China’s four-decade economic growth has been paralleled by maritime expansion, as its commercial and security-related “overseas interests” have expanded far beyond China’s borders. Today, China’s earlier objective of becoming a “maritime great power” has, in many respects, become a reality. China now boasts one of the world’s largest commercial and merchant maritime fleets, while Chinese companies hold considerable stakes in port infrastructure all around the world. China’s shipbuilding industry is unmatched in scale; its capacity is estimated to be 200 times that of the United States. Finally, China’s naval forces – the People’s Liberation Army Navy – have emerged as one of the world’s most powerful navies, with over 140 large surface combatants and three aircraft carriers. The PLA Navy also maintains an increasingly global presence, with operations and joint exercises in distant waters, including the Baltic Sea.
However, as we argue together with Sanna Kopra and Liisa Kauppila in an upcoming article, China’s maritime expansion is increasingly looking beneath the surface, toward the deep sea – generally defined as ocean areas below 200 meters – which China sees as one of the “new strategic frontiers.” Along with the polar regions, outer space and cyberspace, the new strategic frontiers are territories or domains that are opening up for exploitation following advances in technology. In addition, the new strategic frontiers are often defined as global commons or weakly governed spaces, theoretically open for the first capable mover to dominate. As a result, the new frontiers have become targets of intensifying great power competition, and China has decided to position itself at the leading edge of their utilization.
The deep sea is important due to its economic potential, not least because of vast untapped hydrocarbon resources and large deposits of minerals and rare-earths. The Chinese economy is chronically dependent on imported energy, while rare-earths are critical for numerous technologies, including renewable energy systems and advanced electronics. Although China already dominates rare-earth value chains, many of the deposits in the deep sea are located in areas beyond national jurisdiction, and their exploitation could reduce China’s reliance on land-based mining operations under the jurisdiction of other states. In addition, the deep seabed holds unique biological organisms, whose genetic material is increasingly sought after and utilized in biotechnology, pharmaceuticals, and other fields.
In addition to its economic value, the Chinese military sees the deep sea as a “new domain of military struggle,” one that is attracting increasing great power attention. The deep sea has hitherto remained an extremely hostile environment for military operations due to intense pressure, the difficulty of communication and navigation, and many other challenges. However, advances in artificial intelligence, sensors, batteries and undersea communications are allowing the deployment of increasingly capable unmanned and autonomous submersibles, which will gradually open up the deep sea as a new domain of warfare. Some scholars affiliated with the People’s Liberation Army even describe the deep sea as the decisive domain from which the surface, coastal, and air domains can be controlled.
China’s strategy for establishing a comprehensive deep-sea presence consists of a combination of diplomatic, scientific, economic, and military instruments. First, China is a leading supporter of the International Seabed Authority (ISA), which oversees exploration contracts, and may eventually regulate commercial mining licenses in the international seabed. At the same time, China is pouring considerable resources into the development of relevant technologies: it already commands a fleet of over 60 research vessels that explore seabed regions around the world. Chinese research institutions are developing increasingly capable autonomous underwater vehicles, which have been conducting surveys in Arctic waters as well. Finally, China’s military forces are preparing for military struggle in the deep sea by developing novel capabilities ranging from next-generation crewed nuclear-powered submarines to extra-large underwater drones (XLUUVs) and smart mines. The PLA, furthermore, may be able to draw on data collected by research vessels, some of which have surveyed regions close to US military bases, including Guam, in the Pacific.
In conclusion, China sees the deep sea as an important new strategic frontier and the next major direction of its maritime expansion. By several measures, China already leads the race to the ocean floor. It fields increasingly capable platforms and systems for the exploration and exploitation of seabed resources, while its growing diplomatic clout in international maritime governance regimes – especially within the UN system and the ISA – provides a legitimate basis its growing role. The question for other powers, particularly the United States and Europe, is therefore whether they are willing and able to follow China into the depths and shape the rules and technologies of the domain in line with their own values and interests.
Matti Puranen
Associate Professor (Strategic Studies)
Finnish National Defence University
Finland
