The Republic of Ireland is in a unique and very difficult security position in terms of both geography and politics. It sits on the western flank of Europe, exposed to the Atlantic, and with the main communications between Europe and continental America concentrated in its territorial waters off its southwest coast. Politically, it plays an important role in international security, with regular membership of the UN Security Council, and is at the heart of Europe through membership of the EU. Its geographic and political position have made it a regular target for probing and incursions in the physical and digital worlds but, in common with many small states, Ireland lacks the level of ‘hard power’ necessary for its defence. Other European small states have done what they can individually to provide for their own defence while also joining collective defence institutions. Ireland, however, is constrained by its constitution, its neutrality and the Triple Lock mechanism, all of which limit the extent to which it can build up its armed forces and fully engage in collective defence. This paper argues that if Ireland were to develop an effective national intelligence infrastructure to provide strategic forewarning of potential threats, this would considerably enhance its security by enabling more informed decisions and supporting a policy of pragmatic dynamic neutrality.
Ireland is not completely without an intelligence capability. The Irish Defences Forces and An Garda Síochána provide military and security intelligence about potential threats to the State, and its overseas interests. But useful as this is, it is insufficient for Ireland’s needs. The existing intelligence services provide current and warning intelligence but are limited in their ability to provide strategic intelligence or the kind of in-depth national intelligence estimates required for decision-making on international issues. Expanding the remit of these organisations to include that task would be a mistake; it would put an undue strain on their resources and distract them from their core missions. A separate national intelligence agency, in whatever form, with a clear chain of responsibility to government (under a designated Minister), and with oversight and accountability built in from the start, will ensure that decision-makers receive the strategic and estimative intelligence they need.
An important first step towards establishing a national intelligence agency in Ireland would be to allay fears that, shrouded in secrecy, it will engage in activities that are not commensurate with Ireland’s values of neutrality and respect for international rules-based order. But, by making legitimacy and trust the cornerstones of intelligence, Ireland can go a long way towards building an effective intelligence service within its established principles. Engaging with academic thought and research on these issues can provide some practical ways forward, especially if we look beyond the usual examples of the UK and the USA.
For example, since its creation, the UN has resisted a formal intelligence function and, in fact, the word ‘intelligence’ was even banned. The steady increase in attacks against UN missions and peacekeepers led the UN to change this position and establish an intelligence capability. Following extensive consultations with member states, intelligence leaders, academics and other stakeholders, the UN overcame objections to the creation of this function by being very explicit about its purpose and method of operation, putting clear boundaries on the activities it would undertake and providing for oversight and accountability. While it is unlikely that Ireland will limit intelligence activity to the same extent as the UN, there is a model here for establishing intelligence as a legitimate function of the state and a national intelligence agency as the legitimate organ of state to conduct that function.
In terms of trust in institutions, Ireland ranks alongside nations such as Denmark and the Netherlands, and much higher than the UK, with the 2023 OECD Survey on Drivers of Trust in Institutions showing very high public trust in the police, the courts, and the civil service. The Netherlands, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, and Finland, all of which are also considered high trust societies, have developed and enhanced their intelligence agencies without suffering a loss in public trust and there is a growing body of work from those states that Ireland can draw on and from which it can take important lessons. None of these countries is perfect and all have had their intelligence scandals, but they provide useful lessons to learn from and frameworks for thinking about how intelligence fits into the relationship between state and society, and how intelligence agencies in these societies interact with the rest of the international system.
Good intelligence is essential for strategic warning and effective decisionmaking. By being clear from the outset about the role, activities and purpose of intelligence, and learning from societies and organisations with similar values, Ireland can – and should – establish an effective intelligence service that will enable it to navigate the complex contemporary security landscape.
David Strachan-Morris
Dr., Lecturer in Intelligence and Security
School of History, Politics and International Relations
University of Leicester
United Kingdom
