Kristian L. Nielsen
Research Fellow
Corvinus Institute of Advanced Studies, Corvinus University of Budapest
Hungary
kristian.nielsen@uni-corvinus.hu
Russia’s war on Ukraine has galvanized transatlantic relations, and may yet rip them asunder. The tumultuous Trump years were a nadir for the transatlantic alliance. Donald Trump did not endear himself to many be labelling NATO ‘obsolete’ and the EU ‘a foe’. Joe Biden’s presidency has been a return to more normal times. The US and the Europeans have put away the threats of trade wars, and are slowly approaching a consensus on how to deal with China. Yet, however tragic, the Russian war has also been a major factor in the improved relationship.
The war restored a sense of common purpose, as both Europe and the US rallied in support of Ukraine. It demonstrated once more the need to jointly check Russian aggression. The war also resolved a number of contentious issues within the EU, not least the ongoing debate over energy policy and the dependence on Russian supplies. Germany in particular, having thus far run roughshod over their neighbours’ concerns over the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, also ignoring significant US opposition to the project, was chastised and shamed into backing down.
Germany’s commercially driven approach to Russian relations was discredited, as was the personal diplomatic approach of France’s Emmanuel Macron. These two countries rethink of their past positions brought them closer to that of the US and of the Eastern Europeans who had long sounded the warning on Russia’s intentions. The general consensus in Europe remains solid on helping Ukraine, Viktor Orban of Hungary being the main Putin-versteher, possibly joined by newly elected Robert Fico in Slovakia. However, these two together will not be able to change much; their countries are not strong enough to drive major change, and they are both too dependent on goodwill from other Europeans. The election of Donald Tusk in Poland, ending eight years of EU-sceptic populist rule, has further strengthened the Atlanticist, pro-Ukraine center.
NATO was strengthened through the accession of Finland (hopefully to be joined soon by Sweden), which was a marked turnaround for an organization that Macron had not too long ago described as experiencing ‘brain death’. Clearly no more. The European members finally started taking defence seriously, investing more in their militaries, thereby taking some of the sting out of one the perennially thorny transatlantic issues. The war also settled, for the time being at least, the perennial debate over the role of the EU’s military posture. Several initiatives have been taken to bolster the EU’s military crisis management capacity, yet the war has reaffirmed NATO’s centrality as the main provider of hard security.
Yet, it is in the ‘civilian’ parts of the EU’s foreign and security policy competences that the notion of strategic autonomy makes the most sense. Indeed, the EU already plays a large role in economic assistance to Ukraine, and it will undoubtedly take the lead in reconstruction efforts once the war ends. Together with the member states’ individual efforts, it equals the assistance from the US. Moreover, some of the projects being launched in the sphere of military-industrial policy may well be Europe’s biggest contribution to joint security. If the EU members, with the support of the Commission succeed in upgrading and consolidating their armaments industries it will benefit NATO too. However, there should be no illusions as to the mountain that needs to be climbed before the EU members can produce, say, ammunition in the quantities needed for the war in Ukraine. Conversely, it will only be achieved in the framework of the EU.
The political chaos in the US Congress in October shows that the current sense of common purpose may be short-lived. Although help for Ukraine was only a minor factor in the ousting of the Speaker of the House, it was one of the issues being held hostage by the Trump-supporting Freedom Caucus. Among this segment, aid for Ukraine has become controversial, not least since Donald Trump himself has long ago come out in opposition to further assistance. Given political polarization, it is far from certain that Joe Biden, the Democrats, and the more moderate wing of the Republicans will be able to steer a steady course heading into an election year. It may soon strain relations, if Europeans, already struggling as it is, have to shoulder a greater part of the burden in supporting Ukraine militarily.
The real nightmare scenario, of course, is that Donald Trump returns to the presidency. Not only will few cherish a return to his unpredictable style of foreign policy. Given his past statements of admiration for Vladimir Putin, it is unlikely that Trump will continue Biden’s policy. That will leave the EU to contain Russia on its own, which it will struggle to do. It will also once more renew the debate on the future of NATO, of which Trump has continued questioning the value. Both developments would drastically worsen Europe’s strategic situation. Moreover, it is hard imagining either development happening without leading to major recriminations both within Europe and across the Atlantic.
While the ambition of greater strategic autonomy is worthwhile, and must be pursued, it is doubtful whether Europeans are ready to have the ambition tested in short term. A disinterested America, a Russia that cannot be contained, and an ever more assertive China; those will not be ideal circumstances. Whatever the ambition level, the fact remains that the EU is the junior partner in the transatlantic alliance. The response to Russia’s war on Ukraine has underlined that, even as it galvanized the alliance. Joe Biden did much to restore a semblance of normality to transatlantic relations, and his actions have been essential in addressing Europe’s most pressing security problem. Yet much is riding on his ability to remain in office beyond January 2025, lest transatlantic relations destabilize once more and European security takes a turn for the worse.