Among HUMINT techniques, the illegal method tends to be the most effective during times of hybrid or full-scale war, making it particularly relevant in the current global climate. This method involves conducting intelligence operations in enemy territory without using official cover, such as diplomatic status, and ideally without any visible contact with the nation carrying out these activities (the Western term for that is ”non-official cover”).
Illegals typically use documents that express a nationality different from their true one, and they may impersonate others, both living and deceased (impostors). The idea has even become a recurrent scheme in popular culture, exemplified by the TV series ”The Americans.” It is well-known that Russian intelligence employs this method, particularly in the context of the war in Ukraine, partly as a response to restrictions on Russian diplomatic missions or other official representations in many EU countries. In the internal hierarchy of the Soviet security apparatus and its Russian successors, ”illegals” are viewed as an elite group within the espionage profession.
While this type of operation is often attributed to Soviet and Russian intelligence, it is also important to recognise that the Israeli intelligence services may have been the primary users of this kind of method. Within the former Soviet bloc, the East German Stasi intelligence, the HVA, led in this regard. Nonetheless, the KGB and its successors, in fact, executed significant operations of that kind, with notable examples including the cases of William Fischer (also known as Rudolf Abel) and Konon Molody (also known as Gordon Lonsdale).
From a scholarly perspective, understanding this method is a salient aspect of studying intelligence or security. In this context, access to in-depth archival data is crucial. For example, the extensive British counterintelligence files on the already mentioned Lonsdale affair are available at The National Archives in Kew. Concurrently, the Polish Institute of National Remembrance (IPN) has made similar documents from 1945 to 1990 available for research. These documents contain information on case officers (handlers), illegal agents and residents, liaisons and couriers. They also include original Soviet manuals and data concerning specialised training programs in Moscow for future handlers of illegal agents. Moreover, most importantly, the plans and reports stored in the IPN archive enable the reconstruction of the entire system of similar operations against the West.
The system was complex, encompassing precise plans of espionage operations abroad and a dual system of illegal residencies (stations). One type operated directly in adversarial countries, such as the USA, Great Britain, FRG, France, Switzerland, and Italy. The second type functioned as liaison posts in neutral or less significant countries, intended for communication and coordination. The commercial fleet played a vital role in supporting these operations through illegal communication methods, drawing parallels with the contemporary Russian ”shadow fleet.” The system also utilised sailors, international train conductors, and airline stewards as couriers and liaisons.
The Polish example demonstrates that the method in question was complicated to implement due to both trivial budgetary and human limitations. The romantic times when anyone would devote their entire life to the communist idea passed with the revelation of the system’s crimes in the late 1950s. A trivial problem for illegal agents is loneliness, functioning in a relationship imposed by the service or the need to hide a double life from their partner (resulting in jealousy). Otherwise, other problems typical of single people arise (alcohol, stimulants, casual sexual relations), leading to an increased risk of exposure. A significant problem was also the headquarters’s control over the agent, which had been dormant for years. Moreover, the aforementioned reliance on frequent travellers also posed risks, as all such individuals are often under heightened suspicion from law enforcement for potential illicit activities beyond espionage, like smuggling.
Consequently, American opponents of Soviet ’illegals’ coolly stated in one of their internal reports that, ultimately, the activities in question ’are complex, time-consuming and probably overestimated’. According to the Americans, the enormous costs of such intelligence operations are in no way commensurate with the importance of the successes achieved. The Americans also pointed out that, in fact, the activities of Soviet’ illegals’ rarely went beyond (also for mundane reasons) beyond simply ’surviving’ in the West. From the Western services’ perspective, it was their theoretical ’mobilisation’ potential in the event of war that is dangerous, rather than their actual information or penetration capabilities.
Władysław Bułhak
Dr hab., Senior Lecturer/Researcher
University of Warsaw
Institute of National Remembrance
Poland
w.bulhak2@uw.edu.pl; wladyslaw.bulhak@ipn.gov.pl
