China’s strategic objective in the Baltic Sea region is to steadily enhance its economic, technological and infrastructural presence, with a view to establishing long-term political influence in the regions of Northern and Central-Eastern Europe. This region is of strategic importance to Beijing due to the development of transport routes, access to port infrastructure, technological cooperation, and links with the Arctic dimension of China’s policy, including the Polar Silk Road concept.
One of the key instruments for achieving this goal for China is scientific research cooperation. In the Baltic Sea region, this represents a significant soft power instrument, serving to build China’s long-term political, technological and economic presence in Northern and Central-Eastern Europe. China’s strategic initiatives, including academic projects, researcher exchanges, and investments in scientific infrastructure, are aimed at projecting a positive image of a responsible, innovative nation. This commitment is demonstrated by its efforts to address pressing global challenges, such as climate change and technological development. Concurrently, scientific collaboration enables Beijing to influence narratives aligned with China’s interests and objectives, thereby strengthening its influence among expert communities and establishing a network of relationships that support its long-term strategic goals in the region.
Despite the differing approaches to governance and economic development between the Baltic Sea states and China, mutual cultural and academic contacts continue to thrive. These include the exchange of experiences, while also contributing to the positive image of the country and strengthening its international reputation. Chinese embassies and Confucius Institutes, which are typically located at universities, play a pivotal role in this regard. Their primary functions include the gathering of information and the establishment of contacts with the political and economic elite. Additionally, they are responsible for identifying market opportunities, including potential investment prospects. For instance, in 2015, the China-Latvia Center for Academic Cooperation was set up as part of the Belt and Road Initiative. In addition, Chinese embassies are initiating cooperation in academic and cultural spheres. The primary objective is to create a positive image of China or neutralise information that is critical of it. To a certain extent, there is a degree of overlap between Chinese communication strategies aimed at discrediting NATO and the EU, and Russian information strategies.
In recent years, there has been a notable decline in China’s popularity among the Baltic Sea states. Some of them reported cases of Chinese espionage as a potential threat. In Lithuania, the intelligence and security services have indicated an escalation in the aggressive nature of Chinese intelligence and security activities. In Estonia, concerns have been raised about the possibility of so-called scientific espionage by Chinese institutions implementing scientific and cultural projects. Accusations were particularly directed at Confucius Institutes regarding the Chinese authorities’ involvement in academic discourse. It was stated that these Institutes are instruments of Chinese soft power, but they also serve to justify China’s actions regarding human rights violations in Tibet and its desire to incorporate Taiwan into the People’s Republic of China. In light of these circumstances, it is challenging to envision the prospect of autonomous research and universal access to information within the Chinese state’s hierarchical structure. This is particularly evident in institutions and educational systems in less developed countries, where resources for research and education are limited, and there is a greater likelihood of pressure from China.
Furthermore, Russia’s increasing isolation after 2022 has created new opportunities for China to increase its presence in the Baltic Sea and Arctic regions, and the broader northern Euro-Atlantic space. The decline in scientific collaboration between Russia and Western countries has resulted in a gradual restructuring of research networks, data flows and technological partnerships. In this context, China has begun to play an increasingly important role as an alternative scientific and economic partner for Russia, particularly in the areas of polar research, Arctic infrastructure, and the development of the Northern Sea Route. Russia is actively seeking to expand cooperation with countries of the global South, viewing them as a potential source of investment, technology, and legitimization of its presence in the Arctic. Consequently, scientific cooperation is becoming part of a broader process of geopolitical reconfiguration of the polar region and the construction of alternative cooperation networks outside of Western structures.
Concurrently, scientific and research endeavours are progressively acquiring strategic and security dimensions. The development of satellite infrastructure, environmental research, and observation systems is dual-use, combining civilian and military applications. In this context, China’s presence in the Baltic Sea and Arctic region can be interpreted not only as a manifestation of interest in climate change or research cooperation, but also as a long-term strategy for building political, technological, and economic influence. In contrast to the Russian approach of leveraging scientific cooperation as a means of exerting political influence and its shadow diplomacy, China’s strategy appears to be more focused on a gradual and systematic expansion of its infrastructural and technological presence. This means that science and research cooperation are becoming a crucial instrument of geopolitical competition and shaping a new balance of power in the Baltic Sea and Arctic region.
Aleksandra Kuczyńska-Zonik
PhD, DSc, Senior Analyst
Institute of Central Europe
Poland
aleksandra.kuczynska@ies.lublin.pl
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