Łukasz Kulesa
Deputy Head
Research Office, Polish Institute of International Affairs
Poland
February 24th, 2022, has been frequently labelled as a transformational moment not only Ukraine, but also for European and global international relations. The day of the renewed Russian attack on Ukraine represented also a crucial point for the relations between Poland and the U.S. under the Biden presidency. Before February 2022, the relationship could be best described as awkward or “complex”. The Russian invasion brought the U.S. and Polish administrations together under the overarching goal of providing support to Ukraine. The bond between the two countries seems to have grown stronger, with development of cooperation not just in the security domain, but also in economy and energy spheres.
The complex relationship between the Biden administration and the Polish leadership was influenced by Biden’s predecessor. The experience of the Trump presidency sets Poland apart from the majority of the U.S. allies in Europe. Warsaw succeeded in forging a productive relationship with Trump and his administration, with similarity of worldviews between Trump and the conservative Polish government playing a major role. In the security domain, for example, Poland succeeded in cementing an increased rotational U.S. military presence in the country.
The Biden administration arrived in office with an international agenda that underlined the value of U.S. alliances. In Europe, it aimed primarily at rebuilding the relationship with Germany. That resulted in the relative less attention devoted to Poland, fewer diplomatic contacts, and also controversial decisions such as the May 2021 waiver of U.S. sanctions to non-Russian companies involved in the Nord Stream 2 project, broadly seen in Poland and in the region as damaging for their interests. The Biden administration also frequently raised rule of law, media freedom and human rights issues in Poland. As of late 2021, it seemed that both countries would focus on maintaining the relationship at existing levels rather than substantially strengthening or expanding it.
The renewed Russia aggression against Ukraine has led to the re-affirmation of U.S. commitments to NATO, modification of the policy on Russia, considered now by the U.S. as the “immediate and ongoing threat” to international peace, as massive U.S. engagement in supporting Ukraine. It was also led to strengthening of U.S. military presence in Poland. This included not only emergency deployment of additional forces near the Polish-Ukrainian border, but also the June 2022 decision on the first major permanent deployment of U.S. military personnel in the country (forward headquarters of the Vth Army Corps).
Tragic developments in Ukraine brought the U.S. and Poland closely together politically and strategically. On the practical level, Poland has become the main hub for U.S. assistance outreach to Ukraine. The intensity of the bilateral contacts on all levels increased expeditiously, including the visit of President Biden to Poland in March 2022. Poland’s ‘soft power’ in the U.S. was significantly enhanced by the scope and volume of its assistance towards Ukraine, including the reception of Ukrainian refugees.
With the new dynamics in the political sphere, economic and industrial links with the U.S. have also been strengthened. Defence cooperation had been the most visible element of the bilateral relationship, and it continued after February with procurements of U.S. weapons systems including Abrams main battle tanks and plans for purchase of Apache helicopters. The November 2022 decision to select the U.S. company Westinghouse as the partner in the construction of the first Polish nuclear power plant provided another platform of cooperation, with the overall value of the contract estimated at 20 billion USD.
Despite the renewed sense of unity and purpose brought to the bilateral relations by the war, some problems may lay ahead. These are substantial rather than Biden-specific. Firstly, given the deterioration of the security situation in its vicinity, Poland is determined to secure the expanded U.S. military presence in Poland, with the permanent deployment of U.S. brigade-level units as the next target. The Biden administration, on the contrary, seems to treat the military ‘surge’ in Poland as a temporary measure, to be discontinued in near future. Secondly, Poland needs to react to the increased U.S. focus on Indo-Pacific. Unlike France or the UK, it cannot offer substantial contributions in terms of military presence in the region, as its armed forces remain heavily tilted towards European land warfare. At the same, Poland cannot remain indifferent to the U.S. expectations towards its partners to support American agenda vis-à-vis China and Indo-Pacific.
The complex relationship between the Biden administration and the Polish leadership was influenced by Biden’s predecessor. The experience of the Trump presidency sets Poland apart from the majority of the U.S. allies in Europe. Warsaw succeeded in forging a productive relationship with Trump and his administration, with similarity of worldviews between Trump and the conservative Polish government playing a major role. In the security domain, for example, Poland succeeded in cementing an increased rotational U.S. military presence in the country.
The Biden administration arrived in office with an international agenda that underlined the value of U.S. alliances. In Europe, it aimed primarily at rebuilding the relationship with Germany. That resulted in the relative less attention devoted to Poland, fewer diplomatic contacts, and also controversial decisions such as the May 2021 waiver of U.S. sanctions to non-Russian companies involved in the Nord Stream 2 project, broadly seen in Poland and in the region as damaging for their interests. The Biden administration also frequently raised rule of law, media freedom and human rights issues in Poland. As of late 2021, it seemed that both countries would focus on maintaining the relationship at existing levels rather than substantially strengthening or expanding it.
The renewed Russia aggression against Ukraine has led to the re-affirmation of U.S. commitments to NATO, modification of the policy on Russia, considered now by the U.S. as the “immediate and ongoing threat” to international peace, as massive U.S. engagement in supporting Ukraine. It was also led to strengthening of U.S. military presence in Poland. This included not only emergency deployment of additional forces near the Polish-Ukrainian border, but also the June 2022 decision on the first major permanent deployment of U.S. military personnel in the country (forward headquarters of the Vth Army Corps).
Tragic developments in Ukraine brought the U.S. and Poland closely together politically and strategically. On the practical level, Poland has become the main hub for U.S. assistance outreach to Ukraine. The intensity of the bilateral contacts on all levels increased expeditiously, including the visit of President Biden to Poland in March 2022. Poland’s ‘soft power’ in the U.S. was significantly enhanced by the scope and volume of its assistance towards Ukraine, including the reception of Ukrainian refugees.
With the new dynamics in the political sphere, economic and industrial links with the U.S. have also been strengthened. Defence cooperation had been the most visible element of the bilateral relationship, and it continued after February with procurements of U.S. weapons systems including Abrams main battle tanks and plans for purchase of Apache helicopters. The November 2022 decision to select the U.S. company Westinghouse as the partner in the construction of the first Polish nuclear power plant provided another platform of cooperation, with the overall value of the contract estimated at 20 billion USD.
Despite the renewed sense of unity and purpose brought to the bilateral relations by the war, some problems may lay ahead. These are substantial rather than Biden-specific. Firstly, given the deterioration of the security situation in its vicinity, Poland is determined to secure the expanded U.S. military presence in Poland, with the permanent deployment of U.S. brigade-level units as the next target. The Biden administration, on the contrary, seems to treat the military ‘surge’ in Poland as a temporary measure, to be discontinued in near future. Secondly, Poland needs to react to the increased U.S. focus on Indo-Pacific. Unlike France or the UK, it cannot offer substantial contributions in terms of military presence in the region, as its armed forces remain heavily tilted towards European land warfare. At the same, Poland cannot remain indifferent to the U.S. expectations towards its partners to support American agenda vis-à-vis China and Indo-Pacific.