ERA chair of Maritime cybersecurity
Tallinn University of Technology
Estonia
kave.salamatian@taltech.ee
The waves of digitalisation are now touching the maritime industry that is transformed, along with other components of the society. While, this transformation brings expected generic benefits like, dematerialisation of transactions, faster and more reliable operations, improved cooperation between actors, etc., there are specific factors driving the maritime sector. By 2050, up to 17% of global CO2 emissions are projected to come from seaborne activities. Moreover, these activities are deploying over the sea, an environmentally sensitive area. Internet of things instrumentation in maritime infrastructure provides fine grain data needed to optimise resource consumption and reduce the ecological footprint. Autonomous ships and port infrastructure offer a major evolution in this direction. The maritime infrastructure is becoming a major cyber-physical nexus where the cyber world is intersecting with the physical space and impacting it.
Cybersecurity is a major issue for digitalisation. While digitalisation of maritime industry can potentially benefit the whole economy, it also brings risks of major disruptions in case of cyber-attacks. Maritime systems are complex interdependent systems with components of different nature, e.g., energy, propulsion, navigation, refrigeration, etc., that used to be « water tighten » with functionality separation. However, the advent of digitalisation opened the hatches, e.g., if not well protected, a PLC in refrigeration might, if hacked, access to the navigation control and be misused to physically hijack a ship. Maritime communication links are potential doors accessible to malicious actors to harm maritime infrastructure, or vessels that are in autarky when at sea and must guarantee safety at all instants. This calls for cautions while integrating digital components in maritime systems. Cybersecurity threats target the whole range of maritime infrastructure, e.g. ports, communications systems and ships. These cyber-attacks can be of familiar types, e.g. phishing, malware, social engineering, brute force, denial of service, ransomware, etc. But they also target more specific maritime elements, e.g. AIS spoofing, GPS and positioning attacks, process attacks on autonomous ships, SCADA attacks on Command & Control systems, etc. Mitigating these attacks needs fundamental research activity.
The digitalisation will bring deep structural changes to the maritime industry. Autonomous ships and harbours will change the way seafarers are working; vessels or infrastructure have to be designed differently; a large part of cargo documentation and business processes, at the core of maritime transport will undergo major changes. These changes entail evolution of the education and the careers of seafarers. Addressing these issues are difficult for any industry, but they are even more complex for the maritime one, with its longstanding traditions and the large number of stakeholders. This mandates evolution of seafarer education.
From Hanseatic league times, the Baltic Sea and the crossing maritime traffic have been strategic. But, the new strategic configuration after Russian invasion of Ukraine, and Finland and Sweden joining the NATO, have put nowadays this region in geopolitical focus. The explosion in the NorthStream pipelines in 2022, unfortunately confirmed the worries about the vulnerability of maritime infrastructure. In this context, maritime cybersecurity is of utmost importance. In particular, accounting for the recent history of cyber-activity in the region. This calls for a high level of preparedness and coordination for maritime actors in this region.
However, there are challenges for providing a cybersecure maritime environment in the Baltic Sea. There is a lack of human resources, that is caused by the joint effect of the attraction of already rare cybersecurity specialist to other traditional areas of cybersecurity, and the absence of dedicated education programs aimed into improving the competences of seafarers to cybersecurity issues. Collaboration between Baltic countries and stakeholders is also weak as most actors are following the logic of economic competition, rather than a constructive cooperation in cybersecurity. EU initiatives like the CISE, that enable the sharing of classified and unclassified information, are increasingly important to ensure cybersecurity. The level of readiness of maritime companies to cyber-risks is also alarming. Even ransomware, that can be mitigated relatively easily through regular back-ups, are still a major issue affecting an increasing number of maritime actors. More generally, there is a lack of coordination structures at the regional level for gathering expertise, at technical, organisational and strategic levels. Such structures should become the top priority of Baltic Sea neighbours’ governments and stakeholders if they wish to counter the Russian cyber-activism.
Cybersecurity is a major issue for digitalisation. While digitalisation of maritime industry can potentially benefit the whole economy, it also brings risks of major disruptions in case of cyber-attacks. Maritime systems are complex interdependent systems with components of different nature, e.g., energy, propulsion, navigation, refrigeration, etc., that used to be « water tighten » with functionality separation. However, the advent of digitalisation opened the hatches, e.g., if not well protected, a PLC in refrigeration might, if hacked, access to the navigation control and be misused to physically hijack a ship. Maritime communication links are potential doors accessible to malicious actors to harm maritime infrastructure, or vessels that are in autarky when at sea and must guarantee safety at all instants. This calls for cautions while integrating digital components in maritime systems. Cybersecurity threats target the whole range of maritime infrastructure, e.g. ports, communications systems and ships. These cyber-attacks can be of familiar types, e.g. phishing, malware, social engineering, brute force, denial of service, ransomware, etc. But they also target more specific maritime elements, e.g. AIS spoofing, GPS and positioning attacks, process attacks on autonomous ships, SCADA attacks on Command & Control systems, etc. Mitigating these attacks needs fundamental research activity.
The digitalisation will bring deep structural changes to the maritime industry. Autonomous ships and harbours will change the way seafarers are working; vessels or infrastructure have to be designed differently; a large part of cargo documentation and business processes, at the core of maritime transport will undergo major changes. These changes entail evolution of the education and the careers of seafarers. Addressing these issues are difficult for any industry, but they are even more complex for the maritime one, with its longstanding traditions and the large number of stakeholders. This mandates evolution of seafarer education.
From Hanseatic league times, the Baltic Sea and the crossing maritime traffic have been strategic. But, the new strategic configuration after Russian invasion of Ukraine, and Finland and Sweden joining the NATO, have put nowadays this region in geopolitical focus. The explosion in the NorthStream pipelines in 2022, unfortunately confirmed the worries about the vulnerability of maritime infrastructure. In this context, maritime cybersecurity is of utmost importance. In particular, accounting for the recent history of cyber-activity in the region. This calls for a high level of preparedness and coordination for maritime actors in this region.
However, there are challenges for providing a cybersecure maritime environment in the Baltic Sea. There is a lack of human resources, that is caused by the joint effect of the attraction of already rare cybersecurity specialist to other traditional areas of cybersecurity, and the absence of dedicated education programs aimed into improving the competences of seafarers to cybersecurity issues. Collaboration between Baltic countries and stakeholders is also weak as most actors are following the logic of economic competition, rather than a constructive cooperation in cybersecurity. EU initiatives like the CISE, that enable the sharing of classified and unclassified information, are increasingly important to ensure cybersecurity. The level of readiness of maritime companies to cyber-risks is also alarming. Even ransomware, that can be mitigated relatively easily through regular back-ups, are still a major issue affecting an increasing number of maritime actors. More generally, there is a lack of coordination structures at the regional level for gathering expertise, at technical, organisational and strategic levels. Such structures should become the top priority of Baltic Sea neighbours’ governments and stakeholders if they wish to counter the Russian cyber-activism.