Garret Martin: Washington’s cacophony towards European security

The transatlantic partnership has faced its share of challenges and tension since the return of Donald Trump to the White House in January 2025. And few policy areas have been spared these moments of conflict. This includes the fields where we expected friction, such as over burden-sharing in NATO or threatening to leave the Alliance, the use of tariffs, or how to support Ukraine against Russia’s illegal invasion. It has also applied to far more unexpected cases, with Trump’s call to annex Greenland and his surprise war against Iran at the forefront.

Granted, crises and episodes of tension are deeply ingrained in the history of the transatlantic alliance, and all American administrations since 1945, Republicans and Democrats alike, have clashed with their European allies. Yet, the second Trump term still stands out as an outlier when it comes to the cacophony of its approach to Europe, and especially in the field of security. Different groups and factions are jockeying for influence in Washington but have done so in a rather chaotic fashion and by outlining rather contradictory expectations for their European partners. At times, Europe has been asked to become more autonomous and self-reliant in defense, and at other moments the US has sent not so subtle signals that it wants its allies to remain pliable vassals.

European allies have understandably showed great confusion and consternation when dealing with the erratic approach of the US, or what some experts have called the ‘unstrategic ambiguity’ of the Trump administration. There is no shortage of noise coming out of Washington, but decoding which message is relevant and whether the Trump administration will eventually commit to a clear path insofar as European security, will be absolutely critical. After all, Europe is facing very consequential and difficult choices for its future security architecture, which are not likely to be made any easier by the confusion stemming from Washington.

Indeed, for the past decade, Trump has obsessively emphasized the question of burden-sharing, frequently complaining that NATO allies have long taken advantage of the US and not spent enough on defense. In that vein, Trump is expressing the same frustrations of many of his predecessors, even if he is doing it more publicly and vigorously; and he was able to get the Alliance to move, during the Hague Summit in summer 2025, to a new target of 5% of GDP spending on defense and defense related projects.

This has also been accompanied by other important initiatives that suggest a commitment to greater burden shifting. Thus, the US has transferred, in the past year, senior NATO command posts to European allies and the Pentagon launched its Europe Force Posture review in summer 2026, with the goal of evaluating the US basing and troop level presence on the continent. In this context, Washington has repeatedly expressed its preference for Europeans to take greater control and responsibility for their own defense, while the US would have a lighter footprint.

However, this message of greater European responsibility and control has been also repeatedly undermined by very different tunes coming from the US. Several high-level interlocutors, coming from the Department of State and the Pentagon, have explicitly warned European allies that they would only tolerate relative autonomy. In particular, Europe would be asked to pay more for its defense, and take a greater lead, but it would be expected to remain a client; so, any attempt to prioritize domestic weapon makers to the detriment of US companies would invite large scale retaliation.

The tension between wanting to limit its defense burden and protecting its business interests is, granted, not entirely new when it comes to the US approach to European defense. But it is also coexisting with the new ‘civilizational’ approach promoted by certain influential factions and individuals in the second Trump administration. Thus, Vice President JD Vance’s speech in Munich in February 2025, or the December 2025 National Security Strategy, are particularly clear embodiments of this approach, with the latter warning about Europe facing ‘civilizational erasure’.

In this situation, the US is viewing Europe as an ally with a shared civilizational heritage, built around geography and Christianity, but which has lost its way because of migration and the negative impact of liberalism. This requires that Washington interfere more in European affairs, to cultivate like-minded political forces that share its same civilizational zeal. Such a narrative from the Trump administration suggests an even smaller tolerance for European autonomy if it deviates in any way from certain values.

Finally, the stated US desire for Europe to be strong and more self-reliant is often further undermined by President Trump’s tendency to view the transatlantic partnership through the lens of leverage. Europeans are repeatedly reminded of their dependence on the US, how they owe their ally, and how they will be judged according to their loyalty in all circumstances. That has been particularly on display insofar as the ongoing conflict in Iran.

This confusion emanating from Washington is a real and significant challenge for the transatlantic alliance and European defense. Depending on the camp and context, Europeans are expected to be either a stronger and more self-reliant partner, a dutiful and faithful customer of US defense companies, a civilizational partner following in the US footsteps, or a loyal vassal. None of these options are particularly complementary or would lead to similar choices insofar as protecting European security.