Mikkel Runge Olesen
Senior Researcher
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Denmark
MRO@diis.dk
Since the days of World War II, the northern parts of the Kingdom of Denmark - Greenland and the Faroe Islands - have commandeered special attention from the US, with the Thule Airbase in Greenland being of particular importance. This has given rise to the notion of the ‘Greenland card’ and, to a lesser extent, also the ‘Faroe Islands card’ as a Danish way to leverage its position in the US. Recently, the value of the Arctic “cards” has grown as a result of the changing geostrategic situation in the Arctic. Indeed, we have seen an increased Russian military presence in the Arctic, driven by the dramatic breakdown of Russia-Western relations after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The past decade has also seen a growing Chinese interest in the region proclaiming itself a “near-Arctic” power. Most importantly, however, the US approach to the region shifted from 2019 and onwards towards a focus on the region as an arena for great power competition.
As the strategic value of Greenland and the Faroe Islands has increased, so too have Washington’s expectations for Danish security policy in the region. Most importantly for the US has been the question of situational awareness. For years, Denmark’s ability to detect Russian airplanes in Greenlandic or Faroe airspace had been lacking. The same was true for detecting Russian submarines in the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom gap (the GIUK gap). While not initially a serious priority for Denmark, new US interest in Russian activities in the Arctic from 2019 made finding a solution to these shortcomings acute. As a consequence, Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen, a social democrat, announced in December 2019 that Denmark would invest an additional 1,5 billion DKK in surveillance capabilities in the Arctic. Making more of such investments will be necessary.
The importance of the US leadership role in NATO is hard to overstate. The US is not only the supplier of last resort when it comes to security in NATO and the credibility of article five. The voice of the US is also crucial for the direction of NATO in general and for setting priorities in NATO. For Denmark, maintaining good relations with the US has therefore been a key priority for decades. Located at the entrance to the Baltic Sea, the key concern in Denmark is Russia, widely regarded as the only direct great power threat to Denmark. For the same reason, a key concern for Denmark has traditionally been to direct the focus of the US and NATO towards the Baltic Sea region. The Russian annexation of Crimea 2014 and invasion of the rest of Ukraine in 2022 have served to bring a region that had been down prioritized after the successful entry of the Baltic States into NATO and the EU in 2004 to the very top of Danish strategic considerations once again.
To be sure, Denmark’s standing in the US goes beyond its “Arctic cards”. For years, Danish reputation as a useful and steadfast ally has been underscored by Danish participation in US and NATO coalitions abroad in places like Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan. This military activism has also served to compensate for Denmark’s traditionally relatively low defense spending, which is only recently beginning to rise. However, US appetite for over-the-horizon military interventions in the style of the 2000’s and the 2010’s is declining, further contributing to the importance of the Arctic for US-Danish relations. As the ‘Greenland card’ and the ‘Faroe Islands card’ have risen to prominence, the question now becomes whether they are Denmark’s to play or if Greenland and the Faroe Islands themselves could leverage their newfound strategic value? The ‘Greenland card’ in particular has been singled out by especially Greenlandic politicians as an asset for a future independent Greenland.
As the Danish Constitution states that security policy is the prerogative of Copenhagen, exclusive use of these cards would likely require independence. On the other hand, the two Arctic nations should be careful not to overestimate their strategic value, as it is unlikely to equate the approximately 4 billion DKK that Greenland currently receives from Denmark in yearly transfers (the Faroes receives a much smaller yearly transfer). Still, there may be other ways for them to benefit. Since 2020, the Greenlandic and the Faroe ministers of foreign affairs have been allowed to participate directly in several meetings between Copenhagen and Washington. The Faroes managed to use these meetings to begin negotiating a partnership agreement with the US on a wide range of issues, including trade. This could point the way forward for how the Greenland and the Faroe cards may be played in the future for the good of the entire Kingdom of Denmark.