Northern Europe has re-emerged as a key geopolitical focal point in the rivalry between the West and Russia, with the Arctic forming a central sub-region. During the Cold War, the Arctic played a major role in nuclear deterrence between the United States and the Soviet Union. After the Cold War, the region lost much of its strategic significance and was viewed as an exceptional “area of peace and dialogue” between Russia and the West. This changed as great-power competition intensified, especially after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The Arctic’s military and economic importance to Russia, together with the NATO accessions of Finland and Sweden, has further increased the strategic significance of Northern Europe and the Arctic.
One of the most important geopolitical developments in the region has been the emergence of China as a new Arctic actor. As a global power, China has sought to expand its political and economic influence in the North. Beijing argues that non-Arctic states possess legitimate interests in the region, and the country has described itself as a “near-Arctic state” in efforts to normalise its role in shaping regional rules and institutions.
China’s official rhetoric has emphasised scientific cooperation, climate research, sustainability, and indigenous issues, but its Arctic interests are primarily economic and strategic. Beijing is particularly interested in energy resources, critical minerals, fisheries, future shipping routes, and space assets. In 2018, China linked Arctic sea routes to the Belt and Road Initiative through the concept of a “Polar Silk Road.”
Arctic shipping routes could improve China’s energy security, diversify trade routes, reduce dependence on vulnerable maritime chokepoints, and shorten transport distances to Europe. However, the Northern Sea Route is unlikely to become a major global trade corridor because of harsh conditions and limited infrastructure. Chinese companies have experimented with Arctic transit shipping for years, but regular container traffic remains limited. Nevertheless, Beijing continues to encourage firms to participate in Arctic infrastructure projects and commercial trial voyages.
In the Nordic Arctic, Chinese actors have explored investments in energy, mining, ports, scientific infrastructure, digital connectivity, and subsea cables. Many projects have been delayed, restricted, or cancelled because of growing political and security concerns.
Greenland has become a particularly important case, as Chinese ambitions related to mining and infrastructure have repeatedly raised security concerns in the United States and Denmark. In Finland, Chinese-linked actors explored acquiring the airport in Kemijärvi, but the project was blocked because of concerns raised by the Finnish Defence Forces. The Arctic Connect subsea cable project between the Finnish company Cinia and potential Chinese telecommunications partners has also been halted.
China’s regional presence is most visible in the Russian Arctic. Beijing has invested heavily in Russian Arctic energy projects, particularly liquefied natural gas production in the Yamal region. These investments support China’s energy security while helping Russia mitigate the effects of Western sanctions. Russia’s war against Ukraine has accelerated Sino-Russian Arctic cooperation. Russia needs Chinese capital, technology, shipping demand, and political support, while China seeks energy resources, Arctic operating experience, alternative trade routes, and influence over future regional governance.
China has also become an increasingly important enabler of Russia’s war effort. Chinese companies have supplied Russia with critical technologies and components supporting its defence-industrial base. China has also become a key buyer of Russian energy exports, providing Moscow with vital revenue while European markets reduce dependence on Russian oil and gas.
In the Arctic context, this relationship is especially significant because Arctic energy projects and Northern Sea Route infrastructure are central to Russia’s long-term economic and strategic planning. As Russia becomes more dependent on China for Arctic development, Beijing gains greater leverage over strategically important Arctic infrastructure, energy production, and transport corridors.
Although China does not currently maintain a permanent military presence in the Arctic, growing Sino-Russian cooperation has important strategic implications. The most likely trajectory is not a rapid Chinese military build-up, but rather a gradual expansion of commercial, scientific, technological, shipping, and resource-related activities that may acquire strategic significance over time.
For Northern European states, the central challenge is to balance economic cooperation with security concerns and avoid strategic dependency, as China is likely to become an increasingly important and influential Arctic actor.
Harri Mikkola
Programme Director
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Finland
