Rasmus Brun Pedersen
Associate Professor, PhDDepartment of Political Science, Aarhus University
Denmark
brun@ps.au.dk
With Finland and Sweden's decisions to join NATO and Denmark's decision to lift its defense opt-out, the Nordic countries have come together as military allies within NATO and as partners in the EU's defense initiatives for the first time. Collectively, the Nordic nations possess robust military capabilities on land, at sea, and in the air. This collective strength enables the Nordic countries to assume significant security responsibilities and provide credible deterrence in the Baltic Sea region. Presently, the Baltic Sea area and the High North continue however to rely heavily on the presence of NATO and US forces in the Baltics, as well as the investments made by the United States in military infrastructure and bases crucial for maintaining credible deterrence.
In NATO, countries can ‘pay’ for protection in different ways: ‘Input indicators’ largely relate to investments in territorial defense, ensuring that no one gets a free security ride. Output indicators pertain to participation in various out-of-area operations, where members share risks through military engagements and commitments to out of area operation.
The debate in the Nordic countries has primarily revolved around the input side, emphasizing military investments, the reinforcement of military forces, and capacity-building in the Baltic Sea region. Less attention has been given to the Nordic countries' future commitments to output indicators. Following Russian aggression, the Nordic countries are increasingly expected to contribute to the defense of the Eastern and Southern flanks by supporting weaker and more exposed NATO and partnership countries.
Furthermore, due to the new division of labor between NATO and the EU, Europeans will need to assume a greater role and take on more responsibility for broader European security, including countering extremism in the Sahel, migration problems in North Africa, deterrence in the Black Sea region and the Artic. While Sweden and Finland have participated in various EU-led operations over the past decades, engagement in NATO operations under U.S. leadership takes on a different character, as participation as a partially payments for the security guarantee will assume a different character compared to the peacekeeping operations under UN leadership and the EU-led operations. Denmark and Norway already have a long tradition and extensive experience in participating in such operations while Sweden (and to some extend Finland) has already made some experiences through the partnership program and through involvement in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and the Libya coalition.
The Nordic countries will however face ever growing demands to participate in EU, NATO, and, to a lesser extent, UN operations as the security situation around NATO and EU borders deteriorates rapidly. This will place pressure on meeting the dual demands of delivering on both input and output indicators for the Nordic countries. The increased demands for input contributions will certainly consume many resources in the years ahead, particularly the Danish defense requiring significant investments. Coupled with the high ambitions to support and equip Ukraine in its struggle against the Russian aggressor, future deployments and stabilization efforts will impose significant constraints on the armed forces.
This raises the obvious question of what the Nordic countries should focus on in the future as participation in out of the Nordic area operations will increase in the future. Different historical experiences and strategic cultures mean that it might take time and that significant political efforts are needed to realize the potentials. Here it has been highlighted that the other Nordic countries have viewed Denmark as less engaged in Nordic military and security policy cooperation which have been characterized by a close and substantial cooperation between the Finnish, Norwegian, and Swedish militaries, which will require time and effort for the Danish Armed Forces to catch up with.
Common external threats have however pushed the countries toward a shared threat assessment which may open the way for more cooperation and coordination. One future option could as it has been suggested in the Danish security rapport from 2022 be to consider a reform of NORDEFCO, which has played a pivotal role in Nordic military and security policy cooperation, primarily due to the close bilateral Swedish-Norwegian and Swedish-Finnish defense collaborations. With the integration of the Nordics into the EU and NATO, it would be natural to shift NORDEFCO's role from operational and joint projects toward a forum for Nordic coordination and policy development within the EU and NATO.