Ieva Birka
Dr., Leading Researcher
Advanced Social and Political Research Institute (ASPRI), University of Latvia
Latvia
Ieva.Birka@lu.lv
In a provocation piece for Space & Polity, I highlight the important role diasporas can play as progenitors of interstate conflict (Birka 2022). I note the applicability of this to the Russian–Ukrainian conflict, labeled by Russia as an "extraordinary" measure necessary to protect Russia's sovereignty, and framed as having everything to do with its diaspora, or “compatriots”, in Ukraine.
The Baltic States are hosts to a very high numbers of ethnic Russians, who remained in the Baltic States after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Latvia’s population is roughly 25 per cent ethnic Russian, Estonia’s population is roughly 24 per cent, and Lithuania’s population is roughly 5 per cent ethnic Russian. The percentage of Russian speakers, or those who use Russian for daily communication, is even higher. In Latvia, Russian speakers are nearly 34 per cent of the population, in Estonia about 30 per cent, and in Lithuania 8 per cent. For years scholars have suggested that “continued Russian diasporic presence poses great possibilities for the Kremlin to exercise its influence there” (Coolican 2021: 5).
The task of social integration of Russian speakers in the Baltic states, especially in Latvia and Estonia, has been an unresolved and, oftentimes, neglected issue (Muižnieks, Rozenvalds, Birka 2016). Some progress was made in the early 2000’s, as a response to international pressure for integration and social inclusion policies. However, since the joining of the international organizations, very little progress has been made in promoting integration, social cohesion, and feelings of belonging. More or less, the issue has been side-stepped by respective national governments, allowing for the titular and Russian speaking communities to co-exist in their own linguistic and cultural environments.
However, with the onset of the war in Ukraine, and the backlash to Russia, many previously ignored issues have come to the forefront and have been swiftly addressed. For example, Soviet monuments and symbols have been removed, there has been a purge of Russian state-controlled media from national airwaves and access to other Russian state-leaning media outlets restricted, the economic sector has reoriented itself towards the West, all three Baltic nations have decided to move forward with schooling only in the titular language and have become more stringent regarding language knowledge requirements.
What has, in my opinion been missed, is the opportunity to use the current environment, Russia’s war in Ukraine, and the resulting decisions made to limit Russian influence and do away with Soviet nostalgia, to speak with, explain, and create mutually inclusive dialogues with the Russian speakers in the Baltics. This should have been the moment when the divergent versions of history are reconciled by examining the war in Ukraine. The decision to move forward with only one language of instruction explained as the best course of action for the integration of children into the Baltic societies and as a way of securing their future in the European Union. The complete economic reorientation towards the West used as an opportunity to offer a common vision of future prosperity. The current way of doing things, without talking and explaining decisions, however, seems very much to be – “Our way, or the highway”.
Given the above, the survey data collected in April 2022, by the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung regional office in Latvia, on the attitudes and opinions regarding foreign and security policy is worrying. Two months after the start of the war, 49 per cent of the Russian-speaking respondents stated that social cohesion in Latvia has weakened as a result of the war. Further, 40 per cent of respondents of both Latvian speakers and Russian speakers agreed that the attitude of Latvian speakers towards Russian speakers has worsened. In the same survey, the only demographic group of Russian speakers to support Ukraine in the conflict - with a weak majority of 51 per cent - were 18-24 year olds. The majority of Russian speakers in Latvia were unable or unwilling to express support for either side, with 17 per cent openly supporting Russia.
In light of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the claims of “compatriot” protection made as the basis for that invasion, the unvoiced or undecided allegiances of the Russian speakers in Latvia, and the perceived worsening of the co-habitation environment, issues of integration and social cohesion are more important than ever in the Baltics. However, integration policy, with the aim of promoting a sense of belonging to the Baltic States among Russian speakers, cannot focus solely on linguistic policy as a means of civic and cultural integration.
As I have previously outlined, sense of belonging in integration policy can only be achieved by working simultaneously in four interconnected dimensions (Birka 2014). First, is the membership promotion or cultural integration facet, which happens through language learning and the internalization of values, norms, and belief systems for belonging to the group. Thus far, the Baltic’s have only focused on language, with very little work done in promoting norms, and in reconciling interpretations of history that contribute to the foundation of the belief system. In parallel, structural integration promoting action has to take place. Structural integration requires access to the decision making processes, and social and economic benefits of the group. This calls for individuals to believe that their voice and needs are on equal par with others, that their voice matters in group decision-making, and that access to and distribution of goods take place on equivalent terms. As such, work needs to be carried out in combating Russian-speaker’s perceptions of discrimination, their inclusion in decision making dialogue regarding their future and the future of the Baltic States, and offering a common vision of future well-being. Finally, there is the emotional component of integration, or social and identificational integration, where the emphasis is on shared experiences, frequent and positive contact resulting in a “we-feeling” toward the group or the collective. Again, I believe the current geopolitical context, makes this the opportune time to talk about and work through all the above mentioned facets of integration. This is no easy task, but investing in Russian speaker integration in the Baltics, in the development of a common vision for the future of the Baltic region, might be as important as, or possibly more important than, all the GDP defense spending commitments made to NATO.
