Gunilla Herolf
Senior Associate Research Fellow
The Swedish Institute of International Affairs
Stockholm, Sweden
No accession to NATO has been like the Swedish, and to a degree, the Finnish one. The two of them were unique in that their accessions took place against the backdrop of war in Europe. Finland was admitted to NATO in April 2023, and as Sweden joined, one year later, the situation has again changed dramatically.
A major concern now is that the Russian war against Ukraine may spread to other countries, primarily Georgia and Moldova, which are already partly controlled by Russia and the objects of Russian attempts of infiltration. Another cause for anxiety has been the statements by Donald Trump on restricting the validity of NATO’s Article 5 to those member states who devote a minimum of 2 percent to their defence. Such statements, by a person who may become the next president of the United States, is seen to damage the credibility of NATO. And if the United States would leave NATO, something that cannot be excluded, the situation in Europe will be extremely dangerous.
The uncertainty that Trump´s statements have created is serious even if none of his statements will lead to a new American policy, and the possibility that Russia becomes tempted to test whether Article 5 is valid for all cannot be ignored.
Effects on Sweden
Unavoidably, these dramatic events, including the awareness that Sweden might be at war within a few years, have affected the discussion in Sweden. While the major motive for joining NATO was to be protected by the alliance, now it is also about the Swedish contributions in crisis and war.
Several types of roles, like the participation in NATO Air Policing, NATO’s Standing Naval Forces and NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence are since long foreseen, planned and talked about.
Another role, has, however, become even more prominent, due to the increasingly serious situation. This is the wartime role of Swedish territory enabling reinforcements to reach Europe from North America as well as serving as a staging and base area for allied ground, sea, and air combat forces. An example of Sweden’s role is the ongoing Steadfast Defender exercise, comprising a total of 90 000 soldiers, in which one of the Swedish roles is to serve as a transit country for troops passing via Norway and Sweden towards frontline countries further east under attack.
New policies in Europe
As Sweden and Finland are adjusting to the new situation of becoming NATO members while facing a future fraught with dangers, other European countries are changing too. Several leaders, like Olaf Scholz and Emmanuel Macron, now express their fears that within a few years NATO may find itself at war with Russia. Their views on how to contribute to Ukraine’s defence often tend to differ, but the views on Russia and the possibilities to come to terms with this country have changed considerably in both Germany and France.
The French policy change is more profound than that of any of the others. President Macron’s vision of the future has for a long time been that of a European pillar that will include a reformed Russia while keeping the United States at some distance. In the light of a prolonged Russian aggression those illusions are now gone. His ambitions are instead focusing on the European Political Community, including a large number of countries, i a Ukraine and the United Kingdom but not Russia.
Another major change on the European scene is the return of Poland to the western fold, symbolized by the revival of the Weimar triangle, of France, Germany and Poland. Together with the changes described above, this means a shift in Europe towards the views that have been held by eastern and northern countries all along.
The impact of European rifts
These changes do not mean that unanimity in Europe is total. There are still considerable differences among political parties and people and a few countries hold views that others label pro-Russian. The fact that all do not see Russia in the same way was illustrated when some dismissed the idea of a Baltic successor to Jens Stoltenberg on the grounds of likely being “too anti-Russian”. This is the region which timely and correctly warned of the Russian attack that others did not see.
It should, however, not be forgotten that Europe has other challenges, prominent among them the war between Israel and Hamas. Again, however, Europeans are divided in their views and both the EU and NATO have little leverage in the area.
Two years ago, after the Russian attack on Ukraine, the western world surprised both themselves and others by their firm support for Ukraine and still new rounds of sanctions are decided on. But the lack of military success for Ukraine has dampened the enthusiasm in Europe and the stalemate in the US Congress which has stopped American support to Ukraine has made the frailty of Western unity clear. As a Trump victory this autumn becomes more probable, the need for cohesion in Europe is crucial and somehow the rifts need to be healed. The stakes could not be higher.