Despite internal tensions among western democracies, the Arctic can today be described as an arena for strategic competition where authoritarian states like China and Russia compete against western states, and where both “blocks” seek to protect their interests and values. This strategic competition might not necessarily be a struggle that will be “won” or “lost”, but rather a lasting feature that characterizes the 21st century. In this world order, competition between states, and groups of states, is likely to remain high, where states’ gaining the upper hand in the power struggle are poised to have a greater influence on the rules of the game. In this permanent situation of international competition, the degree of dominance and influence over outcomes in world politics, of the various states, is likely to change over time.
Strategic competition is nothing new in international politics. Nation states, and earlier, city states, have competed for gain and influence as long as recorded history goes back. Early, and well-known examples, are found in the writings of Thucydides and his descriptions of the Peloponnesian Wars in ancient Greece.
With today’s leading politicians and scholars, often having formative years in the post-Cold War period, where the global spread of liberal values and a renewed faith in international law have dominated, some basics insights into interstate competition might partly have fallen out of memory.
Is a lawless jungle growing back?
It is fair to say that today’s rule based international order is experiencing setbacks. In Europe, Russia’s illegal full-scale invasion of Ukraine stands out as the greatest example of this grim shift in political development. Kremlin’s widespread “hybrid attacks”, in the “gray area” between peace and war, are also increasingly experienced on the receiving end in the West, especially among states near the Russian border. In China’s near abroad, and not the least in the South China Sea region, many will describe the situation in somewhat similar terms, as Beijing increasingly is flexing muscles, seeking to broaden its influence, sometimes by economic pressure, through fishing vessels or by “lawfare”.
In this climate of new security threats, states experience that their security does not only depend on their traditional military and law enforcement capabilities. Security might also depend on robustness and vigilance, in what has traditionally been viewed as the civilian sectors. As most sectors and domains play a role in a situation of great power competition, the entire society plays a role to the degree to which western democracies will be able to protect their interest, values and norms in the future. This situation does also increasingly pertains to the future Arctic region.
While Russia represents a multifaceted security threat for great parts of Europe, less is known with respect to China’s willingness to challenge the liberal and rule-based order in Europe and the Arctic. While Beijing certainly is clamping down on internal dissidents and seeks to spread its views on international law in contested regions like in the South China Sea, the Communist leadership has also experienced that hardhanded pro-Chinese external policies might hit back, creating international resistance. Hence, Chinas is probably adjusting its approaches based on experience, adhering to a softer, long-term vision of gradual or incremental, expanded influence.
The Arctic is changing
The Arctic is today undergoing rapid change. Global warming has diminished the prevalence of year-round sea ice, where large sections of previously inaccessible areas in the Arctic today are becoming navigable, especially during summer and fall. While shipping in the Arctic will remain extremely challenging, and the sea ice will freeze back every winter, much more human activity in the Arctic, both civilian and military, should be expected. As human activity generally increases, China should also be expected to become a more active player.
Beijing might on the one hand seek to increase its presence in the Arctic through legitimate activities such as scientific research, commercial shipping or investment in resource utilization. However, the West should be aware of the risk increased presence might cause with respect to dual-use capabilities. Knowledge of the natural world, such as mapping of the deep sea, ice conditions, sea currents, and operation of unmanned and manned platforms for research in this environment, could also be turned into, or facilitate for, capabilities of direct military value. This might pose a long-term threat in a situation of strategic competition. Similarly, a gradually increased diplomatic assertiveness and economic presence might also, over time, be converted into means of leverage. A potential closer Sino-Russian cooperation in the future might also alleviate China’s lack of Arctic territories, giving Beijing a potential greater access to the region.
In this respect the West should protect international laws and regulations, such as the unique rights given to costal states through the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea. In addition, maintenance of cold weather operation skills and the development of new relevant dedicated platforms, such as ice breakers, should be prioritized among western states. Overall, the West needs to start thinking in longer time perspectives, not only in four-year election cycles.
Njord Wegge
Professor
Norwegian Defence University College
Norway
