached and shelled the Ukrainian coast and ports with naval artillery. The Ukrainian Navy’s only effective operation has been the installation of defensive mine barriers in the territorial seas from Odesa to Ochakiv, preventing an enemy amphibious landing in March 2022.
Only after months of fighting did missiles deliveries to Ukraine begin to change the naval balance of power: The addition of Neptune (officially put into service in August 2020) and Harpoon missiles resulted in the destruction of the Russian flagship cruiser Moskva, the tugboat Vasily Bekh, offshore drilling platforms and the liberation of Snake Island. As a result, the Russian military command withdrew its surface fleet to areas around the Crimean Peninsula.
The rapid development and use of naval drones against Russian surface ships in areas beyond the reach of coastal missile systems have recently proven effective and efficient within the “mosquito fleet” concept and have partially compensated for the lack of strategically needed vessels. Over the past few months, the Ukrainian Armed Forces have relentlessly suppressed Russia’s military presence in the Black Sea and Crimea. Without access to substantial surface warships, Ukrainian forces have instead carried out a series of high-precision missions using air and naval drones as well as cruise missiles to penetrate Russian defenses and strike multiple targets at sea. Although Ukrainian kamikaze drones cause limited damage to most warships, Russian naval forces are gradually losing their combat potential to block Ukrainian grain shipments leaving Odesa and to conduct missile strikes against targets within Ukraine. Since this past summer, a series of Ukrainian attacks on Russian forces in the Black Sea has pressured Moscow to reconsider its strategy at sea.
- On July 13, the Kerch Bridge was attacked. The Security Service of Ukraine reported that a new type of kamikaze naval drone was employed during the operation. The two drones used carried around 1 ton of explosives each. As a result, two sections of the bridge were damaged, and its use was restricted for three months.
- On August 4, a Project 775 Olenegorsk Hornyak landing ship was attacked during a raid on Novorossiysk, 5 kilometers (about 3 miles) from the port’s central infrastructure. The attack was carried out by the same type of kamikaze naval drone used in the attack on the Kerch Bridge. No personnel nor advanced weaponry were visible on the ship, which implies that the Russians felt they were not at risk of an attack at Novorossiysk. The attack itself was catastrophic. With another Russian naval base on the Black Sea compromised, Russian military officials were forces relocate some vessels. The landing ship suffered a large roll to the port side and had to be towed to the port for repair. Full repairs will likely be delayed due to a lack of spare parts on the Russian side.
- On September 13, the Ukrainian Air Force attacked the dry dock of the Sevastopol shipyard with Storm Shadow missiles. The attack resulted in heavy damage to the Project 775 Minsk amphibious ship and the Project 636.3 Rostov-on-Don submarine. Russian mass media reported that 10 cruise missiles were used in the airstrike. It is unlikely that both ships will be fully repaired in the near future.
- On September 22, Ukrainian Special Operations Forces and the Ukrainian Air Force attacked the headquarters of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol with Storm Shadow missiles. Operation “Crab Trap” took place during a meeting of the Black Sea Fleet’s senior leadership. The headquarters was significantly damaged and images of the building on fire spread all over Russian and Ukrainian social media. Shortly before the attack on the Russian fleet’s headquarters, its command post near Verkhnesadove, located 30 kilometers (over 18 miles) outside of Sevastopol, was hit by Ukrainian missiles.
- On November 5, Ukrainian forces seriously damaged the Project 22800 Askold missile corvette with French-supplied SCALP cruise missiles. The ship was moored at the Kerch Shipyard’s Zaliv pier and was being prepared for transfer to the Black Sea Fleet in December. Knocking this vessel offline was a major success, as it can carry eight Kalibr missiles at once and was equipped with the Pantsir-M anti-aircraft system.
- On November 10, Ukrainian naval drones attacked and sunk two Project 11770 Russian landing crafts with armored vehicles and military personnel on board at the Chornomorske Port in western Crimea. These vessels had the capability to deliver armored vehicles and personnel up to 600 nautical miles away at a speed of 30 knots.
- On December 26, the Ukrainian Air Forces attacked Russian landing ship Project 775 Novocherkassk in port of Feodosiya with two cruise missiles. Ship was totally destroyed with the most of the crew and sunk.
Ukraine will likely continue to engage Russian forces in the Black Sea
and Crimea with an effective combination of drone and missile attacks. Ukraine
still needs to develop surface fleet capabilities to completely break Russian
maritime dominance and re-take control of its sovereign waters. Without the
urgent development of the Ukrainian Navy’s surface fleet, it will be difficult to liberate the
coastline and impossible to control maritime infrastructure, territorial waters
and exclusive economic zones. Moreover, given that both Ukraine and later
Russia in 2023 have effectively nullified the
2004 bilateral agreement on use of the Azov Sea (which had declared this maritime area as the “internal
waters” of both states), Kyiv needs a postwar naval strategy to deal
with contested areas. Thus, the so-called “mosquito
fleet” tactic represents one of the few, if not only, viable way to secure
Ukraine’s permanent maritime rights and effectively counter current and
future Russian military threats, including naval, marine and long-range aerial
attacks.