Are the Nordic-Baltic countries (NB8) on the cusp of opening a new chapter in their complicated relationship with the People’s Republic of China? Since the end of the Cold War, relations have oscillated markedly. From clashes over human rights and sanctions in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square massacre to an enthusiastic cultivation of strategic partnerships during the “Golden Era” in the 2000 and 2010s – and back again to hardened mutual perceptions when the US-China great power rivalry started to intensify in the late 2010s. As the Trump administration is now disrupting the liberal order, abandoning its European allies and pursuing a commercial détente with China, the NB8 appear increasingly willing to adopt a more pragmatic approach towards Beijing.
During the 2018-24 period of intense US-China rivalry, the NB8 generally viewed China not merely as a security threat, but as a systemic challenger to the liberal rules-based international order. They went further than most other European countries in their de-risking strategies – especially with respect to 5G and critical infrastructure – and they also adopted a vocal stance on human rights issues, with their joint 2021 declaration on Chinese human rights abuses in the Xinjiang province being a case in point. While close ties to Washington and a self-image as staunch supporters of liberal democracy shaped their China-critical position, several NB8 countries had also experienced their own protracted bilateral disputes with Beijing, including Norway (following the awarding of the Nobel Prize to a Chinese dissident in 2010), Sweden (after the abduction of a Swedish citizen in 2016), Denmark (linked to the Tibet investigative commission during 2017-20) and Lithuania (because of the permission in Vilnius for a “Taiwanese” representative office in 2021). Compounding these tensions, China’s extensive support for Russia’s war in Ukraine (2022-) has been widely seen across the NB8 as undermining their core security interests.
Early signs of a more pragmatic turn were already observable in 2023, when the Biden administration resumed high-level diplomatic reengagement with the Chinese government. One example was the renewal in August 2023 – after years of stalled negotiations – of the Danish-Chinese strategic partnership program, albeit in a far slimmer and scaled-down version. Moreover, both Finland and Norway sent their head-of-states to Beijing in 2024, followed last year by the foreign ministers of Denmark, Estonia, Norway and Sweden as well as Finland’s prime minister and Iceland’s president. While these NB8 visitors have all publicly insisted on raising unresolved disputes and disagreements with their Chinese counterparts, they have also highlighted the importance of political dialogue with Beijing, the opportunities for economic cooperation and China’s pivotal role in global affairs. The clearest shift towards pragmatism, however, has emerged in Lithuania. The new prime minister Inga Ruginiene has described the dispute over the labeling of the Taiwanese representative office as “a mistake” and signaled openness to traveling to Beijing to normalize diplomatic relations, which are currently downgraded to chargé d’affairs.
Meanwhile, beyond symbolic gestures such as visa-free travel arrangements, the Chinese government has done little to address the underlying concerns that – apart from the US-China rivalry – prompted the NB8 to distance themselves from Beijing in the first place. China remains a critical enabler of Russia’s war in Ukraine, continues with its military intimidation of Taiwan, tightens its authoritarian control over Hongkong, reinforces its export-led growth model and expands its capacity for geoeconomic coercion. Rather than concessions, Beijing seems confident that its growing dominance in critical technologies and global supply chains – particularly those linked to the green transition – will gradually encourage the NB8 to accommodate themselves. Chinese green tech, including electric vehicles, solar panels and batteries for storage of renewable energy, is already making significant inroads into the Nordic-Baltic region, while several Nordics countries are stepping up their bilateral cooperation with China in areas such as green shipping and geothermal energy.
Even so, skepticism towards China is deeply entrenched across the NB8, notably within the intelligence communities, whose annual reports continue to highlight China as a security threat. And although China has generally receded into the background following Trump’s return to the White House, media coverage of China in the NB8 countries remains largely negative. Thus, although Washington’s MAGA posture has prompted the NB8 to reassess their approach to China, the current warming of bilateral relations is unlikely to herald a new “golden era”.
Andreas B. Forsby
Senior Researcher, PhD
The Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Denmark
