After the immense enthusiasm and surge of empathy and pro-Ukrainian sentiment in 2022, following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the year 2025 has brought a painful pushback. The pendulum of public mood in Poland has swung in the opposite direction. Surveys show a deteriorating attitude towards Ukraine, Ukrainians and their status in Poland. The scale of assistance provided to them have become polarizing issues in domestic political debate. This marks a change from the early weeks after the invasion, but in the long run, it represents a return to the status quo ante. At the same time, in terms of security and foreign policy, Poland and Ukraine still share a fundamental common understanding regarding the sources of threats to Europe, Russia’s strategic and tactical objectives, and the importance of U.S. engagement on the continent.
Poles largely perceive Ukraine through the lens of Ukrainian war refugees. This is now the largest group of Ukrainians in Poland, alongside economic migrants and the Ukrainian national minority of about 40,000 people, who are fully integrated into Polish society. There are nearly one million registered war refugees (with Polish PESEL numbers), and another million economic migrants, although about half of them shuttle between the two countries. The wave of labor migration to Poland followed Russia’s initial aggression in 2014. The Ukrainians adapted well in Poland, with high employment rates, particularly in services and the construction/renovation sectors, despite bureaucratic obstacles to legalizing their stay and the lack of dedicated state benefits. Over the eight years between two major inflows in 2014/2015 and 2022, Poles appreciated the Ukrainians’ diligence and sociability. Considering the scale and pace of migration, the number of incidents remained surprisingly low. For the first time since World War II, Polish society ceased to be monoethnic, and yet this encounter passed without major friction or conflict.
After February 24, 2022, Poland became the main gateway for Ukrainian war refugees. Over a dozen million them crossed Polish borders, many of whom received temporary, often months-long, shelter in Polish homes. A spontaneous outpouring of compassion for the victims of aggression, combined with fear of Russia, activated the Polish state to take multiple actions in support of Ukraine and Ukrainians. In March 2022, the parliament passed a special act, which not only implemented the EU’s Temporary Protection Directive (Directive 2001/55/EC) but also expanded upon it. For example, parents of Ukrainian children under 18 received the so-called 800+ benefit – a monthly payment of nearly €200 per child – regardless of whether the child attended school or kindergarten, or whether either parent was employed. The act also established a Relief Fund to finance support activities for the invaded country, both within Poland and abroad.
In 2022, largely thanks to Polish military aid, Ukraine managed to defend itself. As early as spring, Russian forces withdrew from northern Ukrainian regions, effectively saving the capital. In September, Ukrainian forces pushed the invaders out of Kharkiv Oblast, and in November, they reclaimed Kherson. Spirits were high in Ukraine, and preparations began for a spring offensive the following year. However, the Russians entrenched themselves, and the Ukrainian military actions brought mounting casualties instead of territorial gains. Ukraine’s financial and military resources were running out, as European stockpiles of weapons and ammunition became increasingly depleted, and the U.S. presidential campaign, ahead of the November 2024 elections, intensified. Nervousness gripped Kyiv, and its foreign policy became increasingly demanding.
The stabilization of the front in Ukraine led to a decrease in fear of Russia in Poland. The national debate, rather than being dominated by the war, shifted to the cycle of elections: parliamentary in October 2023, local in January 2024, European in June 2024, and presidential in May 2025. The campaigns were marked by increasingly sharp and simplistic messaging. One recurring topic was the decision to support full trade liberalization between the EU and Ukraine just after the invasion. This triggered a temporary influx of cheap Ukrainian grain into Poland, causing financial losses for some Polish farmers, who began organizing blockades. Ukrainian authorities downplayed the issue and the sensitive pre-election context, while continuing to demand further support. Accusations made by president Zelensky at the UN in September 2023 – alleging that Poland was helping Russia – provoked outrage across all segments of Polish public opinion. The incident also revived memories of the November 2022 event, when a stray Ukrainian missile exploded in the Polish village of Przewodów, killing two people. Kyiv did not express regret, did not pay compensation to the family, but insisted the missile was Russian, aiming to draw Poland – and by extension NATO – deeper into the war against Russia.
Against a backdrop of unjust remarks by Ukrainian authorities domestic opinions polarized, and successive election campaigns latched onto populist slogans. Russian propaganda and disinformation add fuel to the fire – social media channels were flooded with content inciting Polish hatred toward Ukrainians, stoking jealousy over Ukrainian men driving luxury cars, the attractiveness of Ukrainian women “stealing” Polish husbands, and the allegedly privileged status of Ukrainians compared to hardworking Poles. Russian trolls found fertile ground in historical disputes, particularly Ukraine’s long-standing reluctance to permit exhumations of Polish victims on its territory – not only those from the 1943–45 massacres in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia by Ukrainian nationalists, but also from the Polish–Bolshevik War of 1920 or the defense of Lviv in 1939. As a result, Ukrainians ceased to be associated with war and victimhood and instead came to be seen as demanding and cunning (Mieroszewski Centre report, 2025). Numerous public opinion polls have shown that, after a sharp drop in 2023, negative attitudes toward Ukrainians have returned to pre-invasion levels.
As in any democracy, the change in public mood was quickly seized upon by PR strategists, including those advising politicians. Consequently, the so-called ”Ukrainian question” became a hot topic in domestic political debate – only now, in contrast to three and a half years ago when politicians competed over who could help Ukrainians more, the contest has shifted to who can cut support more drastically. The dispute between the government and the president, who come from different political camps, has led to the risk of suspending not only the 800+ payments for war victims, but also the funding from the Relief Fund for storing critical Ukrainian institutional data on servers in Poland, as well as subscriptions for the Starlink systems essential to front-line communication. The latter sparked particular outrage in Ukraine, since Poland is the world leader in providing such terminals to Ukraine – as many as 30,000 – and covering their operating costs.
Despite the changing attitude toward Ukrainians, the perception of the war in Ukraine as an existential threat to Poland has not shifted. Warsaw is heavily arming itself, spending 4.8% of its GDP on defense. While between 2022 and 2024, Poland provided Ukraine with, among other things, 318 tanks, 586 armored vehicles, and 10 helicopters, it continues to support Ukraine’s war effort – by mid-September, it had sent its 47th military aid package. The total value of Polish military aid now stands at over €3 billion, and combined with humanitarian assistance, places Poland among the leading donor nations. Warsaw has also declared participation in the “coalition of the willing” and actively coordinates its policies with partners in Europe and the U.S.
In short, bilateral relations on the domestic level have in last 4 years undergone a second shift, returning to business as usual. On the international level, however, support and cooperation remain strong and intact.
Tadeusz Iwański
Head of Belarus, Ukraine & Moldova Department
Center for Eastern Studies
Warsaw
Poland
