Foreign information manipulation has become a defining element of modern conflict. In Russia’s war on Ukraine, as well as in persistent pressure campaigns around the Baltic Sea, disinformation serves strategic aims that go far beyond propaganda. It seeks to fracture public trust, obscure accountability and compromise policy coherence across the Euro-Atlantic area. This informational dimension now demands the same analytical rigour as more traditional security threats.
In both theatres, disinformation operates through adaptive “narrative families” that exploit local sensitivities. Themes of NATO aggression, Western decadence, or the historical treatment of Russian-speaking minorities are recycled to sow division and fatigue. At their core, these narratives aim to erode trust in institutions and scientific expertise. Nowhere is this corrosion more consequential than in the field of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) security.
The CBRN disinformation nexus has become a distinctive and dangerous subset of the broader information threat landscape. False claims of “military biological laboratories” in Ukraine or insinuations of chemical provocations are not spontaneous conspiracy theories but part of an orchestrated narrative system. Such stories trade on scientific complexity and public anxiety. They gain traction by blending technical terms with selective or misleading imagery. The narratives are then amplified through state media, proxy outlets and diplomatic channels, even reaching arms-control venues. The messaging aims to weaken trust in international treaties and verification processes, and the narratives have been expanding in speed, scale and sophistication since 2022.
Disinformation campaigns that target CBRN issues deploy a distinct set of tactics, techniques and procedures tailored to the technical nature of the subject. While clone-site operations are a recognised tool in broader information warfare, clear evidence that fully fledged clone domains have been a primary vector for CBRN falsehoods is limited; CBRN claims most often spread through state-affiliated media channels, Telegram and other closed messaging networks, pseudo-expert commentary, and the selective re-use or manipulation of genuine scientific imagery and documents. Malign actors make deliberate use of scientific language and fragments of technical data to create the appearance of insider knowledge, then accelerate reach through coordinated amplification — automated bot networks, sympathetic influencers, and cross-platform seeding that repackages content quickly into local languages.
Increasingly, synthetic media and AI tools are used to produce realistic laboratory scenes or fabricated expert statements that complicate verification. The aim is to distort the information environment. By shortening the time from initial claim to mainstream exposure online and in social media, these operations complicate institutional responses, and create ambiguity that outlasts any single debunking effort. Countering these practices therefore requires both rapid response and anticipatory measures involving pre-emptive public explanation, tighter infrastructure and sustained support for fact-checking and scientific communication.
Monitoring this activity has become an analytical discipline in its own right. The CBRN Disinformation Tracker launched in 2025 under the G7 Global Partnership initiative to counter CBRN disinformation provides a structured way to catalogue incidents and measure reach. EUvsDisinfo offers complementary trend data. These datasets collectively map an ecosystem in which malign actors exploit the intersection of science communication, crisis reporting and geopolitics.
In the near-term, the CBRN information threat environment will become more complex. Artificial-intelligence tools are lowering the cost of producing persuasive scientific forgeries. Adversaries are likely to integrate these into election-period influence campaigns, combining local political narratives with global security scare stories. Another risk lies in “crisis piggybacking,” where genuine incidents such as legitimate laboratory accidents are instantly reframed through pre-positioned disinformation assets to validate older falsehoods. For the Baltic Sea region, which hosts dense research and energy infrastructures, such manipulation could have tangible consequences for public order and emergency response.
Responding effectively requires more than debunking. For instance, authorities must pre-empt the narrative space. Public communication about CBRN research and preparedness needs to become proactive, offering clear explanations of laboratory work, how CBRN safety is governed, and who audits compliance oversight. Equally important is for analytical units to adopt shared metrics for disinformation and its impacts and to report them routinely for visibility across borders. Foresight and scenario-planning can incorporate information manipulation into CBRN crisis exercises.
Resilience also depends on the media and scientific communities. Fact-checking organisations in the Baltics and Ukraine operate under severe resource pressure and legal intimidation. Targeted funding, cybersecurity support and coordinated rapid-alert mechanisms would help sustain their role as early-warning sensors.
Ultimately, disinformation in the CBRN domain is not only about words or images. It challenges the epistemic foundations of trust, fracturing the relationship between citizen, science and state. For the Baltic region and for Ukraine, where resilience has become a strategic asset, countering such manipulation is integral to national security. Intelligence and foresight professionals must therefore treat CBRN disinformation as both a present operational threat and a future risk multiplier. The capacity to measure, anticipate and neutralise these campaigns will be as decisive for stability in the Baltic Rim as traditional defence measures on land or at sea.
Filippa Lentzos
Associate Professor in Science & International Security
King’s College London
United Kingdom
Gemma Bowsher
Dr., Senior Research Associate
King’s College London
United Kingdom
