U.S. President Donald Trump has sought to justify his efforts to acquire Greenland by claiming that a significant number of Russian and Chinese ships are constantly patrolling the waters around what is the world’s largest island and an autonomous territory within the Kingdom of Denmark. However, this is not true; over the past decade, all attempts by Chinese stakeholders to invest in infrastructure projects in Greenland have been blocked. Many other development projects involving Chinese investors elsewhere in the Nordic region have met the same fate, and especially since the beginning of Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine, the Nordic countries have viewed Chinese investments with increasing caution. In Greenland, Chinese investors are involved only in the Kvanefjeld mining project, which is currently on hold due to environmental concerns raised by the authorities.
This state of affairs does not, of course, mean that China would not be interested in the Arctic. On the contrary, China has made significant investments to prepare for the future use of the new sea routes and to exploit natural resources in the Arctic Ocean, where sea ice is inevitably declining and shrinking as climate change is progressing at an accelerated rate. Chinese universities, state-owned enterprises, and entities close to the People’s Liberation Army are conducting research and developing ice-class vessels and other high-level maritime technology to increase their understanding of the underwater dynamics of the Arctic Ocean and beyond. In the short term, China’s goal is to launch a regular commercial sea route between major ports in China and Central Europe via the Northeast Passage. In the longer term, China is undoubtedly also preparing for a military presence in the Arctic Ocean: in the event of a conflict, the northern latitudes would offer a route not only for bombers and nuclear warheads, but also for underwater drones and submarines all the way from China to the US west coast.
Although China portrays itself as a “near-Arctic state”, it obviously does not belong to the five Arctic Ocean coastal states or eight Arctic states having land areas north of the Arctic Circle. Thus, its Arctic economic activities are tied to cooperation with local northern actors. Yet, China currently has very few Arctic partners willing to cooperate. For Russia, whose economy has suffered from Western sanctions since the annexation of Crimea in 2014, however, Chinese investors are of key interest, especially when it comes to the export of liquefied natural gas from the Yamal Peninsula to China and elsewhere in Asia. Russia also hopes that China will contribute to the infrastructure development supporting the future regular use of the Northeast Passage. So far, there have been no significant Chinese investments in ports, railways, or other logistics in the Russian Arctic.
For the time being, it thus seems that China is not prepared to support Russia’s war economy at any cost, but it rather seeks to continue balancing between East and West—after all, Europe and the United States are important trading partners for China. From China’s perspective, Russia is an unpredictable partner, and the two countries are separated by deep historical mistrust. Although Arctic cooperation with the Russians undoubtedly benefits China, it is building the know-how and technological capabilities to operate independently in northern waters without Russian icebreakers or other support. In the high seas of the Central Arctic Ocean, Chinese vessels can sail and conduct research activities freely under the freedoms of navigation defined by the international law of the sea. This freedom does not apply to the exploitation of deep-sea minerals, which is why the coastal states of the Arctic Ocean are currently vying to justify their right to expand their continental shelves and thus claim ownership of the seabed’s treasures. China can be expected to oppose these efforts: it is in China’s interest to designate as large a portion of the Arctic Ocean as possible as an international zone and a shared heritage of humankind.
Contrary to President Trump’s claims, China’s presence in the Arctic region has thus far been fairly limited. It is currently building expertise and technology primarily for the future needs— getting ready for a time when the Arctic Ocean will be completely ice-free during the summer, and the so-called Transpolar Sea Route in the high seas near the North Pole will open up for use. This could happen as early as the next decade or closer to the mid-century, but China has time to wait.
Sanna Kopra
Research Professor
Arctic Centre, University of Lapland
Finland
