Niklas Helwig: Europe’s costly transatlantic dependence

When European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen delivered her annual State of the European Union speech this September, she used the occasion to send an indirect but clear message across the Atlantic. Sitting in the chamber of the European Parliament in Strasbourg was Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney. His presence was no coincidence. It underlined a broader European message: relations with the US have fundamentally changed, but Europe is not alone. The EU wants to deepen cooperation with partners that share its interests and principles and that it considers reliable.

However, despite this messaging, the EU’s dependence on the US runs deep and is causing headaches in Brussels. What once resembled a marriage, marked by disagreements but held together by trusted routines and institutions, has become a more transactional relationship in which both sides are increasingly prepared to pursue their own interests. Yet the EU and the US remain deeply connected by economic, political and, above all, security ties built over decades. Navigating this new geopolitical reality requires Europe to come to terms with several uncomfortable realities.

First, the US will remain an indispensable partner for European security for the foreseeable future. Russia’s war against Ukraine has highlighted the continued importance of American military capabilities, intelligence and political leadership. European allies are investing heavily in defence, but important capability gaps remain. For Finland and the Baltic Sea region in particular, credible deterrence and defence continue to rely on a strong US commitment to NATO.

Second, however, this dependence increasingly comes with a geopolitical price tag. The Trump administration has demonstrated a greater willingness to link different areas of the transatlantic relationship, as the Turnberry agreement on transatlantic trade showed. Security guarantees, defence spending, trade, technology regulation and support for Ukraine can all become part of the same political bargaining process. Europe’s dependence on the US in security therefore risks limiting its freedom of manoeuvre in areas in which the EU would otherwise possess considerable economic and regulatory power.

Too painful to stick together, too important to abandon – this is why the debate about European strategic autonomy should not be reduced to a choice between Europe and the transatlantic partnership. Strategic autonomy is not about achieving complete independence from Washington. It is about the capacity to make strategic choices: cooperating with the US wherever interests coincide, while retaining the ability to act when they do not.

The EU consequently needs to weigh more carefully both the benefits and the costs of dependence. Open confrontation with Washington can be expensive, particularly at a time when US support remains essential for Ukraine and European deterrence. But excessive accommodation carries costs as well. If the EU repeatedly refrains from defending its interests because it fears consequences elsewhere in the relationship, its international credibility suffers. It also risks legitimizing coercive transactionalism as an effective approach of US politics towards Europe and thereby worsening the long-term prospects of the transatlantic relationship. At home, the perception of European weakness can further strengthen political forces that question both European integration and the liberal international orientation on which the EU has traditionally relied.

The answer is therefore not disengagement from the US, but a systematic reduction of critical dependencies. In defence, Europe needs stronger intelligence, command-and-control structures and military capabilities of its own. Economically, it requires deeper Single Market integration, greater competitiveness and a stronger international role for the euro. Politically, European governments need to develop the capacity and willingness to act collectively rather than allowing individual member states to obstruct common EU action on vital geopolitical questions.

Greater European capacity would ultimately strengthen rather than weaken the transatlantic partnership. A Europe able to shoulder more responsibility for its own security and defend its economic and political interests would be a more capable partner for Washington. It would also make continued US engagement in Europe easier to sustain politically.

This is particularly important for Finland and the wider Baltic Sea region. Nordic-Baltic defence cooperation has grown dramatically, but regional deterrence still rests on a transatlantic backbone. Strengthening European capabilities therefore should not be understood as an alternative to the American security guarantee. The objective is to ensure that Europe contributes more to that partnership while becoming less vulnerable to changes in Washington. This is also the message behind Mark Carney’s presence in Strasbourg: without turning away from the US, the EU is seeking to broaden its partnerships and strengthen its own capacity to act.