Galina Yavorska
Dr. hab., Professor, Chief Research Fellow
National Institute for Strategic Studies (NISS)
Ukraine
The endgame in the ongoing war of aggression that Russia wages against Ukraine is shaped not only on the battlefield but also in the cognitive domain. Conflicting interpretations of what would constitute a victory or defeat reflect the changing landscape of current geopolitical contradictions and global instability. Ambiguous pledges by partners to support Ukraine for as long as it takes raise doubts as to whether the West fully realizes the fact that victory or defeat in this war will define the future global order.
For Ukraine the victory is defined as the liberation of its occupied territories and reliable future security guarantees, the right to an independent foreign policy, including joining the EU and NATO. For Russia, it is the elimination of Ukraine as a sovereign nation and constraining the global reach of the U.S. and NATO. For Moscow the ultimate goal is to return to the club of the global superpowers, which entails reformatting in its favor the international order.
Ukraine’s western partners’ goals include preventing a direct confrontation between the Russian Federation and NATO countries and eliminating the possibility of a nuclear conflagration. Russia's defeat is seen as a strategic one, it would prevent its re-entry to the global political 'premier league', meanwhile, the attitude to Ukraine's victory is determined by the perceived need for de-escalation.
The interests of the presumably neutral countries (China, the Global South), vary according to prospects at achieving their own goals in the context of the Russo-Ukrainian war. For this reason, the outcome of the military conflict between Russia and Ukraine has no independent significance for them. Aside from the risks of an uncontrolled escalation, they would accept both Ukraine’s victory and its defeat within a whole range of options between compromise and capitulation.
Ukraine's dependency on the Western support requires coordinating its victory strategy with the partner nations. The issues arising from any (mis)understanding between Ukraine and its partners are of a crucial importance. In this regard, the main obstacle is the fact that the partners are coming from the logic of conflict resolution, predominant in NATO since the end of the Cold War. This involves seeking a compromise, in which both sides presumably would come out as ‘winners’.
A compromise requires concessions from both conflicting sides. As Russia has always made clear that no one should expect it to voluntarily pull-out its troops from the internationally recognized territory of Ukraine, the space for a compromise has reduced to unilateral concessions on territories illegally seized by the aggressor. Consequently, that would be a step towards legitimizing Russia’s violations of international rules, the UN Charter and, ultimately, a step towards a greater global disorder.
The notion that all wars end at the negotiating table is erroneous in relation to Russia's war against Ukraine. It draws on improper analogies and disregards the nature of this war as an existential one for Ukraine and affecting what Russia deems to be its vital interests. A strategy aiming at reconciliation with the aggressor is tantamount to a prologue for defeat and will predictably fail to win domestic support on both sides of the frontline.
In discussions regarding the endgame options for the Russo-Ukrainian war, the true stumbling block appears to be not so much the admission of a Ukrainian victory and means available to achieve it, but the acceptance of Russia’s defeat. For many politicians outside Ukraine, the image of a defeated Russia, a world without Russia as we have known it, appears so unthinkable that it undermines the very notion of Ukraine’s victory.
If Ukraine loses, Europe and the global order will face unforeseen consequences. Meanwhile, behind the possibility of Russia’s defeat there looms the specter of a collapsed major nuclear power and Russia is stoking up this fear by its persistent nuclear blackmail. Russian threats of further escalation of the war by resorting to nuclear weapons feed into the perception of Russia's apparent invincibility. This is augmented by the narrative of Russia’s presumably inexhaustible resources – human, natural, economic and, by extension, military. Against this backdrop, the gloomy post-war scenarios emerge, where the authoritarian Russia is preserving in full its traditional global role along with the ability to impose its will by aggression and terrorist methods. Proliferation of these scenarios is instrumental in creating a greater uncertainty and serve a concrete purpose of undermining the international support of Ukraine and preventing it from accession to NATO.
Ukraine’s and Russia’s goals in this war are asymmetrical. Ukraine fights to liberate its territories, while Russia is aiming to proceed with its land grab, enlarging its territory and expanding its sphere of influence, while simultaneously diminishing the geopolitical weight of the West.
The Russia of today has neither capacity nor appetite for a good-faith agreement. By the same token, there is no sense in hoping that delaying Ukraine’s accession to NATO could be a bargaining chip in negotiations for peace. Today both adversaries seek only victory, which for the other party will turn into defeat. This war offers no option for a win-win solution. Consequently, it would be futile for all parties involved, including Ukraine’s supporters, to hope for avoiding the risks by trying to slow down the pace of the military activities. Such strategy is prone to fail, as it stands to reinforce the destructive processes in the global security environment and increase the likelihood of a direct confrontation between NATO states and the Russian Federation.