Dr., Post-Doctoral Researcher
Interdisciplinary Centre for Baltic Sea Region Research (IFZO)
Greifswald, Germany
Mary Keogh
Dr., Post-Doctoral Researcher
Interdisciplinary Centre for Baltic Sea Region Research (IFZO)
Greifswald, Germany
On May 23rd 2022, Lithuania declared itself fully independent of Russia energy. While there has been a significant reorientation in energy strategy throughout the Baltic region since the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Lithuania’s shift has been particularly dramatic. Particularly notable is that, compared with other regional states who either gradually reduced imports or had gas imports suspended by Russia, Lithuania’s approach was pro- rather than reactive.
Lithuania’s proactive stance has roots in its historical experience. As scholar Danius Auers wrote in 2015, history “lives, breathes, provokes and mobilises Baltic publics to an extent almost unimaginable in neighbouring Western European democracies”. The country, according to President Gitanas Nauseda, has “never had a comfortable, calm and predictable neighborhood.” While their European counterparts spoke of positive transformation through trade with Russia, the NATO frontline states maintained a significantly more cautious view of Russia. From the Lithuanian perspective, Russia has remained a primary – and often existential – security threat.
This narrative is reflected in the energy sector, where energy, sovereignty, and territorial integrity have been strongly intertwined in the Lithuanian geopolitical imagination. After independence, Lithuania formed an “energy island” with the two other Baltic states – isolated from European energy systems and entirely dependent on Russia to fulfil its energy needs. Nauseda has referred to dependence on Russian gas in particular as an “existential treat” to Lithuania. Vilnius experienced Russia’s weaponization of energy in the 1990s when Moscow repeatedly disrupted oil supplies to the Baltic countries to gain economic and political concessions. These attempts to employ energy as a coercive measure to reassert Russian control over the Baltic region laid the groundwork for Vilnius’ political behaviour today.
Whereas Germany had argued that energy ties with Moscow would stabilize relations and reign in Moscow’s more hostile tendencies, Lithuania has always insisted that such attempts would backfire. This belief informed the country’s energy diversification agenda and its fierce opposition to the Nord Stream projects it considered inherently geopolitical. Vilnius could not, according to the country’s energy minister, “close [its] eyes to Russia’s attempts to consolidate its geopolitical influence through energy projects”. Since the invasion of Ukraine, the Lithuania prime minister has reaffirmed that the state had warned its “good friends in Germany” to limit deep relations with Russia, because “one day they will regret” it.
The state’s proactive approach was also facilitated by a strong diversification policy that aimed to wean Lithuania from Russian energy dependence. This campaign accelerated after Russia’s invasion of Crimea in 2014, when the state commissioned a liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminal in Klaipėda. This energy security insurance policy, questioned by some, paid off following the invasion of Ukraine in 2022: having already significantly diluted its previous 100% dependence on Russian gas, the state was able to eradicate it entirely with increased imports through Klaipeda.
Lithuania’s LNG project can also be viewed through a wider geopolitical lens. It not only diluted energy dependence on Russia, but also drew the state closer to its key ally, the United States. A widely held view throughout the Lithuanian political classes is that the US military presence in the region is a key guarantor of territorial sovereignty: the 2020 parliamentary resolution defining Lithuania’s long-term foreign policy direction defines it as “an indispensable ally”. The US has long played an important role in facilitating energy independence rhetorically; that it is also a key producer and exporter of LNG add a new dimension to geopolitical cooperation between the states. Upon receiving the first shipment of LNG from the US, Lithuanian Foreign Minister remarked that energy trade was “one of the strategic areas for cooperation”. This partnership meant increased US supplies were integral to replacing Russian gas in April.
The importance of multilateral geopolitics and regional cooperation should not be discounted. The integration of Lithuania and the other Baltic States into European electricity grids ended the previously total dependence on Russian imports, while EU funding for those grids, Klaipeda, and, most recently, the Gas Interconnector Lithuania-Poland have contributed to a significant diversification of Lithuania’s energy imports. Beyond representing a tangible form of integration in Europe and a significant geoeconomic collaboration with the Nordic States and Poland, these infrastructures were integral in providing alternative energy sources and thus facilitating the termination of the Lithuanian-Russian energy relationship.
