China in the Nordic countries: mutual dependency
In the 1990s, the Nordic companies Ericsson, Nokia, Statoil, and Wärtsilä were among the first to invest in China and participate in the transformation of the Chinese economy. For some 30 years, trade between the regions also developed in a relatively balanced way. In 2010, Chinese companies started investing in Northern Europe with Geely’s acquisition of Volvo Cars in Sweden, followed by China Bluestar’s acquisition of the Norwegian silicone group Elkem in 2011. Then came the era of China’s new ”wolf warrior diplomacy”. Tensions arose about human rights, and five years of diplomatic crisis and economic sanctions against Norway followed the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize selection.
But the real turning point was Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and related China-Russia alignment. The direct negative impact on the region’s security led to Finland and Sweden joining NATO in 2023-2024. The Nordic countries strengthened their foreign direct investment control mechanisms and de-risking measures. Examples are 5G bans on Huawei and ZTE, Sweden’s rejection of Chinese investment in the electric battery sector, and reduced dependence on Chinese supply chains. China, however, remains the Nordic countries’ main trading partner in Asia and a key export market in areas including energy and minerals, agricultural products and seafood, medical products, industrial machinery, chemicals, and pulp and paper. Nordic companies also still have a strong presence in China and work with Chinese competitors on high-tech innovations in the maritime sector and areas such as green transition, digital economy, artificial intelligence and new energies like wind power.
China in the Baltics: great disenchantment
In 2012, the Baltic republics joined China’s partnership with 16 countries of Central and Eastern Europe (the “16+1” format). The aim was to open new export markets and secure funding for major infrastructure projects. In Latvia, it would support development of the port of Riga and connections to the China-Europe rail corridor. The results were disappointing in terms of both Chinese exports and investments, with significant tensions also arising regarding human rights. In 2021, Lithuania decided to host a Taiwanese representative office in Vilnius, a decision that earned it strong US support and severe economic retaliation from China. In 2022, following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the Baltic republics withdrew from the China-CEE partnership. Russia is an existential threat to the Baltic States, and Sino-Russian alignment makes cooperation difficult despite new diplomatic efforts.
China’s Arctic Policy and Polar Silk Road: impasse
China inaugurated its Yellow River Station in the Norwegian archipelago of Svalbard in 2004 and was granted permanent observer status with the Arctic Council in 2013. In 2018, China described itself as a ”quasi-Arctic state” in 2018 and began promoting the ”Polar Silk Road”, the maritime trade route connecting China to Europe along the Northern Sea Route. It could halve shipping time between China and Europe and greatly facilitate trade, particularly with Northern Europe. But the PSR’s development depends entirely on Russia, which controls shipping along its Arctic coastline. Russia is collaborating with China in energy and resources but has no interest in a successful China-Europe maritime trade route.
The number of ships making the crossing increased steadily until the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, which radically changed the situation. The successful 2025 voyage of the China-linked container ship ”Istanbul Bridge” from the port of Ningbo in China to the British port of Felixstowe in 20 days via the Arctic route (it would take 40 days via the Suez Canal), masks a strategic impasse and a long pause in cooperation with Finland and Norway on potential logistics hubs such as Kirkenes and Helsinki along the new maritime corridor.
China in Greenland: a long-term strategy but limited presence
Over the past decade, China has launched several investment projects in Greenland in the mining sector (coal, iron, copper, zinc, rare earth elements), transport infrastructure (Finnish airports), and telecommunications (an undersea cable and satellite station in Nuuk). In 2016, Huawei Marine contributed to the extension of the Greenland Connect North undersea cable, and the Greenlandic government signed a scientific cooperation agreement with China. But in 2021, Greenland’s Parliament banned uranium mining, thus preventing China from investing in the Kvanefjeld rare earth mining project. Most other projects were also abandoned following intervention by Denmark and/or US pressure. As of 2026, China’s presence in Greenland is very limited, including some mining, scientific research, and, undoubtedly, the gathering of information. China is patient but lacks the means to act.
Jean-Paul Larçon
Emeritus Professor of Strategy
HEC Paris
France
