‘Foresight Intelligence’ means different things depending on the policy, intelligence practitioner and academic audience. Foresight Intelligence in the United States has frequently been referred as ‘estimative intelligence’ and in Australia the term ‘strategic intelligence’ is used. Semantics aside, most can agree on a few overarching principles on what foresight intelligence is and does. First, unlike ‘here and now’ tactical intelligence or short to medium term operational intelligence, foresight is generally focused on over the horizon threats risks and hazards where intelligence, signals and indicators and therefore pattern recognition remain difficult. What is meant by ‘over the horizon’ varies widely depending on the context under which the foresight intelligence is being applied. A second principle of foresight intelligence is that it exists because our intelligence communities have a duty to warn and reduce uncertainty for policy makers, so they can prevent, disrupt or mitigate emerging threats, risks and hazards.
The Five Eyes Intelligence Alliance and Foresight Intelligence
It may seem strange at first glance thinking about the Five Eyes and Baltic states foresight intelligence cooperation in the same sentence. After all, most Five Eyes countries (United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand) except for the United Kingdom are geographically distant from the Baltic states. Yet in this article, I argue the current global security environment underscores how much more the Five Eyes intelligence alliance could do with Baltic states to improve mutual understanding of emerging threats, risks and hazards.
Not all Five Eyes alliance partners have produced the same volume of foresight intelligence nor developed necessarily deep expertise in it. The United States historically has a longer tradition of producing foresight analysis then perhaps the United Kingdom and Australia. Long tradition of course does not always translate into better foresight analysis. The faulty national intelligence assessments by the US leading up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq or more recently the diverse views within the US IC about the origins of the COVID-19 pandemic show foresight analysis is not only analytically difficult but becomes more so in highly politicised environments. But the 80-year history of the Five Eyes alliance has resulted in all five countries (regardless of varying capability) developing foresight analytical knowledge and capabilities they share. While the second Trump Administration’s unpredictable approach to allies including within the Five Eyes is placing some strain on the alliance at the political level, it is likely it will remain intact in the future. But the uncertain political environment in Washington where long-standing alliances have become more transactional than values based, does mean the other Five Eyes countries need to identify additional initiatives for strengthening the relevance of the alliance and their contribution to Washington. An increasingly multi-polar world also means liberal democracies have a range of other opportunities for intelligence cooperation beyond the Five Eyes intelligence alliance. In such an environment the Five Eyes needs to adapt and reinvent itself for both its member states but also to demonstrate relevance for other liberal democracies where interests intersect. In an ever increasing uncertain and volatile global security environment, one way the Five Eyes alliance can remain relevant is by sharing and expanding its foresight intelligence knowledge more comprehensively than hitherto has been the case with likeminded liberal democratic Baltic states.
Five Eyes and Baltic States Foresight Intelligence cooperation
All Five Eyes countries have deepening bilateral intelligence exchanges and cooperation with many Baltic states particularly since the Russian war in Ukraine. Three of the five Eyes countries (US, Canada and UK) also have significant multilateral opportunities for intelligence cooperation with many Baltic states through NATO. But not all Five Eyes countries have extensive intelligence cooperation with the Baltic states. Yet intersecting global and emerging security interests (e.g. Russia, China, critical infrastructure, hybrid warfare, human trafficking, global health security and human trafficking) suggest the Five Eyes alliance and Baltic states as collectives could benefit significantly from sharing foresight capabilities and knowledge. How should this be done in a practical sense? There are two broad pathways to progress this initiative. First, there is a political/policy dimension where all Five Eyes and Baltic countries underscore the political will to cooperate more broadly on sharing foresight intelligence knowledge. An example of this would be for political leaders in each country to send a senior representative of their intelligence communities to an intelligence exchange hosted by a Baltic country such as Finland, Germany, Poland or Sweden. Perhaps given Poland currently has the Presidency of the Council of the Baltic Sea States it could be hosted there. This high-level intelligence exchange would provide a regular forum for Five Eyes and Baltic states heads of intelligence to exchange foresight assessments on emerging threats risks and hazards of mutual interest and to identify collection and analytical gaps in knowledge. A second dimension to improving foresight intelligence cooperation could include a range of working level activities focused on improving practice and enhancing capabilities. On practice, a virtual foresight analytical community of practice on intelligence priorities could be co-chaired (one Five Eyes and one Baltic nation) to test key judgments and improve foresight assessments. University researchers with intelligence and defence programs and experience working with their respective intelligence agencies could also be invited to open-source forums aimed at helping intelligence analysts work on complex foresight analysis. On capabilities, heads of intelligence agencies (for Five Eyes and Baltic states) could establish a technical working group to identify ways to improve foresight intelligence collection, analysis and anomaly detection using AI and other machine learning techniques. Such measures would have tangible benefits for global security but particularly in Europe and the Indo-Pacific.
Patrick F. Walsh
Professor, Intelligence and Security Studies
Charles Sturt University
Australia
