In the last ten years, there have been numerous discussions in the academic and professional community about how, in what way, and by what methods and means modern security challenges (hybrid threats including AI) can be most effectively countered. Ultimate goal of hybrid threats is to shape the information environment of the attacked audience; influence their cognitive processes and thus the decisions that are made. If the information attacker cannot influence the content of the decision that the target audience (TA) makes, the attacker will try to influence the timing of those decisions. Either to make decisions too early or too late. If attacker wants to be successful, must carefully monitor the entire process of managing the information environment as well as the results of its actions. The efficiency of the entire process is based on information, knowledge and intelligence. The better and more reliable the information collected, processed and delivered and delivered on time, the greater the chances that the target set in the attacker’s plans will be better realized.
It can be concluded that in the gravitational centre of a hybrid attacker is intelligence. Depending on the level of goals set, it can be strategic, but also operational as well as tactical. It is important to note here that tactical intelligence can also achieve effective results in the strategic domain. A good example of this is the fact that Croatia managed to eavesdrop on the telephone communications of Serbian President Milošević by tactical means during the Croatia’s Homeland War. This was for strategic decision-makers in Croatia from crucial importance. The intelligence we collected enabled an in-depth understanding of the content and manner of decision-making content and time on the aggressor’s side and created the preconditions according to which Croatia, slowly but surely, began to achieve a state of information supremacy during the War.
Intelligence is upgraded knowledge. We recognize strategic intelligence as one of the key components of achieving a state of information supremacy. Better and deeper knowledge of the context of processes of the adversary (political, informational, military, cultural, social, economic, security, international) decrease the amount of intelligence that we need to understand the threat, and to be able to plan defensive and, if necessary, offensive countermeasures against a hybrid attacker. This brings us to the centre of this opinion. Given that in the gravitational centre of the attacker’s plans, their realization, monitoring of effectiveness and making corrections is the intelligence, and response of the defence system, should be like that.
The starting points of defence activities are:
- the ability to acquire strategic intelligence that should indicate early warning signal, identify planners, authors and implementers;
- possible vectors of attack(s),
- the timing of the launch of one or more attack vectors;
- ways and models of increasing the effectiveness of the attacker’s actions.
That brings us to education. How can we start new, or enrich existing, study programs with the study of Intelligence and Security Knowledge? How to reconcile the need to educate future experts for the needs of modern and future conflicts and wars with the need to adhere to the necessary levels of secrecy that the intelligence communities require?
Intelligence and Security studies should produce specialists who will:
- be without prejudices,
- know the doctrines, strategies, plans, intentions and abilities of the adversary and who will observe him through the lens of the adversary and not through his own lens,
- be able to read the information between the lines,
- be able to recognize and isolate the necessary and useful information content (signal) from the huge amount of available (dis)information (information noise),
- have the ability to think critically,
- be able to communicate with the power of arguments and not with the argument of power,
- be able to make decisions in situations of incomplete information security and under stress, learn from them, quickly identify possible errors and correct them,
- be able to actively collaborate with other experts at national and international level;
- not give in to the political correctness because political correctness is detrimental to the effective planning and operation of any defense system (it prevents the proper, accurate and reliable recognition of threats and the identification of their causes), and
- have the knowledge, will, time and ability to recognize and deal with the causes of security problems and not only with their consequences.
An analysis of conflicts and wars from the end of the last century to the present day clearly shows that no one will be able to win any conflict and war if remains alone. Without partners, friends, allies. Anyone who loses the ability to create and effectively use strategic intelligence, as well as those who do not constantly develop the existing educational programs and technology associated with it, will be an easier victim for a hybrid attacker. This will weaken not only its defense capabilities as well as societal resilience, but also those international associations of which that country is a member.
Gordan Akrap
Associate Professor, Vice Rector
Dr. Franjo Tuđman Defense and Security University
Zagreb
Croatia
Gordan.akrap@sois-ft.hr
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