Illimar Ploom
Estonian Military Academy
Tartu, Estonia
Viljar Veebel
Baltic Defence College
Tartu, Estonia
Kremlin information influence campaigns in Estonia intensified first just before the first Russian attack against Ukraine in 2014. Since 2019, intensity and variability of attacks has been in rise again. What are the aims, centre of gravity and critical variables of this systematic hostile activity?
The information influence campaigns conducted by the Russian Federation form an aspect of a wider, hybrid warfare front. Also, this front has been set up against the wider West, not merely Estonia. Hence, these country-specific campaigns have rarely separate aims apart from those informing the long-term goals of undermining the cohesion within the West, both between the countries, as well as within separate societies and especially separate language groups. Thus, while messages in Russian are aimed to hail Russian political and military power, messages in Estonian are aimed to disintegrate and disseminate Western culture and society.
What motivates the Kremlin for its activities is the still alive imperialistic consciousness that allows it to perceive itself of being besieged by the West (often called Global Anti-Russia or collective West by the Kremlin). Ever since the post-Cold War settlement Russia has felt that the West has gradually overtaken regions that historically belong to its ’sphere of special interest’. The enlargements of NATO and the EU are the matters at hand. But more than that, the Kremlin believes that events like the Arab Spring and the coloured revolutions among the former Soviet Union member states are initiated and conducted largely by the West. While there is hardly any substance to support these beliefs, the conduct of the West can in certain aspects be seen as dangerous. What particularly frustrated the Kremlin was the removal of Muammar Gaddafi by the Western coalition. Ukraine as an ancient Slavic-Russian territory fits to this Russian narrative well. Especially since the legal president Yanukovich was forced out of the country.
This perception has made the Kremlin to get into a retaliotary revisionist mode and, step by step, it has tried to claim back ’its own’ or at least limit the spread of the Western influence, by demanding security guarantees. Suffice it to mention separatism in Moldova, Georgia, Ukraine and later open conflicts in the latter two. Russian practice and theory have evolved hand in hand. In 2013 one could see the publication of its best known theoretical version by General Valery Gerassimov (“Gerassimov Doctrine”). Along its proposed lines, mirroring supposed Western hybrid action, the Russian federation uses several tools to allow it to place pressure on the Western world in an asymmetric manner, including soft power, cyber-attacks, espionage, economic tools, and information-influence campaigns.
When it comes to influence and propaganda activity, the Kremlin uses several manipulation tactics like disinformation campaigns, fake news, and disseminating specially constructed narratives towards target audiences in the West. These channels and their content are harnessed primarily within Russia’s neighbourhood where there are still substantial Russophone (or Soviet nostalgic) populations which have not yet been successfully integrated into local societies in the post-Soviet space, among them Estonia. With this population segment being part of Western institutions, Estonia proves a worthy target when it comes to being able to show the inherent corruption and ineffectiveness of the West as a whole. Eventually, what makes the measures it uses relatively effective, are the internal socio-economic and ideological divisions within the Western nations originating from the time of 2007 global financial crisis.
Of particular importance are so-called strategic narratives,[1] instruments which manipulate with stories which exist within the collective memory of a group of people. Those narratives are put working towards strategic aims.
By the example of Estonia in 2020-2021, a grand total of seventeen narratives were found and categorised by narrative tracking computer program Exovera. The five most relevant of these are as follows: 1. NATO is a hostile and fragile relic. 2. The west is corrupt, imperialistic, discriminatory, and in decline. 3. Russia is powerful, but also a victim of the aggressive West. 4. Estonia as well as other Baltic states are plagued by poor governance. 5. Russophobia and fascism are present in Estonia.[2]
During parallel observations with the Zignal narrative tracker platform, the four most popular pro-Kremlin narratives in Estonia in 2021 have been as follows: 1. The west is weak and divided; the west is not better than Russia. 2. Liberal values are not succeeding. 3. Migration pressure will disintegrate western societies. 4. Russia is the world’s main protector of traditional values.[3]
For the spread of disinformation, the Kremlin uses several tools, channels, and measures, such as: Pax Russica and the compatriot policy; Russian media; Social media; Pro-Russian activists and pro-Russian NGOs and clubs; Business connections between Estonia and Russia; The prevailing political environment; Cyber-attacks; Targeting democratic systems. Specific means and tools differ depending from language groups. Estonian speakers are mostly addressed by the alternative online portals. Older Russian speakers are addressed by Television channels, younger by Telegramm channels and Twitter.
[1] Miskimmon, A., O’Loughlin, B., & Roselle, L. (2013). Strategic narratives, communication power, and the new world order. New York: Routledge.
[2] Veebel, Viljar. "Russian Strategic Narratives Related to Estonia." A Restless Embrace of the Past?: 161.
[3] Veebel, Viljar, Illimar Ploom, and Vladimir Sazonov. "Russian information warfare in Estonia, and Estonian countermeasures." Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review 19.1 (2021).