Introduction
The intelligence cycle is a theory of how an intelligence organisation is supposed to work. For many, it is considered a universal concept that any intelligence organisation, with respect for itself, must make the cycle the centrepiece of its intelligence doctrine. However, the intelligence cycle is neither a universally valid model nor a valid metaphor for the work carried out inside state intelligence organisations.
A Cold War solution to Second World War problems
The cycle has been around since the end of the Second World War. Initially, the cycle was an attempt by two American officers, Davidson and Glass, to enlighten American commanders on intelligence principles and rid them of their ’contempt for intelligence [1]’ to avoid the intelligence failures of the Second World War. Secondly, Davidson and Glass proposed a cycle as the model of what they saw as the universal principles of intelligence.
In practical terms, the cycle or an accustomed version is prevalent in the American, British, and NATO doctrines. Furthermore, if we move to the European continent, we find the intelligence cycle, even in the doctrines of the intelligence services of the Scandinavian welfare states. Taking a concrete example, I want to zoom in on the Danish example of a state intelligence organisation, where we find that the intelligence cycle is not applied.
Black swan…
If a theory is falsified in just one instance, it is disproved. The late Karl Popper, a German philosopher of science, made the dictum that any theory must be challenged. Popper famously stated, ” No number of sightings of white swans can prove the theory that all swans are white. The sighting of just one black one may disprove it [2]”. By that same token, if the intelligence cycle is seen as a universally applicable and relevant concept, it only takes one example to disprove its universal relevance.
Although the Danish intelligence national community pays public homage to the’ universal’ intelligence cycle in both the security and foreign intelligence service, the intelligence cycle is not used for all intents and purposes. Instead, something else is in play. It is much less exotic and makes the Danish Defence Intelligence Service much more integrable with the rest of the Danish central administration. It is New Public Management. As I have shown in my dissertation and elsewhere, looking for direction vis-à-vis the intelligence cycle in the DDIS, we find, in its stead, a dialogue between the national customers and the DDIS, structured within the theory of New Public Management. So what? So what if organisations claim to follow a time-worn ideal and do something more innovative and more up-to-date? What difference does it make?
”To improve is to change….”
’To improve is to change; to be perfect is to change often,’ were reportedly the words of a cigar-chomping British wartime prime minister.
In her most recent book, American intelligence scholar Amy Zegart argues that three significant challenges – a tech-shaped dynamic threat landscape, a tsunami of data on a more level playing field of state, and privately collected intelligence, and the ever thornier dilemma of secrecy and transparency – face the American intelligence community.
I agree and would extend the argument even further. All states face their brand of multifaceted, dynamic threat picture in a global, multipolar, global security landscape that includes hostile actors on international, transnational, state, non-state, geographical, and environmental levels. All states must stay on an eye-to-eye level with technological developments to exploit them and protect their citizens from attacks prompted by that same technology. Also, new, hybrid forms of conflict have become the new normal. To be able to face these challenges, all national intelligence organisations need to be reflexive about how they meet these challenges. Of course, all intelligence organisations are different. The challenges might be the same, but they are taken down, interpreted, and met in very different ways. There is no one-size-fits-all solution.
These facts point to, in my opinion, that a necessary first step for intelligence organisations is to acknowledge that one of the heirlooms, or flotsam, of the Cold War – the intelligence cycle, initially a solution for mid-20th-century intelligence problems – has turned into a conceptual straitjacket, preventing new and dynamic solutions for 21st-century problems from appearing.
Building reflexivity
Rather than seeking outdated, universal models, national intelligence organisations must establish in-house centres of excellence tasked with staying abreast of the general yet uniquely packed set of challenges that every national intelligence organisation faces. These centres of excellence should be advisors to intelligence leadership and national customers in helping organisations and customers understand what global challenges will mean for them and advising how these challenges could be understood and perhaps acted upon within a national political framework and with limited resources. This is particularly important for small states, which have less influence in shaping world events and, therefore, must be more agile and dynamic in their approach. To improve is to change; to be perfect is to change often.
There is no place for heirlooms from the Cold War or for Cold War flotsam.
Tallat R. Shakoor
PhD, Senior Consultant
Danish National Police
Denmark
[2] Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, 1935. Back to Table of Contents