The Baltic States are hosts to a very high numbers of ethnic Russians, who remained in the Baltic States after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Latvia’s population is roughly 25 per cent ethnic Russian, Estonia’s population is roughly 24 per cent, and Lithuania’s population is roughly 5 per cent ethnic Russian. The percentage of Russian speakers, or those who use Russian for daily communication, is even higher. In Latvia, Russian speakers are nearly 34 per cent of the population, in Estonia about 30 per cent, and in Lithuania 8 per cent. For years scholars have suggested that “continued Russian diasporic presence poses great possibilities for the Kremlin to exercise its influence there” (Coolican 2021: 5).
The task of social integration of Russian speakers in the Baltic states, especially in Latvia and Estonia, has been an unresolved and, oftentimes, neglected issue (Muižnieks, Rozenvalds, Birka 2016). Some progress was made in the early 2000’s, as a response to international pressure for integration and social inclusion policies. However, since the joining of the international organizations, very little progress has been made in promoting integration, social cohesion, and feelings of belonging. More or less, the issue has been side-stepped by respective national governments, allowing for the titular and Russian speaking communities to co-exist in their own linguistic and cultural environments.
However, with the onset of the war in Ukraine, and the backlash to Russia, many previously ignored issues have come to the forefront and have been swiftly addressed. For example, Soviet monuments and symbols have been removed, there has been a purge of Russian state-controlled media from national airwaves and access to other Russian state-leaning media outlets restricted, the economic sector has reoriented itself towards the West, all three Baltic nations have decided to move forward with schooling only in the titular language and have become more stringent regarding language knowledge requirements.
What has, in my opinion been missed, is the opportunity to use the current environment, Russia’s war in Ukraine, and the resulting decisions made to limit Russian influence and do away with Soviet nostalgia, to speak with, explain, and create mutually inclusive dialogues with the Russian speakers in the Baltics. This should have been the moment when the divergent versions of history are reconciled by examining the war in Ukraine. The decision to move forward with only one language of instruction explained as the best course of action for the integration of children into the Baltic societies and as a way of securing their future in the European Union. The complete economic reorientation towards the West used as an opportunity to offer a common vision of future prosperity. The current way of doing things, without talking and explaining decisions, however, seems very much to be – “Our way, or the highway”.
Given the above, the survey data collected in April 2022, by the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung regional office in Latvia, on the attitudes and opinions regarding foreign and security policy is worrying. Two months after the start of the war, 49 per cent of the Russian-speaking respondents stated that social cohesion in Latvia has weakened as a result of the war. Further, 40 per cent of respondents of both Latvian speakers and Russian speakers agreed that the attitude of Latvian speakers towards Russian speakers has worsened. In the same survey, the only demographic group of Russian speakers to support Ukraine in the conflict - with a weak majority of 51 per cent - were 18-24 year olds. The majority of Russian speakers in Latvia were unable or unwilling to express support for either side, with 17 per cent openly supporting Russia.
In light of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the claims of “compatriot” protection made as the basis for that invasion, the unvoiced or undecided allegiances of the Russian speakers in Latvia, and the perceived worsening of the co-habitation environment, issues of integration and social cohesion are more important than ever in the Baltics. However, integration policy, with the aim of promoting a sense of belonging to the Baltic States among Russian speakers, cannot focus solely on linguistic policy as a means of civic and cultural integration.
As I have previously outlined, sense of belonging in integration policy can only be achieved by working simultaneously in four interconnected dimensions (Birka 2014). First, is the membership promotion or cultural integration facet, which happens through language learning and the internalization of values, norms, and belief systems for belonging to the group. Thus far, the Baltic’s have only focused on language, with very little work done in promoting norms, and in reconciling interpretations of history that contribute to the foundation of the belief system. In parallel, structural integration promoting action has to take place. Structural integration requires access to the decision making processes, and social and economic benefits of the group. This calls for individuals to believe that their voice and needs are on equal par with others, that their voice matters in group decision-making, and that access to and distribution of goods take place on equivalent terms. As such, work needs to be carried out in combating Russian-speaker’s perceptions of discrimination, their inclusion in decision making dialogue regarding their future and the future of the Baltic States, and offering a common vision of future well-being. Finally, there is the emotional component of integration, or social and identificational integration, where the emphasis is on shared experiences, frequent and positive contact resulting in a “we-feeling” toward the group or the collective. Again, I believe the current geopolitical context, makes this the opportune time to talk about and work through all the above mentioned facets of integration. This is no easy task, but investing in Russian speaker integration in the Baltics, in the development of a common vision for the future of the Baltic region, might be as important as, or possibly more important than, all the GDP defense spending commitments made to NATO.