Marcin Kaczmarski
Lecturer in Security Studies
University of Glasgow
UK
The biggest paradox of Russia-China relations revealed by the war in Ukraine is that incremental developments have not led to a strategic breakthrough. While the Sino-Russian relationship can be considered at its peak over the last three decades, it is still a partnership with limitations.
Overall, for almost a year of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, Moscow’s relations with Beijing have improved.
Politically, China demonstrated unwavering loyalty to Russia, not uttering a single word of criticism in the public domain, mirroring instead narratives produced by the Russian propaganda. Beijing has accepted Moscow’s justifications for the use of force and unambiguously blamed the US and NATO for the outbreak of the war. The Chinese media and netizens have spread Russian conspiracy theories, related for instance to alleged US biological laboratories in Ukraine. Beijing seized every opportunity to peddle the critique of US ‘hegemony’ and portray itself as a neutral third party.
Militarily, joint exercises continued. For the first time, Russia and China conducted two joint bomber patrols, one in May and another in November. During the latter, the aircraft staged landings on each countries airfields. In December, both navies organised regular maritime exercises. On top of this, Chinese troops took part in the Vostok-2022 Russian strategic exercises. All those military undertakings took place in East Asia. China was able to demonstrate to both the US and Japan that Russia was ready to support China’s military brinkmanship in Asia. Due to Moscow’s growing reliance on its southern neighbour, Beijing did not feel compelled to reciprocate in Europe.
Economically, Chinese companies have seized emerging opportunities in the Russian market. Chinese energy behemoths and independent refineries alike increased the amount of oil they purchased from Russian producers, benefitting from substantial discounts. As a result Russia once again surpassed Saudi Arabia as China’s number one supplier. Chinese companies were able to replace their Western counterparts that created the vacuum leaving the Russian market in a number of sectors. Bilateral trade turnover in 2022 was close to reaching the magical threshold of US$ 200 billion (according to the Chinese side, it was US$ 190 billion). In the Russian Far East, the railway and road bridges over the Amur River finally opened, following decades of delays.
Whereas Sino-Russian relations follow the pattern of an ever-closer cooperation, the main limitation is the absence of China’s strategic support for Russia, support which might be costly for Beijing, especially in its relations with Western states. Beijing has not offered substantial financial or economic assistance, nor has it come out to help Moscow bypass Western sanctions. No major investments, mergers or contracts have been announced. Having switched off the Nord Stream gas pipeline and effectively cutting off its European customers from Gazprom’s resources, Russia desperately needs a new pipeline (even if its construction is going to take time). China, however, seems to be in no hurry in supporting the project of a trans-Mongolian pipeline.
This policy stands in contrast to Beijing’s response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea. At that time, China and Russia were able to agree on the Power of Siberia gas pipeline, while Chinese loans paved the way for Novatek’s Yamal-LNG project.
Russia’s war against Ukraine has put Beijing in an uncomfortable position. On the one hand, China is tempted to capitalise on Russia’s weakness. Western sanctions have been gradually depriving Russia of access to partners, capital and advanced technologies. China might be particularly interested in gaining stakes in Russian energy companies as well as in the Russian upstream. Russia’s weakness might enable Beijing to entrench its influence in the Russian energy sector, including the ownership in Rosneft or Gazprom as well as in the most promising oil and gas fields.
On the other hand, support for Russia would generate a number of risks for Beijing. Economic assistance for Russia would make Chinese companies subject to secondary sanctions. China is much more exposed to the world and globalisation process than Russia. The Chinese economy still relies on the openness of the global economy. Moreover, Beijing is keen on driving the wedge between the US and the European Union. The Chinese leadership continues to maintain the image of ‘bad Americans and good Europeans’, blaming the US – rather than European member states – for all the West’s ‘sins’. China’s tangible support for Russia may bring the US and European states closer together and strengthen trans-Atlantic unity, a result Beijing has been trying to avoid for the last two decades.