Artis Pabriks
Dr., Director
The
Northern Europe Policy Centre
Latvia
In the summer of 2022, Madrid hosted a NATO summit to discuss the new realities in the European security environment. Already five months have passed since Russia initiated a full-scale invasion in neighboring Ukraine. It was a war whose violence, crimes against civilians, number of casualties, and number of refugees reminded of the Second World War. The consequences of this war, whenever it will end or expand, would have a dramatic impact on European and world security comparable to WW2. This war is not about Ukraine only, it is about the existing world order, Western value system, and the future of the Western alliance, including the transatlantic alliance.
In 2022, most of the member countries of the EU and NATO Alliance did not expect and were not prepared to face such a war in their close proximity. Militarily, during the last decades, most Western countries have been efficiently disarming, dismantling their armies, and closing many production lines of military equipment. Their warehouses were left half-empty. It was broadly assumed that the main Western challenge is international terrorism, and military engagement was expected to be mainly expeditionary. As a result, in 2022, formerly well-trained and armed Western armies were only a meager shadow compared to those of the Cold War era. Western public views were focused on culture wars and discussing the consequences of global warming but neglected threats to their fundamental freedoms challenged by the growing Russian totalitarian threat and rising alliance of authoritarian regimes around the globe.
Despite the fact that territorial defense was always on our minds, also Latvia, after joining NATO in 2004, somehow started to follow this widespread pattern. General assumptions of Allied priorities and analysis slowly eroded our alertness to danger as well. Compulsory military service was abolished, and we started to rely on professional troops and voluntary National Guard service.
Latvia intensively prepared its military for international missions. The military budget was slowly giving in to other national needs of the country in transition, like health, road infrastructure, education, and social affairs. As a result, in 2010, Latvian military spending was only about 1% of GDP. It was very difficult to argue in favor of larger military spending when most of our allies, further to the West, simply disregarded any possibility of military conflict on European soil. Also, the financial crisis took its toll on military spending in NATO despite our warnings that Russia continues to invest in its military and could potentially pose a danger to Europe. At large, the mainstream West did not see and did not want to see Russia as a threat despite these warnings from mainly Eastern European and Baltic analysts, who were frequently labeled by their Western colleagues as warmongers and troublemakers, among others, undermining lucrative Western business with Russia.
As Wesley Clark puts it in his brilliant CSIS interview, the misreading of Russia was huge, with disastrous consequences. The West, for years, was concerned about Putin's red lines, not about the Western red lines, which were either not defined or allowed to be crossed without any consequences, and it happened for years, encouraging Russian aggression against neighboring countries.
The Madrid Summit of NATO was an attempt to change it. Among other things, it envisaged additional troop stationing along the eastern borders of the Alliance. Finland and Sweden applied to NATO seeking a security umbrella against future threats from Russia, thus abolishing their long-established policies. NATO declared it would support Ukraine in its rightful defense and provide it with additional military equipment and humanitarian aid. Later on, it became a slogan “to stand with Ukraine as long as it takes.” Within the Alliance, as far as Baltic requests were taken into account, promises were made to station allied troops of brigade size in each of the three Baltic states, and there was a political promise to defend their territories from the first centimeter, inch, or meter. It was a change of NATO posture, since previously it was frequently argued that Baltic states are difficult to defend, and in the event of an unlikely Russian invasion, some territories would be lost to invaders and to be liberated later. In Madrid, this attitude changed, which has meant that its military and defense planning should be adjusted accordingly.
Changes happened also in the Baltic countries, which increased their military readiness and spending already since the 2014 Russian invasion in Ukraine and annexation of the Crimean Peninsula. Lithuania and later Latvia revived compulsory military service, military spending was aimed at 3% of GDP, new purchases of equipment were ordered, industry adapted to military needs, and volunteers were joining National Guard formations. In January 2024, defense ministers of Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania agreed to coordinate their activities and strengthen their respective borders with Russia militarily. There were public requests by the author of these lines to construct a modern Mannerheim Defense Line stretching from the north of Finland to the south of Poland in order to safeguard independence from uninvited Russian intruders.
Baltic observers were carefully analyzing the Russian invasion in Ukraine and faced quite a bleak picture. Russians followed their historic tradition, and just like in previous wars, they were ready to sacrifice great numbers of their soldiers in order to achieve even relatively small gains. Russian society was under massive information control of the regime, and there were no signs of unrest that could threaten the totalitarian rule of the Kremlin. During the last two years, the Russian economy was put on a military footing, while the Western economy was not. Western support to Ukraine was decreasing due to internal quarrels in member states and among member states, thus forcing Ukrainian troops to save ammunition and adopt defensive strategies. Even in 2024, there is still murmuring in some countries further to the West from the Baltics about supporting Ukraine, but few want to admit that support is not sufficient and it comes too late. Politically, there is not yet a clear message that Ukraine must win and Russia must lose this war; rather, reality can be described by political strategy which does not make Ukraine lose and Russia win.
I would argue it is a defeatist strategy, a naked blindness that encourages Moscow for new wars, challenges Western unity by eroding trust of mutual military assistance, weakens Transatlantic unity, and encourages authoritarian regimes across the globe to unite against Western liberal democracies and, first of all, against the USA.
Looking from the Baltic perspective which, if common sense would prevail, in fact should be the Western perspective, Ukrainian victory is crucial for the future peace and security of Europe.
At this moment, countries at the Russian border are fed with promises that if one of NATO “houses” is put on fire, others will immediately come and extinguish it. However, currently, we are letting the arsonist run around the village and burn another house without proper response. With every day, this arsonist becomes more self-confident, more willing to try to burn one more house, including a NATO member country. His target is to challenge the status quo, restore the Russian Empire, and dismantle NATO.
The right deterrence would be to stop him from running around with matches now, but this is not what happens due to continuous and deep misinterpretation of Russian policies in many capitals of our Alliance. During the last years among the Western leadership, there were a number of false claims that too large assistance to Ukraine would lead to escalation. As a result, fear of escalation has led to the failure of credible deterrence, including nuclear deterrence, since more and more observers doubt that in the event of a Russian attack on a NATO member state, the USA would risk a nuclear response. The outcome of doubting deterrence is obvious, namely, the arsonist is getting closer to the Alliance. If the USA and other nuclear allies are not willing and ready to risk nuclear war to deter Russian invasion in the Baltics, it has to win the war against Russia in Ukraine now. We also must calm our fear about possible internal upheaval inside Russia which leads to another fear that if Russia perceives its war in Ukraine as lost, it might have regime changes in Moscow and destabilize the monster. Such a scenario is much less dangerous than Ukrainians losing the war because we give in and appease totalitarian claims.
Due to these political inconsistencies, the Baltic states and other countries in the region feel an increasing existential threat to their freedom and are ready to do what it takes not to let the history of 1939/1941 repeat. Therefore, the Mannerheim Line at the Eastern border with Russia, comprised of defense fortifications, roadblocks, bunkers, minefields, and a number of modern 21st-century installations, should be built in the nearest time. There is a search for deeper military cooperation with new NATO members Finland and Sweden, as well as Poland, and in fact with any ally ready to join the coalition of willing to defend values and freedoms on which our countries are built. Of course, it happens along with persistent assistance to Ukraine, which is the last bastion separating the rest of Europe from a new war.
The alternative is not an option, and the sooner other Western leaderships will understand it, the better. The alternative would include not only the loss of independence for some countries bordering Russia but also the failure of the whole Western system and their values, possible dismantling of NATO with subsequent threats of new global wars in Europe and the Pacific. Therefore, the arsonist must be stopped in Ukraine if we are not willing to face fire at our home.