Kimmo Elo: Germany’s liberal democracy under pressure: China and Russia as the most active “foreign powers”

Germany’s position as the EU’s most influential democratic system has made it one of the main targets for authoritarian states seeking to undermine liberal democracy. Its strong and diversified economy also attracts scientific and corporate espionage. Yet, from the perspective of political stability, the more serious concern lies in the growing attempts to destabilise Germany’s liberal-democratic order. These efforts have become more visible since Russia’s anti-Western rhetoric escalated into full-scale war against Ukraine. However, China’s ambitions to rise as a global superpower cannot be overlooked, as they contribute to increasing pressure on European liberal democracies.”

The Zeitenwende (juncture) declared by Chancellor Olaf Scholz in response to Russia’s invasion also reflects a shift in Germany’s security and threat assessments. An interesting loophole into this change is provided by the 2024 annual report of The German domestic intelligence services (Verfassungsschutz), published in June 2025. The report highlights intensified influence operations by Russia and China, with cyber activities playing a central role. Both states possess increasingly advanced capabilities to conduct large-scale, sophisticated cyber operations, which are difficult to counter and result in financial damage and massive data breaches.

Although Russia and China share the strategic goal of weakening liberal-democratic systems and reducing the resilience of Germany and the EU, their operational approaches differ. Russia, facing extensive sanctions since 2022, has maintained high levels of activity, focusing on traditional intelligence targets such as foreign policy, security policy, EU affairs, and NATO. It seeks influence in EU energy policy and German domestic politics, targeting elections, political parties, and decision-makers to identify actors who may serve Russian interests.

Operationally, Russia has been challenged by the closure of its legal residencies. Russia has responded by intensifying intelligence gathering through contacts and open sources. It has also deployed “low-level agents” — individuals without formal intelligence training — for one-off sabotage and espionage missions. Alarmingly, Russia appears willing to use direct violence against individuals if it believes this will help it to achieve strategic goals.

China’s objectives in Germany, particularly in political intelligence and influence, are similar to Russia’s but pursued with greater subtlety and long-term strategy. This makes Chinese operations harder to detect. China has long been active in scientific and technical espionage, exploiting the openness of global academic networks. German authorities, like those in Finland, have begun educating e.g. researchers about related security risks. China also appears more adept than Russia at integrating human intelligence (HUMINT) with technical and open-source intelligence.

A common feature of both Russia’s and China’s intelligence operations is their centralised control from Moscow or Beijing, respectively. Intelligence priorities are set at high political levels, an observation being rather typical for foreign intelligence from historical perspective. For counter-intelligence, this requires activities and competences moving away from a simple identification of individual spies toward an improved understanding of broader strategic intentions. This is especially important given Europe’s uncertain security environment and the unpredictability of U.S. intelligence sharing. Should the U.S. reduce its cooperation, German (and European) security assessments could face serious blind spots.

Recently, German authorities have warned about the potential misuse of democratic mechanisms by authoritarian forces. There are concerns that foreign powers may exploit parliamentary processes to gain access to classified information for strategic purposes, possibly with “useful idiots” or actively collaborating MPs. This highlights the “dual-use” risks inherent in liberal-democratic structures as well. Awareness of such systemic vulnerabilities is essential to defending liberal democracy. Undermining democracy through its own mechanisms is not just Germany’s problem—it affects all European liberal democracies. The more these risks are recognised, the less room there is for abuse.