Against the backdrop of Russia’s war on Ukraine, numerous European leaders, including the German Foreign Minister, have acknowledged that they failed to pay sufficient attention to repeated warnings from the Baltic states about Russia. With Russia now perceived as a significant threat to Europe, it will be interesting to observe if and how other EU capitals follow the proactive example set by Lithuania.
Lithuania’s proactive stance has roots in its historical experience. As scholar Danius Auers wrote in 2015, history “lives, breathes, provokes and mobilises Baltic publics to an extent almost unimaginable in neighbouring Western European democracies”. The country, according to President Gitanas Nauseda, has “never had a comfortable, calm and predictable neighborhood.” While their European counterparts spoke of positive transformation through trade with Russia, the NATO frontline states maintained a significantly more cautious view of Russia. From the Lithuanian perspective, Russia has remained a primary – and often existential – security threat.
This narrative is reflected in the energy sector, where energy, sovereignty, and territorial integrity have been strongly intertwined in the Lithuanian geopolitical imagination. After independence, Lithuania formed an “energy island” with the two other Baltic states – isolated from European energy systems and entirely dependent on Russia to fulfil its energy needs. Nauseda has referred to dependence on Russian gas in particular as an “existential treat” to Lithuania. Vilnius experienced Russia’s weaponization of energy in the 1990s when Moscow repeatedly disrupted oil supplies to the Baltic countries to gain economic and political concessions. These attempts to employ energy as a coercive measure to reassert Russian control over the Baltic region laid the groundwork for Vilnius’ political behaviour today.
Whereas Germany had argued that energy ties with Moscow would stabilize relations and reign in Moscow’s more hostile tendencies, Lithuania has always insisted that such attempts would backfire. This belief informed the country’s energy diversification agenda and its fierce opposition to the Nord Stream projects it considered inherently geopolitical. Vilnius could not, according to the country’s energy minister, “close [its] eyes to Russia’s attempts to consolidate its geopolitical influence through energy projects”. Since the invasion of Ukraine, the Lithuania prime minister has reaffirmed that the state had warned its “good friends in Germany” to limit deep relations with Russia, because “one day they will regret” it.
The state’s proactive approach was also facilitated by a strong diversification policy that aimed to wean Lithuania from Russian energy dependence. This campaign accelerated after Russia’s invasion of Crimea in 2014, when the state commissioned a liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminal in Klaipėda. This energy security insurance policy, questioned by some, paid off following the invasion of Ukraine in 2022: having already significantly diluted its previous 100% dependence on Russian gas, the state was able to eradicate it entirely with increased imports through Klaipeda.
Lithuania’s LNG project can also be viewed through a wider geopolitical lens. It not only diluted energy dependence on Russia, but also drew the state closer to its key ally, the United States. A widely held view throughout the Lithuanian political classes is that the US military presence in the region is a key guarantor of territorial sovereignty: the 2020 parliamentary resolution defining Lithuania’s long-term foreign policy direction defines it as “an indispensable ally”. The US has long played an important role in facilitating energy independence rhetorically; that it is also a key producer and exporter of LNG add a new dimension to geopolitical cooperation between the states. Upon receiving the first shipment of LNG from the US, Lithuanian Foreign Minister remarked that energy trade was “one of the strategic areas for cooperation”. This partnership meant increased US supplies were integral to replacing Russian gas in April.
The importance of multilateral geopolitics and regional cooperation should not be discounted. The integration of Lithuania and the other Baltic States into European electricity grids ended the previously total dependence on Russian imports, while EU funding for those grids, Klaipeda, and, most recently, the Gas Interconnector Lithuania-Poland have contributed to a significant diversification of Lithuania’s energy imports. Beyond representing a tangible form of integration in Europe and a significant geoeconomic collaboration with the Nordic States and Poland, these infrastructures were integral in providing alternative energy sources and thus facilitating the termination of the Lithuanian-Russian energy relationship.
Against the backdrop of Russia’s war on Ukraine, numerous European leaders, including the German Foreign Minister, have acknowledged that they failed to pay sufficient attention to repeated warnings from the Baltic states about Russia. With Russia now perceived as a significant threat to Europe, it will be interesting to observe if and how other EU capitals follow the proactive example set by Lithuania.