Science in the Arctic has become increasingly politized. This trend is particularly evident when it comes to Chinese research and science. With the politization comes consequences for the Nordic Arctic countries, one of which is uncertainties: What can we make of the research Chinese scientists are conducting in the Arctic, and what are the implications for Arctic counties?
In the 2018 White Paper that presented China’s official Arctic Policy the two first goals are to understand the Arctic and to protect the Arctic. The two other goals are to develop the Arctic, and to participate in Arctic governance. Understanding the Arctic is pursued through research and scientific exploration of the Arctic climate, as explained in the Whit Paper: ‘China will improve the capacity and capability in scientific research on the Arctic, pursue a deeper understanding and knowledge of the Arctic science, and explore the natural laws behind its changes and development, so as to create favorable conditions for mankind to better protect, develop, and govern the Arctic.’ The second goal of Arctic protection also relates to science. To protect Arctic ecosystems and climate, science is needed.
The Chinese state itself uses Arctic science and China’s research history as a legitimizer for its Chinese interests and presence in the White Paper. Here China’s 1996 membership to the International Arctic Science Committee, and that scientific cruises with the research vessel Xue Long (Snow Dragon) began in 1999 is referenced. Furthermore, that the Polar Research Institute of China opened the Arctic Yellow River Station in Ny-Ålesund on Svalbard more than twenty years ago, in 2004, is also included in the White Paper to illustrate that China’s interests for the Arctic is not something new.
Another aspect of science politization is the increased attention to dual and multipurpose use of infrastructure and technology. Already in 2014, the Norwegian government declined an offer from the Chinese research side to pay for most of the construction of a third radar on Svalbard. The radar was proposed to EISCAT (European Incoherent Scatter Scientific Association), a scientific organization that conducts space research, to which China is a member. The Norwegian Ministry of Education did not state security concerns as the reason, but it is likely that this was part of the evaluation. In addition to a research facility in Ny-Ålesund, the second Chinese research facility in the Nordic Arctic is the China-Icelandic Arctic Science Observatory (CIAO)in Kárhóll on northern Iceland. The commencement ceremony of construction was held in 2014 to much fanfare, and CIAO was opened in 2018. However, CIAO has since suffered economic plights, and the bilateral Arctic cooperation, what then Icelandic president Grimson called a cornerstone of the bilateral relations in 2012, has soured. There have also been warnings about covet operations under the guise of research in Icelandic debates.
A third aspect of science politization relates to great power rivalry and increased geopolitical tensions. The Arctic is a suited place for China to test its cutting-edge technology or to further its existing lead on technology. China is already leading in many renewable energy technologies, that other countries, including the Nordic Arctic ones are dependent on, or at least cannot compete on in terms of price. Arctic science can also be relevant to China’s third goal in the White Paper, to develop resources. Mapping the ocean floor can for example indicate where there is future potential for deep sea mining. Tracking fish stocks not only reveals how the ocean is changing, but could also potentially be used for identifying commercially viable fish stocks. Remote sensing of the Arctic environment can also be used to feed into China’s big data machinery, and AI development. It is of course not unique to China to try to exploit the possibilities available, most countries do. What sets China apart from other countries though, is its position as the only possible contender to the US.
Science is in its nature international, but this is currently under pressure. We are beginning to the negative implications of lack of shared data with Arctic climatic data. The data flow from Russia has been restrained since 2022, and with Trump 2.0, US climate data is also not being shared as before. In managing risk and insecurities, the Nordic countries must find the delicate balance between protecting assets from foreign interference, and allowing foreign scientists access. As small states we do not benefit from isolating ourselves, and excluding parts of the world. Rather, we must find ways to live with the uncertainties the current world order poses, including how to continue beneficial research cooperation.
Iselin Stensdal
Senior Researcher
The Fridtjof Nansen Institute
Norway
istensdal@fni.no
