Claudia Müller
Member of the German Bundestag
Germany's Eastern European policy is in shambles. The Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 shattered the post-cold war European peace order and abruptly burst some of the bubbles of German foreign policy.
Germany's foreign policy gaze towards Middle and Eastern Europe (MOE) was long in a felt tradition of Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik. Coupled with a plea for forgiveness, the Social Democratic Chancellor made a historic attempt in the early 1970s to largely normalise Germany's relations with the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact states after the German atrocities during the Second World War. For large parts of German society, the Ostpolitik formed the basis of a new self-satisfaction with itself and its relationship with the Eastern European states.
In Germany, these political maxims were carried over into the 21st century. Large parts of the German public and politicians, subsequently began to make two momentous mistakes: first, from then on, when looking to the MOE region, they were only looking towards Russia.
And secondly, as other European states were already beginning to look towards Moscow with an unclouded gaze, relations in this country were stubbornly continued or even expanded in a naive manner.
Thus, German society accepted, largely without debate, that Putin's Russia increasingly claimed the historical legacy of the Soviet Union. Therefore, it claimed a right to interfere with the doings of its neighbouring states, or better to say that those states had to take Russian interests into account of their internal, and international policies.
How little Germany was willing to look at the other states in the region or even to take their perspective into account, is shown by the large number of missed opportunities. For example, it was only after 24 February that the German public became aware of how strong and justified the security needs of the MOE NATO countries are. Before that, neither the war in Georgia in 2008, nor the extremely brutal Russian warfare in Chechnya and Syria, nor the trail of blood from Russian assassinations across Europe, the creation of a conflict in eastern Ukraine or the annexation of Crimea in 2014 had fundamentally shaken Germany's image of Russia. Full of conviction that the German-Russian partnership would remain close in the future, the plans for the large-scale Nord Stream 2 energy project were signed in 2015.
The ruins of this misguided German Ostpolitik now lie at the bottom of the Baltic Sea.
It is obvious that Germany must restart its MOE policy. The pivotal point should be the Baltic Sea.
On the one hand, the construction and great support of the Nord Stream 2 project has strongly effected Germany‘s relation with its direct neighbours in the region. Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland have always been strong critics of the project. Unfortunately their objections were taken light-heartily by many in the German governments before. The Green Party Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock is trying to change this view of German politics upon the region, making one of her first trips after the Russian attack on Ukraine in 2022 to the Baltic States. The trip was an important gesture of solidarity.
On the other hand, many German interests culminate around the Baltic Sea. Many of these interests are interconnected. In terms of security policy, the Baltic Sea will increasingly come into focus. With the accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO, the Baltic Sea will no longer be just an EU inner sea, but also NATO's Mare Nostrum. However, in the near future, the Baltic Sea will not be a sea of security cooperation, but of confrontation, since Russia also has two access points. The attack on the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, though the complete background is not yet fully known, has shown how vulnerable the security in the region is. However, increased cooperation in this area is absolutely necessary, as this is the only way to address the challenges and properly exploit the advantages.
For example, the Baltic Sea region is essential for Germany's future energy supply. Closer connections will allow a more effective and efficient European use of renewable energies such as offshore wind, as well as the import and distribution of liquid energy sources in the future.
It is also becoming apparent that the Baltic Sea will be particularly hit hard by the effects of the climate crisis. How we will deal with its effects and how they can be mitigated, is a task that we will only be able to solve together in the Baltic Sea region.
A stronger focus on the countries of the Baltic Sea region within German politics must also be accompanied by a change of mind set in German society. There needs to be an openness to rethink the old, to put stereotypes about the region to the test and to update the view of the region. And that might be the most difficult challenge ahead for German and international politicians and stake holders in and of the region.