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Daniel S. Hamilton: The Baltic States in the Transatlantic Alliance

Daniel S. Hamilton 
Senior Non-Resident Fellow 
Brookings Institution
USA 

Senior Fellow 
Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies 
USA

Former U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, responsible for U.S. relations with the Baltic states. 

Although small in size, the Baltic states stand tall in the transatlantic relationship as allies who uphold our shared values of freedom, human rights and the rule of law, democracy, and market economies. Each country’s principles, its success in building a strong and resilient democracy and free markets, and its determination to support democratic development throughout Europe and beyond, make each a valued ally in NATO. Baltic voices are also important in European councils when Europeans debate whether they want an outward-looking, Atlanticist Europe that can be America’s counterpart on a range of regional and global challenges, or an inward-looking Europe that seeks to protect itself from outside challenges and attempts to pose as America’s counterweight. The Baltic democracies and their diasporas remain vigilant and vocal opponents of authoritarian states such as China and Russia. 

The role of the Baltic states looms particularly large today, as the transatlantic alliance acts to stop Russia’s further invasion of Ukraine and to deter it from taking any steps that could endanger NATO allies. Our first and main task is to help Ukraine win. Putin’s aggression is more than an attack on Ukraine; it is an assault on basic principles and structures underpinning European and transatlantic security – no forceful change of borders, the right of countries to choose their allegiances, equal security for all countries. These principles go to the heart of what the transatlantic alliance stands for. Putin’s war also tests the ability of democracies to refute his efforts to establish contrary principles, such as his claim that Russia has an inherent right to defend ethnic Russians and Russian speakers, regardless of their citizenship or of territorial boundaries. Such a generalised right would wreak havoc in a world where most states are multi-ethnic. 

Our priority task is to back Ukraine politically, economically, and militarily, including with higher-end military armaments and equipment than NATO allies have thus far been willing to provide, and to be prepared to counter Russian escalatory actions, whatever and wherever they may be. Allies must also follow through on NATO’s June 2022 Madrid summit decision to move from small tripwire forces in the Baltic states and Poland, and provisions for reinforcement, to robust forward defense and deterrence by denial all along the alliance’s eastern flank—the operational implication when allied leaders say they will “defend every inch” of NATO territory. This change will require more US and European troops deployed to NATO’s east, new infrastructure by host nations to receive those troops, a new command structure, and a revised concept for military operations. 

In the economic sphere, the priority should be to maintain, and where possible strengthen, sanctions against Russia, and to take joint or complementary steps to address the inflationary pressures and supply chain disruptions currently roiling our societies. 

Over the longer term, the transatlantic partners have a strong common interest in facilitating Ukraine’s evolution into a successful Western-oriented state able to support the aspirations of its people. That means supporting anti-corruption efforts, helping Ukrainians strengthen their democratic institutions and the rule of law, and to provide the assistance they will need to recover and rebuild. 

One of the many consequences of Putin’s further invasion of Ukraine is the complete transformation of Northern Europe’s security landscape. The decision by Finland and Sweden to join the alliance will connect the entire High North outside of Russia in a NATO strategic space, facilitating NATO support to the Baltic states and raising the threshold of risk for Moscow should it contemplate any further aggression. 

One particular concern is the ongoing crisis in Belarus. The Baltic states have helped their Western partners focus on the stakes and understand better the dynamics in that country. We share a strong interest in a peaceful transition of power in Belarus to a government chosen in democratic elections that enables better ties with its neighbors, acceptance of European human rights norms, and sovereign independence from Russia, and that stops being a conduit for invasion, corruption, human trafficking, drugs, and other negative flows. 

The Baltic region has again moved to the forefront as a critical space for all transatlantic partners in the aftermath of Russia's ongoing aggression against Ukrainian region of Crimea, and in light of the ongoing challenges of the open-ended Soviet succession. There is a unity in this region of Europe that is unmatched elsewhere on the continent.