Justinas Lingevičius: Lithuania’s response to existential anxiety

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022 has come as a shock by the fact itself and the increased uncertainty of the future security. At the same time, the political discourse in Lithuania has been quick to remind that the war has already started in 2014 by the annexation of Crimea and the armed conflict in Eastern Ukraine. No wonder the Government of Lithuania sent surface-to-air missiles Stinger ahead of the invasion, being among the first NATO members to provide military assistance to Ukraine. This has echoed already noticeable transformative changes in Lithuania developed since 2014 when the matter of national security has topped the political agenda.

An analysis of the political discourse in the post-Crimean situation has shown that Lithuania’s self-perception has been mobilized on the basis of self-preservation as a small state: security of its territory and a sovereign political subject in the Western political family. Such self-perception has come as a result of openly naming Russia a direct military threat to Lithuania in this asymmetric and antagonistic relationship. Though Russia has been the Other to Lithuania since early 1990s, its attacks against Ukraine’s sovereignty in 2014 have led to straightforward recognition of national security threats posed by Russia, reconfirmed again in 2022.

These external shocks and increased existential anxiety have become a litmus test to redefine and reflect Lithuania’s own positioning as well as relations with partners and neighbors. For years, the perception of a small border country has been associated with a certain level of helplessness and reliance on security shelters provided by Western organizations, first and foremost, NATO (military security) and the EU (economic security). Since 2014 these tendencies have changed in a way that smallness has no longer been accepted as an argument for weakness, but as an imminent condition which requires greater responsibility and action by Lithuania rather than an excuse to seek shelter.

The most evident example of such a change – the way NATO has been perceived. After the annexation of Crimea and then the later Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the strong confidence in NATO has been suggested within the political discourse focusing on shared security concerns regardless of the size or location of the country. In other words, NATO and its emerging presence in the so-called Eastern flank (first, the Enhanced Forward Presence battalions established in 2017 and, second, plans for the NATO brigades agreed in the Madrid Summit) have become an integral part of Lithuania’s self-perception and the post-Crimean identity in foreign and security policy. 

Therefore, compared to earlier years, the annexation of Crimea sparked the realisation that foreign and security policy has to be readjusted and Lithuania must take independent actions, namely by focusing on national defence capabilities, higher defence spending, better and more rapid military modernisation, civil resilience and better cooperation with the regional and international partners. For example, In 2016, military conscription was reintroduced after more than a decade of building a professional army. In later years, the National Security Strategy was updated (2017 and 2021) and interparliamentary party agreements on defense policy (2018 and 2022) were signed.

One of the dominant transformations – rapid increase of defense spending. In 2013, Lithuania spent 0.77% of its GDP on defense, while in 2018 the country exceeded the agreed goal of 2% by allocating 2.01% of GDP (from 267.3 to 873 million euros). Though the gradual increase has been planned since then, the Russia’s invasion of Ukraine last year pushed the Government and the Parliament to make a bolder decision resulted the defense spending of 2.52% of GDP in 2023. The decision was also taken with a possibility for an increase of up to 3% of GDP, making Lithuania one of the leading NATO investors in defense.

In the current light, the political discourse leads to framing Lithuania as an advocate for rules-based norms, a supporter of democracy and a smart host of multinational military presence, able to concentrate on its national interests and to mobilize necessary resources. Particularly in the debates on the NATO brigade, there are noticeable endeavors to emphasize country’s self-determination, usually called homework-to-be-done, based on heavily investing in necessary infrastructure, training area and military equipment. This also signals continuous reconsideration of self-perception, again highly affected by regional insecurity. At the same time, the question of sustainability and resilience remains – how the growing instability and tensions would affect the political course and the security agenda.