Natalya
Belitser
Expert/Senior
Researcher
Pylyp
Orlyk Institute for Democracy
Ukraine
belitser.n1@gmail.com
The year 2024 marks the tenth anniversary of the Russian-Ukrainian war and two years of the ‘Big War’ after the full-scale Russian invasion on 24 February 2002. This war – the longest and bloodiest in the post-WWII Europe – began by the occupation and annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in February – March 2014 and must end by its liberation.
Unlike the successful ground operations of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) in 2022, the 2023 counteroffensive is considered a failure. Against this background and without dwelling on its causes and the objectivity of such an assessment, it is worth paying attention to the obvious successes of Ukraine in the Black Sea and in the Crimean ‘stronghold’ of the Russian army.
Among the outstanding AFU achievements there is the flagship Moskva destroyed by the Ukrainian ‘Neptun’ missiles yet in April 2022. This event is also notable for the almost mystical coincidence: just before, a postal stamp appeared with the Moskva image and the already well-known meme sending Russian warship… far away (the words of a defender of the Snake Island). Was it a prophetic vision of the Russian BSF fate?
Indeed, by the end of 2023, 26 Russian warships had been hit by missiles and/or naval drones; 10 of them were destroyed and sunk, and 16 seriously damaged. For a country having practically no fleet this result is truly extraordinary… The last strike on December 26, 2023 hit the large landing ship Novocherkassk; since its original mission of invading Ukrainian ports proved unavailable, it was used to deliver munitions and transport personnel. Iranian drones and/or explosives on board caused a powerful detonation that destroyed the ship. According to data from various sources, up to 74 crew members may have been killed, and 27 wounded.
As a result of the successful targeting Russian warships, its Navy was driven out of Crimean ports (mainly to Novorossiysk) and practically deprived of the possibility to launch missiles, thus slightly reducing the threat of constant alarms in Ukraine. Ensuring a free passage of ships carrying grain and other cargo through the Black Sea ‘humanitarian corridor’ created by Ukraine after Russia’s withdrawal from the ‘grain deal’ in summer-23 is also a big achievement. The sea blockade attempt failed, and by the end of December over 300 ships with 10 ml tons cargo moved safely to their destinations.
The increased attacks’ efficiency has become possible due to the British cruise missiles Storm Shadow provided in early 2023, and its French SCALP version first delivered in August-23. Particularly important were the strikes on the Kerch Bridge, the dominant link between Crimea and the mainland Russia, built in 2018. The most powerful were in October 2002 using a truck with skilfully hidden explosives and in July 2023 by the ‘Sea Baby’ drones designed and produced in Ukraine. These attacks lead to frequent bridge’s malfunctions but not to its final destruction, which, if combined with cutting of the ‘land corridor’ connecting the peninsula with the occupied part of southern Ukraine, will make Crimean military base practically untenable.
To achieve this ambitious purpose, Ukraine needs more advanced, precise and long-range missiles like the US ATACMS and German TAURUS. This should bring the end of the war decidedly nearer, become an important element of the new Black Sea security strategy and therefore, be in the interest of the civilized world. However, only a few ATACMS were delivered so far, while the US has a huge stockpile of them, and Germany still refuses to provide TAURUS despite the increasing pressure on government from MPs, experts and public figures. Moreover, AFU are prohibited from using weapons supplied from the West to attack the territory of the RF. Not having an opportunity to fight on equal footing with Russia, which bombs and shells civilian population and critical infrastructure throughout Ukraine, our army can be compared to a boxer who is forced to “fight with one hand whereas his other hand is tied behind his back”. Such an adverse situation looks even more embarrassing given the fact that Russian stores of weapons are replenished by the Iranian drones and ballistic missiles from North Korea. Although formally this ban does not apply to Crimea recognised as Ukraine’s territory, the shortage of munition and delays in supplies seriously complicate the main task of de-occupying the peninsula. The main reason for this indecision and hesitation is fear. Fear of ‘escalation’, of crossing one more ‘red line’, of a nuclear war, of NATO involvement, etc. While all the experience gained during this war clearly shows: these threats will not be realised. And since Putin’s Russia, with its centuries-old chauvinist-imperialist mentality, understands only the language of force, this is high time to demonstrate it not only in words, but also in deeds.
The best examples of such force and resilience are given by the Ukrainian people and, in particular, our Crimean compatriots. In the occupied Crimea, the initial determination to use only peaceful means of resistance was gradually supplemented by more active forms, including sabotage, reconnaissance of military facilities, location and movement of troops, etc. Encouraged by Ukraine’s successes in the Black Sea and on the peninsula, covert warriors, such as members of the Crimean Tatar-Ukrainian ‘Atesh’, are of great help to AFU, GUR, SBU and other structures. An important role in the revived hopes was played by the change in ideology and strategic planning for the Crimea’s liberation. Until 2002, reliance on the political-diplomatic path prevailed; now more and more policymakers in Ukraine and abroad are convinced that this goal cannot be achieved without a military component. This changing trend can be traced by analysing, for example, the dynamics of sentiments, discussed topics and planned activities during the ‘Crimean Platform’ events, starting from its first summit in August 2021. Reforms in the Ministry of Defence, now headed by Rustem Umerov, are also promising, in particular, for the Crimean Tatars – both servicemen of the AFU and those who live on the occupied peninsula but long its liberation and participate in the resistance movements.
Although actual liberation is still far ahead, strategic and practical planning of the future reintegration of Crimea is already underway. There are huge problems and challenges yet to be solved and overcome, starting from the administrative issues, deciding what to do with traitors, collaborators, bearers – voluntarily or not? – of Russian passports, property acquired by the illegally arrived citizens of mainland Russia, and much more. Let’s hope that by keeping our unity and doing everything possible to win this war, these difficulties will be overcome, too.