The Arctic has become one of the world’s most contested strategic frontiers over the past decade as melting ice opens new shipping lanes and exposes vast untapped reserves of energy and critical minerals. Relations between Russia and its seven Arctic counterparts have deteriorated over the conflict in Ukraine, destabilising a region once defined more by cooperation than confrontation. In this increasingly crowded and contested environment, China’s growing presence has emerged as one the most consequential factors shaping the Arctic’s future. What is driving China’s interest in the region, and should other regional stakeholders be cautious of it?
Chinese ambitions in the Arctic are not new. The country refers to itself as a “near-Arctic state” and originally outlined its interests in the region through its 2018 Arctic Policy White Paper. Its declared objectives are access to new shipping routes, scientific research, and participation in the development of Arctic resources, particularly energy. In principle, these do not clash with the interests of European and American stakeholders in the region. However, Chinese activities in the Arctic have made NATO allies in the Arctic and beyond increasingly nervous.
The source of this anxiety is largely linked to China’s partnership with Russia and its privileged access to the latter’s vast Arctic resources. The cornerstone of this partnership has historically been the development of liquefied natural gas (LNG) projects in the Russian Arctic with ventures such as Yamal LNG and Arctic LNG 2. This collaboration has enabled Russia to expand its energy exports and diversify its markets, while China benefits from a stable supply of energy to fuel its economic growth.
The partnership extends to the construction of ports, terminals, and other infrastructure along the Northern Sea Route (NSR), facilitating shipping traffic and trade between the two nations. Both Beijing and Moscow recognise the strategic and commercial potential of the NSR that China incorporated into its “Polar Silk Road” (PSR) initiative. The prospect of using the NSR as an alternative shipping lane to access European markets is becoming more attractive as pressure mounts on traditional routes such as the Strait of Hormuz or the Strait of Malacca. This reliance on the latter for China, coined as the ‘Malacca Dilemma’ by former President Hu Jintao, makes the NSR a tempting potential alternative. Beyond energy and transport, China and Russia have also engaged in scientific collaboration with joint research initiatives and exchanges of polar scientists.
At the same time, we should not overstate the closeness of China and Russia in the Arctic. Their cooperation to date remains largely transactional and focused on areas of direct mutual benefit, mostly commercial. Russia continues to guard against allowing China significant influence in its Arctic territories, despite the rhetoric surrounding the PSR. For instance, Chinese vessels using the NSR are subjected to the same access control regime as any other country, while Moscow demonstrated reluctance to grant China access to sensitive technologies such as nuclear icebreakers.
China has sought to engage with all Arctic stakeholders, including Nordic countries and Canada, but with mixed results. China’s ambitions are still constrained by its non-Arctic status and by scepticism from both Russia and NATO Arctic states, who are wary of potential dual-use infrastructure and military applications. Despite these pushbacks, China’s interests in the Arctic are set to grow further. Besides energy supplies and trade opportunities, the Arctic also contains important but mostly untapped reserves of rare earths (particularly in Greenland), the extraction and processing of which is dominated by China.
In this context, European and American stakeholders of the Arctic should acknowledge two things. First, China’s engagement in the region is here to stay. As other third parties such as the U.A.E. or India aim to expand their reach to the Arctic, the argument against a Chinese presence becomes hard to sustain. Second, selective engagement with Beijing could prevent Russia becoming China’s sole Arctic partner and reduce the risk of a Sino-Russian bloc dominating the region. Encouraging China’s participation in multilateral frameworks and promoting transparency may therefore serve Western interests better than outright exclusion.
Although its push for influence challenges the status quo, Beijing also has a strong interest in preserving regional stability. Economic connectivity, access to Arctic markets, and the viability of the NSR all depend on a peaceful and predictable environment. Arctic states for their part will have to balance strategic competition with pragmatic engagement if they want to maintain the security of the High North for the 21st century.
Nicolas Jouan
Senior Analyst
Defence, Security and Justice Research Group, RAND Europe
United Kingdom
njouan@randeurope.org
