In “China’s Arctic Policy” white paper published in January 2018, the word “cooperation” was remarkably mentioned 45 times. According to this policy document, “‘cooperation’ is an effective means for China’s participation in Arctic affairs” as well as one of the four basic principles in terms of China’s Arctic engagement. However, since the Russia-Ukraine conflict broke out in February 2022, an increasing number of examples have proved that China’s Arctic-focused cooperation with Arctic states including Russia has already come to a standstill internationally and regionally, multilaterally and bilaterally, economically and scientifically. This situation can be named as “China’s Arctic predicament”, which has seriously hindered the realization of China’s Arctic policy goals stated in the white paper—“to understand, protect, develop and participate in the governance of the Arctic, so as to safeguard the common interests of all countries and the international community in the Arctic, and promote sustainable development of the Arctic.”
From the perspective of the Theory of Constructivism in International Relations, the “China’s Arctic predicament” is a constructed fact. One of the main factors contributing to the China’s Arctic predicament is a prominent Western narrative of “China’s threat in the Arctic” based on the term “strategic competition” defined by U.S. policy documents. The 2022 US National Strategy for the Arctic Region emphasized that China “seeks to increase its influence in the Arctic through an expanded slate of economic, diplomatic, scientific, and military activities.” The 2024 U.S. Defense Department Arctic Strategy insisted on “preserving focus on the pacing challenge of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) globally.” While according to the book Perception and Misperception in International Politics by Robert Jervis, several U.S. experts acknowledge that there are intentional misunderstandings regarding China’s Arctic policy, out of paranoid mentality, ideological prejudice and U.S. exclusive national interests in the Arctic.
The latest intentional misunderstandings come from U.S. President Donald Trump who repeated his need to annex Greenland, part of Danish territory. Trump invoked the danger posed by a Chinese takeover of Greenland due to its key strategic location between China the United States, Russia and China, warning of the threat from imagined Chinese destroyers and submarines nearby the Ocean. Just as rebuttals from military and academic circles, Trump’s claims sincerely go against the common sense regarding Chinese presence in the Arctic. Notably, China has no military presence in the Arctic region, neither any military bases, destroyers, submarines nor allies. That is why no substantive content regarding military was included in “China’s Arctic Policy” white paper. Only Chinese research vessels have regular operations in the Arctic international waters for scientific purposes, under close surveillance by Arctic states such as the United States. Additionally, a policy brief titled “Cutting Through Narratives on Chinese Arctic Investments” argues that “the scale and scope of actual Chinese investments are often exaggerated in media and public debate”, describing the Chinese investment projects across Arctic states from 2007 to 2025. Actually the success rate was exactly zero both in Finland and Greenland.
As discussed above, we have to say the so-called “China’s threat in the Arctic” is transparent as China’s incomplete Arctic capacities are unable to uphold any substantial threat to the Arctic region. It seems not hard to conclude that in nature “China’s threat in the Arctic” is a rhetorical illusion based on self-centered political ambitions and uninformed speculation. In other words, China has been portrayed as a threat in the Arctic when some aggressive claims are to be proposed, and once challenging actions are taken for the benefits of exclusivity, the narrative of “China’s threat in the Arctic” are put aside and neglected until new opposing-China claims appear. During this repetitive process, in the context of strategic competition among major powers in the Arctic region, China is like being placed inside a drawer, this narrative appears when the drawer is pulled out and disappears when the drawer is pulled in. To get an easy win over the Arctic, no matter what the real threat is, the narrative of “China’s threat in the Arctic” has always been on call. Considering this reality, China’s Arctic predicament characterized mainly by the stagnation of China-Arctic cooperation can be visualized as a transparent threat in a drawer.
Facing the increasingly severe predicament in the Arctic, China actually has little power to change as China is in a disadvantaged position in terms of development, security, civilization and governance. First, China has no institutional connections with regional or sub-regional economic organizations for significant contributions to Arctic sustainable development. Second, China has not been at the table yet when it comes to Arctic traditional security issues in particular. Third, on social and cultural transition there is a gap to fill out between Chinese knowledge and Indigenous Traditional Knowledge. Last but not least, China is far from the rule-making authority on Arctic global governance.
In conclusion, here is a paradox. On the one hand, China’s Arctic capabilities are insufficient; on the other hand, the narrative of “China’s threat in the Arctic” is widely-spreading. Against the background of the prolonged Russia-Ukraine conflict, these two aspects jointly determine the inevitability and long-standing of China’s Arctic predicament. Then, the only remaining question is whether there is “a key other” that can help restore China-Arctic cooperation to break through China’s Arctic predicament. Let’s wait and see.
Xu Qingchao
Ph.D., Wutong Youth Professor, Director of Polar & Deep-Sea Strategic Studies Center
World Sinology Center, Beijing Language and Culture University
China
xuqc@blcu.edu.cn
