Zachary Paikin
Dr., Researcher
EU Foreign Policy at the Centre for European Policy
Studies (CEPS)
Brussels, Belgium
zach.paikin@ceps.eu
From the beginning of her tenure, President Ursula von der Leyen has envisioned a ‘geopolitical Commission’. And now, with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the promise of a Zeitenwende, talk has centred on the emergence of the European Union as a ‘geopolitical actor’. Yet, as with other elements of EU jargon, the meaning of this term is contested. Depending on the definition used, one can ascertain the chances for the survival of EU geopolitical power in this new era of great power rivalry.
Should geopolitical actorness be equated with the EU’s newfound ability to respond decisively to a major geopolitical crisis on the European continent? Among EU Member States, illusions over Russian intentions have undoubtedly gone by the wayside, resulting in a higher degree of unity towards Moscow than was the case before Putin’s invasion. However, one should distinguish the ability to react decisively in a crisis situation from the more proactive task of crafting a durable, common understanding of European interests. Thus far, EU external action remains a tool to amplify the reach of national foreign policies rather than a replacement for the latter.
What about enhanced hard power capabilities? Should steps forward on EU defence – especially the shift in emphasis from crisis management abroad towards territorial defence and deterrence – be seen as a step towards becoming a geopolitical actor? The result of Russia’s war is the further entrenchment of NATO as the primary organisation responsible for the defence of Europe. EU geopolitical actorness can therefore only be achieved through deeper cooperation between the EU and NATO. While this can be done in a way that respects the EU’s decision-making autonomy, there is little doubt that Washington is now better placed than Brussels to shape the Ukraine war’s endgame – and thus shape the content of the continent’s future security order.
Given this constraint on the EU’s term-setting ability in its own neighbourhood, it is hard to imagine Brussels emerging as one of the key poles at the global level, save for on a few specific policy issues. In fact, with Russia’s great power status also being questioned following its botched invasion, the world appears increasingly (albeit not entirely) bipolar. Although the EU’s competency in the realm of trade allows it to appear as a ‘geopolitical’ player vis-à-vis China, the rules and the power balance governing the geographical terrain of the Indo-Pacific will be primarily litigated between Washington and Beijing, with others in a more auxiliary (albeit not unimportant) role.
This brings us to the technical – and perhaps still the most useful – definition of ‘geopolitical’, namely the pursuit of political interests across a geographical space, which should be distinguished from mere power politics or polarity.
According to this more traditional understanding of the concept, the EU has been a de facto geopolitical actor since the adoption of the European Neighbourhood Policy in the mid-2000s. When paired with the 2004 and 2007 rounds of enlargement which placed the EU on the border of the post-Soviet space, this led the promotion of EU norms to become geopolitical in effect, even if not in intent.
The EU was able to use this geopolitical influence to great effect – and in a uniquely EU fashion. By promising market access and pushing for political and economic reforms, the EU encouraged states such as Ukraine to align themselves closer and closer to the orbit of Brussels, without the need to apply hard power. While all international orders offer a mixture of coercion and consent, this one was situated decidedly more towards the ‘consent’ side of the spectrum, at least with respect to government-to-government relations.
Whether this ‘softer’ form of geopolitical influence can survive the return of hard power in Europe has become a key question facing the EU.
On the one hand, offering candidate country status to Ukraine – which would likely not have been on the table if not for the war – marks a major milestone in potentially reshaping the space occupied by the EU on the continent. If Ukraine does eventually become a full Member State, this could imbue the European peace project with new life, drastically improving the EU’s soft power influence in Russia. Moreover, a strong and prosperous Ukrainian democracy would dramatically reshape the regional security balance, providing a bulwark between Central Europe and Russia rather than a vacuum at the extremity of competing spheres of influence.
On the other hand, the problems plaguing EU reform and enlargement have not entirely been overcome. The Western Balkans continue to linger outside the EU, despite (limited) recent progress on the accession process and the promise of a more innovative relationship offered by the European Political Community. No agreement exists between Member States on how to sequence enlarging the EU’s membership and reforming its decision-making. In fact, existing disagreements have likely been exacerbated by declining trust between the Franco-German axis and newer Member States given their differing approaches to the Ukraine war (although these are occasionally differences of perceived style rather than policy substance).
In short, it does not appear as though the war has resolved the basic shortcomings which limit the EU’s influence in its own neighbourhood, rooted in disunity among Member States and a binary ‘in or out’ accession process. Despite talk of a Zeitenwende, the EU’s overall method of engagement with its neighbours has not verily changed, save for specific actions such as repurposing the European Peace Facility for an era of war. With Ukraine’s accession likely to take a decade or more, it will be years before we know whether the EU’s geopolitical influence will survive the trauma of Putin’s invasion.