Oscar Winberg: Congress, Trump, and transatlantic relations

Since Donald Trump returned to the White House in early 2025, the transatlantic relationship has been tested. After almost two years of turmoil, including unpredictable trade policies, threats against Greenland, and a war against Iran, European confidence in the Trump administration is low. In Sweden, for example, no more than 11 percent of the population have confidence in Trump to do “the right thing regarding world affairs.” The downturn over a couple of years is remarkable, in 2022 over 80 percent of Swedes viewed the United States as “a reliable partner.” Today, that number is 31 percent.

With the spotlight squarely on the executive, the role of the legislative branch is often missing in the public conversation around the United States and the transatlantic relationship. In part, this is indicative of the presidential system and media attention. But it is also the natural result of a Congress, with Republican majorities in both chambers, willing to cede their constitutionally vested authority to their ally in the White House. In November, however, the United States will go to the ballot box with all seats in the House of Representatives and a third of the seats in the Senate up for election. Regardless of the outcome, the midterms could well be a decisive moment for the transatlantic relationship.

While both historical trends and opinion polls suggest that the Democratic Party will win, gaining control of the House and, possibly, the Senate, the outcome is not certain. If the Republican Party exceeds expectations and win enough seats to keep their majorities in both the House and Senate, it will indicate that the United States is content with Trump’s leadership. This might look like a continuation of the status quo, but would in fact represent a stark signal that there is no going back to “normal” in the transatlantic relationship. And explanations of Trump’s return to the White House that focus on a broad anti-incumbent sentiment in the high-inflation post-covid years would look less credible. As a result, the remnants of the idea of Trump as an anomaly would crumble.

If the Democratic Party wins, however, the calculus changes. A win could come in the form of a “blue wave” that carries the Democrats to majorities in both chambers or in the form of a “blue ripple” that results in no more than a narrow House majority while falling short in the Senate. Either way, a majority in either chamber would give the Democratic Party ways to challenge the Trump administration and reassert the power of the legislative branch. This matters because in his second term Trump has relied on acquiescence from both Congress and the Supreme Court to usurp authority and enact his agenda without being reined in by constitutional checks and balances. Without allies in control on Capitol Hill, Trump will be far more restricted. But confrontations between the White House and Congress could also lead to increasing gridlock and even constitutional crises.

The nightmare scenario, including for the United States’ allies in Europe, is unreliable results. This did not use to be a significant concern, but today the Republican Party has embraced false claims of election fraud as part of their political identity. Ahead of the midterm elections, they are rewriting the rules of the game.

Republicans, encouraged by Trump and authorized by the Supreme Court, have redrawn congressional districts and rewritten voting laws with the (often explicit) goal of making sure the party remains in power. Furthermore, Trump has attempted to limit access to the ballot via executive orders restricting mail-in voting. Meanwhile, the president’s allies have spoken about deploying paramilitary law enforcement agents to patrol voting locations in a blatant strategy of intimidation and interference in the electoral process.

Even if the vote counts would suggest Democratic victories, Republicans could well challenge the results or even refuse to certify the results in an attempt to remain in power. This was the game plan in the aftermath of Trump’s loss in the 2020 presidential election. European leaders have already been forced to walk a tightrope, attempting to safeguard democratic values without provoking Trump, but doctored midterm results inconsistent with the will of the electorate would up the ante and further threaten to erode the transatlantic relationship.

The midterms are often understood as a referendum on the president. This is even more the case than usual with Trump in the White House. After all, he has an extraordinary ability to claim the media spotlight. But the legislative branch is not, and should not, be an afterthought in American politics. More than a referendum on Trump, the midterms will determine the direction of both Congress and the country. As such, it is a pivotal moment for transatlantic relations.