For decades, Denmark has followed a doctrine of Super-Atlanticisim (as is appropriately called by Dr Hans Mauritzen), seeing its relationship with the US as a special one. Or as the Danish Prime Minister in the past seven years Mette Frederiksen dictates: “There should not be a single A4 sheet of paper between the US and Europe (read:Denmark).” For over 150 years, Denmark has held onto a strong identity of a small, open, and democratic country that punches over its weight in international affairs.
Those are two important reasons why, since the first Trump term from 2018, Denmark’s policy towards China has turned from pursuing a comprehensive strategic partnership to stronger criticism of China’s authoritarian rule and derisking from Chinese elements in the value chains. When Trump in his second term showed that his demand of Greenland was serious, Denmark’s dream of a special relationship with the US was shattered. But that does not mean Denmark is turning towards China. While some other Western leaders have streamed to Beijing to talk about trade and a stable international order in 2026, Denmark remains in lingering between what it calls democratic idealism and pragmatic realism.
From value-based to pragmatic idealism
Under Mette Frederiksen’s first term (2019-2022), Denmark followed a value-based foreign policy. It involved strong support of Ukraine in the country’s fight against Russia, support of Taiwan against potential authoritarian rule by mainland China, close relations with other democratic countries, and using aid to promote democracy in developing countries. At the same time, it also involved a loyal following of the US, close relations with Israel, restriction on immigration, and distancing itself from authoritarian countries especially China.
After the government changed from a single center-left party to also include center and center-right parties in 2022, the new foreign minister (and former prime minister) Lars Løkke Rasmussen launched a new Foreign and Security Policy Strategy in summer 2023 from value-based to pragmatic idealism. In its preface, Rasmussen writes: “We must not be naïve. Countries act according to their own interests, not according to what would be good for Denmark.”
What that means for Denmark’s China policy, should be a more balanced approach than the earlier distancing and critiques. One that would include more engagement and normal business while recognizing that “China wants more elbow room” and that Denmark should defend itself against unfair economic competition from China through cooperation in the EU.
However, in practice, rather than a fine, active balancing act that we see in many middle powers in Asia between the US and China, and between politics and economy, Denmark’s current China policy has so far more resembled lingering: still driven by a strong ideology and undecided about how to embrace the new realities.
Security suspicions and market competition
As a symbol of renewed engagement between China and Denmark under the new government in 2022 with Lars Løkke Rasmussen as Foreign Minister, the two countries launched a Green Joint Work Programme 2023-2026 to deepen cooperation on climate, energy, environment, and agriculture. However, various hurdles already stand in the way. Since Denmark’s rejected Huawei’s bid for the country’s 5G network in 2019, security suspicions of China have spread to other products, including operation systems in electric vehicles (EVs), security cameras, medical devices, and air friers.
The security suspicions derive largely from the Danish Defence Intelligence Service (DDIS)’s risk assessment. It has over the years warned against threats from China, and in its latest annual Intelligence Outlook published in December 2025, China is seen to aim to assert regional dominance in Asia, force reunification with Taiwan, strengthen its position relative to the US, reduce Western influence in international affairs, deepen its partnership with Russia, and seek economic and technological self-sufficiency. China’s effort to transfer technology from the West through legitimate and illicit means is considered the greatest threat to Danish research, innovation, and technology. All those reasons make China a significant security risk to Denmark in the eyes of the Danish intelligence.
Therefore, although the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Danish National Bank consider China irreplaceable for the Danish economy because of its market, innovations, and position in the supply chains, the predominant China policy is de-risking.
Moreover, the Danish windmill giant Vestas is feeling the pressure of Chinese competition. While Vestas still leads in the global overall installed capacity, Chinese companies are catching up quickly in new installations. When the Danish government reached an agreement on subsidizing offshore windfarms in June 2025, Danish land-based windfarm developers started to consider buying Chinese produced windmills. That led to questions in the media about the quality of Chinese windmills, the risks of relying on China for supply of energy, and the security risk of allowing China a backdoor into Denmark’s critical infrastructure.
Then against the backdrop of COP30 in Brazil in November 2025, a major story broke out in Danish media that Danish aid to China in the past transferred wind technology in an effort to help China become green, which is believed to help China compete against Danish producers today. The Danish model of development cooperation is thereby fundamentally questioned if the developing country partner can potentially become an economic or geopolitical competitor in the future.
Sailing in a new direction?
Against the background of security suspicion, fear of competition, and ideological concerns in Denmark about China, it was extraordinary that Danish Minister for Industry, Business and Financial Affairs, Morten Bødskov, visited China in January 2026 and renewed a bilateral framework agreement on green maritime technology and shipbuilding. China’s shipbuilding capacity and Danish green shipping solutions are described as a perfect match for green transition in global shipping. It remains to be seen whether the agreement can be fully implemented now that the Danish shipping giant Mærsk took over temporary operation of the Balboa terminal at the Panama Canal despite Chinese government opposition, after Panama nullified the operation rights of the Hong Kong company CK Hutchison.
As Denmark negotiates and welcomes a new government after the general election in March 2026, where Lars Løkke Rasmussen plays a crucial role, a slight change in Denmark’s China policy is possible. Pragmatism may become more prominent, whether in the form of cooperating with China or defending Denmark’s commercial interests. At the same time, many Danish politicians and elites still believe in the liberal world order led by the West, and they are reminiscent of a world led by a more normal US and waiting for its return.
Yang Jiang
Senior Researcher
Danish Institute for International Studies
Denmark
