Artis Pabriks: Transatlantic relations and the Russian threat

In 1989, the German rock band Scorpions released the song Wind of Change, which reflected the optimism and hopes prevailing in the West regarding the political changes taking place in the Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev. The Iron Curtain was falling, and it appeared that the USSR—and, following its collapse, the states that emerged from it—would rapidly develop into liberal democracies. A number of Western analysts in the United States and Western Europe, including Francis Fukuyama in his influential book The End of History and the Last Man, argued that liberal democracy had prevailed globally and that Russia would eventually return to the family of free and democratic nations.

These expectations proved overly optimistic and, to a considerable extent, reflected wishful thinking. Misperceptions of Russia contributed to delayed and, at times, misguided responses in Western political decision-making, which in turn helped create the more dangerous international security environment now felt across the European continent.

The contemporary international environment is arguably more dangerous than at any point in recent decades. The previous international order has significantly deteriorated; Europe’s relative economic position has weakened compared with Asia and the United States; and transatlantic security ties have been challenged by growing doubts about mutual commitment and political resolve, particularly since President Donald Trump returned to office on 20 January 2025.

Authoritarian states such as Russia, Iran, North Korea, and China have been strengthening their ties and coordination in opposition to the West. Russia has been waging a war of unprecedented scale against Ukraine since 2022 while simultaneously challenging NATO, particularly its European members, through an increasing number of hybrid attacks, acts of arson, and sabotage. Tensions between Putin’s Russia and the West continue to rise.

Against this background, Western unity, military capabilities, industrial output, and societal resilience are becoming increasingly important. Of particular significance is the transatlantic alliance and the role of the United States, as US involvement in European security has for decades constituted one of the principal guarantees of security on the European continent.

Since 2025, the US approach to European security has undergone several significant changes. The White House’s patience with what it regarded as Western European neglect of defence and security has diminished. Relations between the transatlantic partners have become increasingly transactional and have been marked by elements of confrontational rhetoric, unpredictability, and mutual mistrust.

To better understand the current US role in European and global security, it is important to examine President Trump’s policies towards European allies, Ukraine, Russia, and the Pacific region in their broader strategic context. In many respects, US policy towards Ukraine has been perceived as a litmus test for Washington’s wider approach to Europe.

Since 2025, many European allies, particularly frontline states, have expressed concern about shifts in White House policy towards Ukraine. On 28 February 2025, a meeting between President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, President Trump, and senior US officials took place at the White House. The publicly broadcast confrontation was widely perceived as humiliating for President Zelenskyy, particularly given the conduct of President Trump and Vice President Vance.

A few days later, on 3 March, the White House paused military aid to Ukraine. Later, in July, President Trump introduced the PURL system, under which the United States supplies American weapons to Ukraine while the costs are covered by other Western allies. Although some forms of support, including intelligence sharing, were maintained, the Trump administration effectively ended direct US financing of much of Ukraine’s military resistance to Russian aggression. Consequently, a substantially greater share of the burden was transferred to NATO’s European allies.

By March 2026, other NATO countries had transferred USD 4.2 billion to the United States through the PURL system while simultaneously continuing to support Ukraine from their national budgets, thereby replacing a significant share of previous US assistance.

Another important change in the US approach to foreign and security policy was the introduction of an increasingly transactional relationship with both its closest allies and Ukraine. However, even this transactional approach did not guarantee automatic US support.

The Ukrainian side therefore hoped that the minerals agreement signed on 30 April 2025 by US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and Ukrainian First Deputy Prime Minister Yulia Svyrydenko would soften the White House’s approach towards Ukraine and generate tangible benefits, particularly in the form of military assistance. These expectations, however, were not fulfilled, and US military support to Ukraine was not restored to its previous level.

Instead, the White House engaged in diplomatic negotiations with Moscow in a manner that could be interpreted as favouring Russia rather than merely reflecting transactional diplomacy. White House representatives Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner visited Moscow on five occasions. In addition, on 8 August 2025, President Trump received President Vladimir Putin on US soil for bilateral negotiations.

A number of policy analysts and observers noted that President Trump appeared to pursue a “carrot” approach towards Russia, the aggressor state, while applying a “stick” approach towards Ukraine, the victim of Russian aggression. The motives underlying such a strategy remain open to interpretation. Nevertheless, the approach surprised European allies of the United States and did not bring an end to the war any closer.

Throughout 2025, the White House adopted a comparatively accommodating diplomatic posture towards Russia and lifted some previously imposed energy sanctions. At the same time, President Trump continued to exert public pressure on Ukraine to accept concessions to Russia, despite opposition from several NATO allies to such a policy.

