Jessica Greenberg, Marianne Riddervold & Guri Rosén: A stronger Europe in a weaker transatlantic order

Transatlantic relations have always moved between cooperation and crisis. The Iraq War deeply divided Europe and the US, trade disputes have strained relations, and Trump’s first presidency brought open conflict over NATO, burden-sharing and multilateral cooperation. Yet shared interests, strong economic ties, common institutions and a basic commitment to liberal democracy remained in place even when governments disagreed, allowing the partners to manage disagreements over individual policies within a broader and strong relationship.

Our recent co-edited report, Populism and the Future of Transatlantic Relations: Challenges and Policy Options published by the European Center for Populism Studies argues that this time is different. Under Trump’s second presidency, the transatlantic rift is more severe severe since it cuts across all the four pillars on which the post-war transatlantic relationship has rested: security, trade and finance, international institutions and shared democratic values. President Donald Trump’s questioning of Article 5, threats towards Greenland and changing approach to Ukraine have made the US a less predictable security partner. The US is also more willing to use tariffs and economic pressure against allies, less committed to international cooperation, and increasingly at odds with the EU over international law, democracy and the rule of law.

Today, the country on which Europe relies heavily for its defence also uses trade, finance and, technological dependencies as a source of leverage to enforce its own interests. International institutions are less able to contain disagreements and solve global challenges when Washington is willing to disregard the rules it helped create or even withdraw from cooperation. And as differences over democracy, the rule of law and international law grow, the very value basis on which the transatlantic relationship has rested is now being undermined. The problem is therefore not simply that Europe and the US disagree more over particular policies. The foundations that made such disagreements manageable are themselves weakening.

These changes go beyond Trump and will not disappear with a new US president for two main reasons. First, strategically, while American and European threat perceptions converge in some areas, they do no longer overlap. Washington increasingly focuses on its near abroad, is caught up in the Middle East and sees China as its central long-term strategic challenge. Europe is focused on Russia, dealing with war and insecurity on its own continent.

Second, domestically, political polarization, right-wing populism and growing opposition to international cooperation have weakened the political and value based foundations of the relationship.

The report argues that these domestic political developments may be the most serious long-term challenge to transatlantic cooperation yet. Trump matters not simply because of the policies of one administration, but because the political forces behind him reach beyond one presidency. A future administration may again take a more traditional approach to Europe, but Europeans can no longer assume that the old relationship will simply return.

None of this means that more than seventy years of transatlantic cooperation will simply disappear. Europe and the US remain deeply tied together through NATO, extensive trade and investment, defence-industrial cooperation, technological dependencies and dense public and private networks. On many issues, their interests continue to overlap. These interdependencies  create strong incentives for cooperation even as the broader political relationship weakens. The report therefore identifies a weaker form of ‘muddling through’ as the most likely path for transatlantic relations going forward. In such a scenario, cooperation becomes more issue-contingent, based on the specific interests of either side rather than the broader political and value-based consensus that characterized much of the post-war period. The relationship may therefore become weaker and more interest-based without fully breaking apart.

So what, then, should the EU do going forward? Across the report, the authors argue that the EU needs to continue its quest to become stronger, better coordinated and less dependent on other sactors. It can no longer rely on stable US leadership and must be able to act on its own when necessary. This is what strategic autonomy should mean: It is not about turning away from the US or ending transatlantic cooperation, but about reducing the kind of dependence that leaves Europe unable to respond when American and European interests or values diverge.

That also requires a more unified and firm European position towards Washington. The report argues that the EU should move away from appeasement and respond more clearly when US policies work against European interests. Acting together gives European governments more room to withstand pressure and makes it harder for individual states to be played off against one another. At the same time, Europe should continue to cooperate closely with the US where interests align but be clear about the values and norms it seeks to defend. Democracy, pluralism and the rule of law have been central to the European project and should not be weakened in an effort to preserve transatlantic unity.

A stronger and more autonomous EU is therefore not an alternative to the transatlantic relationship: It may be the best way to preserve it. Europe would be better able to deal with changes in US politics, while also becoming a stronger and more credible partner when the two sides want to act together. Under current conditions, strengthening the EU may be the best way not only to secure autonomy in a more conflictual world, but also of sustaining transatlantic cooperation.

The report: https://www.populismstudies.org/populism-and-the-future-of-transatlantic-relations-challenges-and-policy-options/