The 2019 intelligence legislation package introduced legislation on strategic intelligence to Finnish law. The package included legislation on civilian intelligence, military intelligence, the use of network traffic intelligence in civilian intelligence, and intelligence oversight. Before the enactment of the 2019 legislation, Finland was one of the few remaining countries in the European Union without specialised intelligence legislation. The need for intelligence legislation in Finland was based on the changes in the global security environment, and on the increased importance of the cyber environment in the context of national security. The enactment of the legislation also served to show how ubiquitous a tool intelligence has become in liberal democracies.
The goal of intelligence is to achieve a decision-advantage using the foreknowledge that well-timed and high-quality intelligence information can yield. Modern strategic intelligence is characterised by an expansive field of acceptable targets: strategic intelligence no longer focuses on the military and espionage activity of other states alone. The new types of asymmetric threats and hybrid activities carried out by both state and non-state actors have become key targets of strategic intelligence along with global terrorism and serious international organised crime. The line between internal and external security has faded as societies have undergone digitalisation, resulting in the critical functions of the state becoming dependent on digital systems and networks. This has created new vulnerabilities that can be exploited with very little resources by hostile actors.
With the importance of foreknowledge in countering the new types of threats, it is not surprising that democratic states have come to adopt strategic intelligence as a part of their security apparatus. There is, however, an inherent tension between intelligence and democracy. Intelligence is defined by secrecy, lack of transparency, challenges related to accountability and oversight, and the special nature of intelligence agencies compared to other parts of the government. Intelligence also has power implications, as it centralises power through information control to the executive. In contrast, democracy is based on openness, transparency, predictability, and accountability, as well as decentralised power through the separation of powers.
Because of this inherent dissonance between intelligence and democracy, democratic states must find a way to control and minimise the risks intelligence poses to democracy. The key to this is the process of democratisation of intelligence. Establishing a credible independent intelligence oversight system and the juridification of intelligence – creating a legal basis for the intelligence agencies and their intelligence powers – are key components of the democratisation process. Oversight is necessary in order to ensure the legality and accountability of intelligence activities, and juridification makes intelligence visible and a part of the legal system, as it is not democratically acceptable that intelligence boils down to secret activity carried out by secret organisations. Democratisation of intelligence is a process that describes the relationship between a given state’s core values – democracy, rule of law, and human rights – and its intelligence apparatus. As such, it is entirely possible for democratisation to regress, if any of its elements are weakened.
Rule of law is currently under pressure in Western democracies, and a portion of the pressure stems from the unstable global security environment and the intensifying securitisation caused by it. Feelings of insecurity can lead to the notion that the less constraints the state’s intelligence apparatus has, the more effectively it can guard national security. After all, the authoritarian states causing insecurity are not known for caring about the democratic legitimacy of their intelligence services. This line of thinking contains a grave misconception about the nature of democratically legitimate intelligence. First of all, the democratic principles and rule of law prevent the intelligence services becoming too autonomous and unfocused. Secondly, the principles help to ensure that the personnel of the services are qualified and well-trained. Thirdly, democratically legitimate intelligence helps maintain societal trust towards the authorities by ensuring accountability and providing legal safeguards. Societies without trust are fragile: this is why many authoritarian and totalitarian states eventually crumble from within. Intelligence services in a democratic state are not tasked to only protect the survival of the state, but protect the survival of the state as a liberal democracy, and in this task, the principles and oversight of democratically legitimate intelligence are a strength, not a weakness.
Joonas Widlund
D.Sc. (Admin.), Postdoctoral Researcher
School of Management, Public Law
University of Vaasa
Finland