At the same time, leading Western European countries did not fully seize the opportunity to assume a more consequential and strategically autonomous role in their policy towards Russia, and largely continued to follow the US lead.

In his relations with European partners, President Trump also introduced a more transactional approach towards NATO allies, demanding substantially higher levels of defence expenditure. The 2025 US National Security Strategy emphasised greater burden-sharing and argued that European states should become the principal conventional military actors in Europe, given that the United States had strategic priorities in other regions, particularly the Pacific.

As a result, the NATO Summit in The Hague produced an agreement to increase defence-related expenditure to 5 per cent of GDP, a decision frequently presented as a political victory for President Trump. A closer examination of the factors driving European defence spending, however, suggests that the primary motivation was the growing Russian threat to Europe. President Trump’s position nevertheless served as an important accelerator of European military preparedness and defence-industrial efforts in anticipation of a possible confrontation with Russia.

The trend towards higher military expenditure and greater European self-reliance did not begin with Donald Trump’s return to office in 2025. The principal catalyst was Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. In 2025, the 29 European NATO members spent approximately USD 559 billion on defence, compared with USD 388 billion in 2023. This represented an increase of approximately 44 per cent between 2023 and 2025, much of which had already occurred before the NATO Summit in The Hague. Frontline countries located closer to Russia experienced some of the largest increases.

An additional incentive for many European NATO members to develop their own defence capabilities was President Trump’s increasingly confrontational rhetoric towards several European partners. One prominent example was the aggressive diplomatic pressure placed on Denmark regarding Greenland. Such rhetoric contributed to an increasingly strained atmosphere in transatlantic relations between the United States and several European allies, further undermining mutual trust.

Friendly diplomatic rhetoric towards the Kremlin, reductions in support for Ukraine, and conflicting or confrontational messages directed at European allies contributed to declining trust within the alliance and growing doubts about whether the United States remained fully committed to defending its European NATO allies in the event of a military confrontation with Russia.

The prevention of war depends substantially on the credibility of deterrence—that is, on the perceived willingness and capability to employ decisive military force if necessary. Recent perceptions and public uncertainty regarding the US commitment to European security appear to have produced two contrasting effects. On the one hand, they have accelerated European investment in defence, which can be regarded as a positive development. On the other hand, they may have encouraged Russia to test Western resolve, increase pressure on Ukraine, and probe NATO cohesion.

Given that one of Vladimir Putin’s longstanding strategic objectives has been to weaken, and potentially undermine, NATO, internal uncertainty among transatlantic partners may be interpreted by Moscow as evidence of alliance weakness. Such perceptions can reinforce the Kremlin’s belief that increased pressure on European NATO members could make this objective more attainable. Like Europeans—and indeed some US allies in the Pacific—Russia is increasingly questioning the likelihood and strength of an American response in the event of a conflict involving European NATO members.

President Trump’s rhetoric and inconsistent verbal commitments have generated greater uncertainty regarding US strategic resolve. Combined with Europe’s slow adaptation to its own defence requirements, this has weakened the perceived credibility of deterrence and may consequently have incentivised Russia to test European limits, contributing to increased military pressure, hybrid threats, and escalation.

Responsibility for this uncertainty, however, does not rest exclusively with the United States. Many European allies neglected investment in defence and societal resilience for decades. Instead, they hoped that the Wind of Change would eventually Westernise, democratise, and liberalise Russia’s political elite and society. They also expected political change in Russia to generate economic benefits and profitable opportunities through cooperation between Russia and the West.

Instead, European states became, to a significant extent, victims of their own illusions and found themselves insufficiently prepared for the resurgence of an increasingly imperial Russia willing to test Western resolve and prepared to make substantial sacrifices in pursuit of restoring its former sphere of power and influence.

In the second half of 2026, Russia continues to escalate its confrontation with the West. This escalation cannot be explained solely by changes in White House foreign and security policy or by previous European negligence. The principal driver of Russian escalation remains the Kremlin’s own strategic calculations. Nevertheless, President Trump’s policies towards Ukraine and European allies can be understood as an additional factor encouraging Moscow to test the limits of Western resolve.

Given the current state of affairs, the West should be prepared for further hybrid and military escalation by Russia. The most effective response is to demonstrate credible strength, enhance the resilience of Western societies, avoid internal divisions, and reinforce transatlantic trust and cooperation.

United we stand; divided we fall.