The main difference between intelligence and diplomacy – as I used to answer when asked – is the whole starting point of intelligence. Taking the world as it is, not as we would like it to be. While both are crucial for any country, we in Europe need to learn to use them more strategically together.
The world of today is in transition. While the old rules-based order is suffering, the new set of transactional rules are not yet fully formed. What is already clear though, is that the new rules are pointing towards a world of strongmen, who again intend to divide the globe in spheres of influence. Strength and interests weigh more than values. A world where might makes right.
This is a dangerous time for European democracies. Europe has been rather slow to interpret the signs of the changing world, or act accordingly. Adversaries have started to think that Europe is risk-averse and weak. We have forgotten what war is like. People die and people suffer. Countries and governments need to make unpopular decisions and sacrifices, trying to survive. While Ukraine has been fighting for its existence, it has also bought us time to prepare for a more dangerous world. We should use this time wisely.
Only recently have we started seriously talking about building up our defence, improving our resilience or making Europe feared again. While we are now increasing our defence spending rapidly, we need to make sure we prepare for the right threats at the right times and build resilience in the right places. And to do it together. Big spending without a joint threat picture or without a common plan would be a massive missed opportunity.
At the same time, dangers of today are much more than military threats. And strength is much more than military capabilities. Finland has been an example of comprehensive security model, including a whole-of society approach to preparedness.
As part of adapting to the new realities and as part of growing stronger together, Europe could benefit from learning to use our intelligence more wisely. We need more foreign policy focus in intelligence, and we need more intelligence in foreign policy.
More intelligence in diplomacy
Intelligence diplomacy does not have a clear definition. For the most part, it is understood as merely declassifying intelligence for diplomatic objectives. Declassifying intelligence before the Russian attack on Ukraine was a very successful example, giving an early warning to Ukraine, helping to unite the global west as well as paving the way for a smoother NATO-accession for Finland and Sweden.
Secondly, intelligence diplomacy is also the term when intelligence directors are used as back-channel messengers. Talking to those parties that one cannot be seen talking to. The most famous recent example was the role of the former CIA Director Bill Burns in Russia or in the Middle East, later declassified.
However, intelligence diplomacy could also be interpreted as a much wider concept. As the use of intelligence, together with allies, or against adversaries, in order to drive common objectives or create leverage. There are lots of tools in the leverage toolbox currently, as authoritarian states have very little moral limitations for weaponizing everything from energy to immigrants.
There are real, pressing threats to European security. Some are serious and deadly, including assassinations, sabotage or extremely harmful cyber attacks. But there are also clumsy proxy projects, cheap information campaigns or practically harmless denial-of service attacks, intended merely to confuse us.
The intelligence services have the capabilities to sort out which is which. They can predict and prevent the serious ones and dismiss the lesser ones. They need to bring the uncompromised, unbiased analysis to the table. Understanding the capabilities, objectives and modus operandi of the adversary, as well as their motives, fears, concerns and red lines. While the picture is never perfect, professional Intelligence is the best tool we have for understanding and countering the adversary.
Foreign policy actors need to use that intelligence – together with other sources of information – wisely and strategically, together with allies. Identifying and exploiting the vulnerabilities of an adversary would also allow us to turn the tables and start ourselves defining the agenda and rules. Otherwise we might get stuck in an endless game of whack-a-mole.
Without the combined understanding of intelligence and diplomacy, we risk either wasting our energy on bluff operations, crying wolf too many times or even worse – failing to show strength when tested or attacked.
More foreign policy in intelligence
While the intelligence services cooperate and share intelligence effectively with partners, their links to foreign policy decision-making might not always be very strong. Their understanding of the decision-maker or his/her realities could be suboptimal. And vice versa. The foreign policy professionals might not be able to interpret the message correctly unless they understand the intelligence cycle, different methods of collection or basic rules of the intelligence analysis. There is also a necessity for a common understanding of the foreign policy needs, in order to direct intelligence collection to the topics, organizations and people that really matter.
Therefore, both sides need to join forces and make sure that the message is well constructed, delivered, received and understood. The last part is fundamental, as intelligence failures typically derive from a lack of communication or understanding between the intelligence service and the decision-maker.
Even when the process is well coordinated on a national basis, and shared with allies, there is no easy way to use it effectively together, especially in multilateral settings.
Furthermore, during the more peaceful post-Cold War period, we have intentionally, and for a good reason, created legal and other hurdles for sharing or using the intelligence more widely than is absolutely necessary. Perhaps this is the right time to reconsider the necessity and scope of those hurdles and make them suitable for the current era.
While never surrendering to a world of disorder or giving up our core values, we could still acknowledge the facts, recognize the severity and urgency of the threats and start preparing ourselves for a more dangerous world. For the world as it is.
Teemu Turunen
Ambassador of Finland to the UK
Former Deputy Director of the Finnish Security and Intelligence Service SUPO
