In times of renewed geopolitical competition and spheres-of-influence thinking, it is worth to (re-)assess the risk China may represent to Arctic security and regional order. The PRC has approached the Arctic as space to expand influence, pursuing growing activities of economic, research and development (R&D), political, and military nature. As non-coastal state, China holds no sovereign rights, yet applies its self-declaration of near-Arctic state to shape the region. Climate change is also enabling new access to the Arctic, its resources and shorter transport routes. Despite significant navigation challenges, and resources mostly being within Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) territories, the Arctic’s physical changes feed expectations for economic gain and political influence, which in turn contribute to tension. Key Arctic coastal states1 have reacted in various ways to safeguard their interests. Thus, China-related and geopolitical developments are increasingly putting pressure on the region.
Beijing’s efforts for Arctic influence represent a comprehensive approach that combines economic, R&D, political and military activities. Framing the Arctic as global commons, Beijing claims the right to draw benefits from the region,2 constructing an appearance of legitimacy for its Arctic pursuit. Economic activities include bilateral cooperation with Arctic states; regional large-scale investments in projects, infrastructure, logistics hubs, and land purchases, making China a key investor in the region. The building of polar infrastructure, deepwater ports, polar-class ships, and ground-based satellite stations also raise intelligence and military risks. Plans for a China Center for Cooperation on Development of Special Economic Zones in BRICS Countries may give Beijing an additional edge over others. Linked are R&D activities to expand Arctic-specific technology and expertise, including Arctic scientific expeditions with a home-built icebreaker. The clear fostering of dual-use science for potential military use raises security concerns for the region and beyond.
Political and military activities underline China’s Arctic quest. The goal of becoming a maritime and polar power3 and the Arctic’s definition as new strategic frontier are to be implemented by the Five-Year Plans,4 by improving situational assessments and shaping norms and maritime law and order. As member of the Arctic Council (AC), Beijing can take part in working groups. On the military side, China would be able to push its interests and project military force via a modernized military, anti-access/area-denial capabilities, a blue-water navy, dual-use means, space and cyber capabilities, including potential spoofing and deception of military GPS assets, as well as with a proven aggressive approach in contested waters. Of further importance is the expanding Sino-Russian strategic cooperation, which encompasses advanced military technology, joint nuclear-capable long-range bomber flights near Alaska, and Coast Guard patrols in the Arctic Sea.
Arctic states, notably Canada, the U.S. and Norway, have reacted to China’s activities out of concern for national security and sovereignty as well as Arctic stability. Strategy papers on the Arctic, national security and defence have been updated; surveillance increased; military presence and capacity expanded; threat detection and response capabilities improved. Of growing concern are grey-zone activities below the threshold of actual conflict. Some Arctic states have also pushed back to China’s economic expansion. China’s 2026 draft 15th Five-Year Plan emphasizes scaling up and intensifying Arctic activities, particularly regarding resources, security and autonomous systems.5
China’s continuous expansion of regional and geopolitical influence – with a strong Arctic foothold and as key Arctic stakeholder with economic dependents – raises the stakes for (hybrid) conflict in the region. Rapidly developing AI technology and its inclusion in essential tools/processes add risk to economic, R&D, political and military matters. As non-Arctic state, China is shaping a region partly against sovereign-rights holding states, and possibly undermining coastal states’ rights and the regional order. With existing regulatory bodies lacking the means to deal with security issues, potential (hybrid / grey-zone) conflict cannot be addressed; consequently, the AC could benefit from greater institutionalization and the inclusion of a security mandate. Further needs concern mechanisms for coordination on Arctic security developments, improved early warning and military transparency, and arbitration means. Yet, the reality is also that China will have to be integrated in Arctic security frameworks – in a manner that fosters and steers cooperative behavior and Arctic stability.
Sybille Reinke de Buitrago
Dr., Academic Manager, Researcher, and Associate Professor
Institute for Criminality and Security Research (IKriS) & University of Bremen
Germany
1Arctic states (Canada, Denmark – via Greenland, Norway, Russia, U.S.) hold sovereign rights according to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
2State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China. 2018. China’s Arctic policy. (January). http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2018/01/26/content_281476026660336.htm; State Council. 2015. China’s Military Strategy. PRC. http://english.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2015/05/27/content_281475115610833.htm
3Ibid.
4State Council. 2026. Draft Outline of the 15th Five-Year Plan. https://english.www.gov.cn. Accessed March 12, 2026; State Council. 2021. 14th Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development and Long-Range Objectives Through the Year 2035 of the People’s Republic of China. http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2021-03/13/content_5592681.htm (translation: https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/china-14th-five-year-plan/, Center for Security and Emerging Technology).
5State Council. 2026.
Back to Table of Contents