After more than 25 years in NATO and 20 in the EU, it turns out that the Nordic-Baltic area has become the largest ‘reservoir’ of like-minded allies for Poland, where new prospects for cooperation are opened up by Finland and Sweden’s membership in the Alliance. The region has never been as integrated as it is today. As such, it features various, often overlapping formats of political and military cooperation (complemented by developing bilateral strategic partnerships). Poland is a member of several of them including the Northern Group, the Bucharest Nine, and the Council of the Baltic Sea States.
Launched in 2010, the UK-led Northern Group has been a forum for consultations among the defence ministries and military leadership of the United Kingdom, the Nordic and Baltic states, the Netherlands, Germany, and Poland. It is primarily focused on security issues in Northern Europe, including the Baltic Sea region and NATO’s northeastern flank. These meetings are also aimed at coordinating positions within NATO. Denmark hosted the most recent gathering in November 2024, which was attended by Ukraine’s minister of defence and minister of strategic industries. The discussions focused primarily on continued military support for Ukraine and cooperation with its defence industry.
Poland and the Baltic states participate in the Bucharest Nine (B9) – a platform for consultations and coordination among the leaders (heads of states) of the eastern flank countries (from Estonia to Bulgaria) ahead of NATO’s summits since 2015. In June 2024, the prime minister of Sweden and the president of Finland attended a B9 meeting for the first time. Owing to the positions of Budapest, Bratislava and partially Sofia on Russia and Ukraine (the last two B9 summits did not adopt a joint statement), the security interests of the other B9 countries are now more closely aligned with those of Sweden and Finland than with Hungary, for instance. Representatives of all Nordic states participated in this year’s B9 summit in Vilnius (2 June).
The Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) – with its permanent secretariat in Stockholm – is the only forum that includes all countries from the region except Russia (the European Union is also a member). Moscow withdrew from the organisation in May 2022, following its suspension by the Council. To date, the CBSS – spearheaded by foreign ministers – has focused on cultural and educational projects, ‘soft’ security (combating human trafficking), and sustainable development. Council’s agenda is set by a rotating one-year presidency held by successive members. On 1 July this year, Poland assumed the CBSS presidency from Estonia.
Poland remains outside two increasingly important regional groupings – the UK-led Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) and the Nordic-Baltic Eight (NB8). Established in 2014, the JEF comprises the United Kingdom, the Nordic and Baltic states, and the Netherlands. It was designed as a multi-domain rapid reaction force of like-minded partners, capable of deploying up to 10,000 troops. Although originally intended for crisis response operations beyond Europe, today its geographical centre of gravity lies in the Nordic and Baltic region, the North Atlantic, and the Arctic. The JEF has conducted regular military exercises in the Baltic Sea area. Its operational response mechanism was first activated in November 2023, following damage to the Finnish-Estonian Balticconnector gas pipeline.
The NB8 has evolved from a mechanism used by the Nordic countries to support the Euro-Atlantic integration of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia into a platform for coordinating actions and advancing shared interests, particularly in the fields of foreign and security policy. The format is well-tailored to small, like-minded countries in the region, enabling them to present a unified position on key issues. Cooperation within the NB8 intensified following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Over the past three years, Nordic-Baltic consultations have focused on supporting Ukraine and Moldova, tightening sanctions against Russia and its ‘shadow fleet’, strengthening NATO’s north-eastern flank, countering hybrid operations, increasing resilience to non-military threats, expanding energy cooperation and coordinating actions towards Belarus and Georgia. The platform currently includes summits of heads of government, meetings of foreign and defence ministers, state secretaries, and MPs, as well as joint visits to third countries. Each year, a different capital chairs the NB8 (Copenhagen in 2025). In 2024, Sweden, which acted in this capacity, invited the Polish foreign minister and prime minister to the NB8’s meetings. Last April, the group held its first meeting with representatives of the Weimar Triangle at foreign minister level.
In order to reinforce the northern pillar of its foreign and security policy, Poland should consider partnering with the JEF by participating in its military exercises in the Baltic Sea region and coordinating positions with the NB8 more frequently. Furthermore, Warsaw should support the continued involvement of the Nordic countries in the B9, without ruling out a formal expansion of the platform. Poland should also use its CBSS presidency to transform the organisation in line with the recommendations set out in the report by Toomas H. Ilves and Gabrielius Landsbergis on future orientation of the Council (2025). The CBSS could assume a greater role in regional cooperation to counter Russian hybrid threats. That should include the protection of critical underwater infrastructure in the Baltic Sea and hindering Russia’s ‘shadow fleet’.
Piotr Szymański
Senior Fellow
Security and Defence Department
Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW)
Poland
